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Digitized by the Internet Archive 
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http://www.archive.org/details/conversationsonsOOelye 



CONVERSATiaNS 



ON THE 



SCIENCE 



OF THE 



HUMAN MIND. 






X y 



eONVERSATIONS 



ON THE 



SCIENCE 



OF THE 



HUMAN MIND, 



BY EZRA STILES ELY, D. D. 

Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the City of Philadelphia. 



PHILADELPHIA: 

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR. 

SOLD Br A. FINLEY, CGBJfEIl OF CHESI^UT AKD JOURTH STREETS. 

William Fry, Printer, 
1S\9. 






Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to wit: 

******** 3J, YY REMEMBERED, that on the nineteenth day of 
I Seal. * April, in the forty -third year of the Independence of the 
******** United States of 'America, A. D^,, 1819, Ezra Stiles Ely, 

D. D. of the said District, hath deposited in this office the title of 

a Book, the right whereof he claims as author, in the words following, 

to wit: 

" Conversations on the Science of the Human Mind. By Ezra Stiles 
Ely, D. D. Pastor of the Third Presbyterian Church in the city of 
Philadelphia." 

In conformity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, 
entitled, *' An Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing 
the Copies of Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprie- 
tors of such Copies, during the times therein mentioned." — And also 
to the Act, entitled, "an Act supplementary to an Act, entitled, " an 
Act for the encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of 
Maps, Charts, and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such 
Copies during the times therein mentioned," and extending the be- 
nefits thereof to the Arts of designing, engraving, and etching histo- 
I'ical and other, Prints." 

D. CALDWELL, 
Clerk of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 



^"^ 



,^^^ 



Contents, ix 

Uses of the word Taste.— -Emotions. — Description of the principal 
Affections of Man. — A rule concerning inordinate Affection. — Re- 
gard. Page lOS 



CONVERSATION XI. 

Account of the Human Passions. — Lawful Passions. — Some general 
Ijaws of Feeling. — Sympathy, Commisei-ation, Compassion, defin- 
ed. — Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of 
our Mental Nature. ' 125 



CONVERSATION XII. 

The Faculty of Volition, or the Will. — Some contemplated action 
the object of every Volition. — Desire and Preference different from 
Volition. — The Will a dependent Faculty. — Perception and Con- 
ception the only independent Faculties of the Mind. — Definition of 
Volition and Motive. — Inducement and JSIolive distinguished. — 
Several general Rules concerning Volition. — An Inference concern- 
ing the importance of regulating oar Thoughts. 133 



CONVERSATION XIII. 

The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. — An Operation of this Faculty 
distinguished. — Prnof of the Existence of this Faculty. — Objects of 
our Efficiency. — Some Operations of Man that are ordinarily per- 
formed without Volition, may be performed from Voluntary Exer- 
tion. — How the Mind exerts aQ Agency on the Body is unknown 
by us. — The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental 
Faculties considered. — On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep- 
tion, &c. 144 



CONVERSATION XIV. 

Consideration of several Attributes of the Soul which are not inhe- 
rent. — Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity. — Of Physica\ 
Liberty and Necessity. — Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and 
Metaphysical Necessities. 161 



Contents, 



CONVERSATION XV. 



Disposition of Mind. — Inclination. — Habit.— Imitation. — Consideration 
of several Principles of Human Actions. — Principles of Substances, 
Sciences, Actions, and Moral Actions. — Sentiments. — Instinct. — 
Instinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations. Page 173 



CONVERSATION XVI. 

Several Complex Operations of Man considered.— Attention, Obser- 
vation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem- 
I)lation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.— 
Compounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name given to 
several successive Conceptions. 186 



CONVERSATION XVII. 

Improvement and Injui'y of the Original Faculties of the Mind. — They 
have their Infantile state — Exercise and Discipline the chief means 
of their Improvement. — Insanity, a state of mind resulting from 

' some Injury. — Dreaming. 200 



CONVERSATION XVIII. 

Comparative Mental Science. 208 



CONVERSATION XIX. 

Recapitulation of the Principal Doctrines, taught in the preceding 
Conversations. 218 







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PREFACE, 



The writer of the following pages has endea- 
voured to exhibit, in a familiar manner, the Ele- 
ments OF THE Science of the Human Mind. 
The sources whence he has drawn his doctrines, 
are his own consciousness, memory, and reflection; 
and the writings of Locke, Hume, Price, Hart- 
ley, Lord Karnes, Reid, Stewart, Duncan, Pre- 
sident Edwards, Beattie, Watts, Condillac, and 
Cogan. What he deems true, and most important 
in all these celebrated authors, will be found in this 
compendium. He disclaims all metaphysics but those 
of commoJi sense. 

He flatters himself, that these Conversations will 
prove beneficial to Students in Law, Medicine, and 
Divinity,* and to the most^ intelligent young ladies 
of our country. 

No science is so intimately connected with all 
other systematic arrangements of knowledge as that 
of v/hich he has here treated; and he cannot but 
hope, therefore, that many who have neither time 
nor patience to peruse many volumes, will do him 
the honour of thoroughly examining one. 

Philadelphia, January 1st, 1819. 
A 2 



CONTENTS. 



CONVERSATION I. 

Introduction. — The chief Obstruction to the Advancement of the 
Science of the Soul. — Its utility. Page IS 



CONVERSATION 11. 

The Human Soul defined. — Consciousness. — Judgment. — Axioms.— 
Substances.— Attributes. — Mind and Matter distinct things. 21 



CONVERSATION III. 

Faculty defined.— Body. — Simple and Complex Operations.— Essen- 
tial and Incidental Attributes —Ten Faculties of the Human Mind 
enumerated. — All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for 
all his Actions. 32 



CONVERSATION IV. 

Definitions.— Genus and Species. — The Faculty of Perception. — Five 
kinds of Perceptions. — Instrumentality of bodily Organs.— Conscious- 
ness. 39 



CONVERSATION V. 

The Faculty of Understanding or Conception. — Different Operations 
of this Faculty. — Imagination. — Discernment. Comprehension. — 
Apprehension. — Intuition. — Some general laws of Conception. — 
The Importance of this Faculty. SI 



viii Contents. 



CONVERSATION VI. 

The Faculty of Judging. — Objects of Judgment. — A Truth. — A False- 
hood — Classification of Judgments. — They are Constitutional or 
Acquired. — The former are consequent on Consciousness, Percep- 
tion, (Conception, Memory or Conscience. — The latter result from 
Reflection, Reasoning, or Testimony. — Believing considered. 

Page 59 



CONVERSATION VII. ) 



The Faculty of Memory. — Objects of Memory. — Local Memory.— 
Classification of the Operations of Memory. — Recollection. — Re 
membrance. — Memory essential to some Conceptions. — Time. — 
Duration. — Futurity. — Identity o — Knowledge of our own .continued 
Mental Identity. — Personal Identity. 76 



CONVERSATION VIII. 

The Faculty of Reasoning. — Premises. — Conclusion.— A Syllogism.— 
Classification of Reasonings. — Demonstrative and Probable Reason- 
ings. — Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings. — Analogical, 
Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings. — Reasonings a priori, a poste- 
riori, ad absurdurn, and ad homiuem. 89 



CONVERSATION IX. 

The Faculty of Conscience. — Proof that all men have this FacuHy. — 
Other names fpr the same thing. — Some general Observations and 
LaM's concerning the Operations of Conscience. — Operations of Con- 
science always occasion certain Feelings. 101 



CONVERSATION X. 

The Faculty of Feeling. — Feelings distinguished from other, Mental 
Operation's. — One general Law of Feelings. — Classification of all 
Human Feelings.—Sensations considered. — Three Appetites. — 



CONVERSATIONS. 



-- i 



CONVERSATIONS 



ON THE 



SCIENCE 



OF THE 



HUMAN MIND. 



CONVERSATION I. 

Introduction.^ — The chief obstruction to the advancement of the 
Science of the Soul.' — Its utility. 

Pupil. You have proposed, Sir, to conduct me 
through the thorny maze of Metaphysics; and I 
design to follow you, if not with equal steps, at least 
with equal ardour. Once, 1 confess, that I hated 
every thing that could be denominated metaphysics. 

Professor. You would make me promise too 
much. I have only proposed to teach you the ru- 
diments of the science of the human soitl^ which de- 
partment of knowledge is expressed, in a modern 
classification of universal science, by the term An- 
thropsychia; but which is rather indefinitely called 
" The Philosophy of the Human Mind," by all our 
ancient writers. This specific science is only one 
branch of metaphysics^ which treats of the nature, 

B 



14 Principal Obstructions to 

relations, and operations of all substances and their 
attributes. But tell me, why do you speak of the 
thorny maze of metaphysics; and why did you hate 
the name of this extensive science? 

PupiL Because I thought all metaphysical reason- 
ings unintelligible and useless; especially if they re- 
lated to the human soul. Until you constrained me 
to study the works of Dr. Reid and his successor, 
Professor Stewart, I was ready to despair of obtain- 
ing any distinct and satisfactory conceptions on this 
subject. 

Professor, Whence arose your principal difficul- 
ties in attempting to acquire a thorough acquaint- 
ance with the human soul? 

Pupil. I had not learned, that in mental science 
a man must primarily regard his own consciousness 
of what passes within himself, and look to it for the 
facts from which he is to reason; just as the natural 
philosopher looks to his perception of external ob- 
jects for all the phenomena, whence he is to derive 
those general observations, which are called the 
laws of nature. In the next place, the writers with 
whom r was conversant, did not appear to be mas- 
ters of their subject. 

Professor, And what is your chief obstruction 
now? 

PupiL It is either the imperfection of language, 
or else the imperfect use which metaphysical writers 
have made of the terms which they possess;* and I 
am not able at present to determine which. 



* A specimen of the improper use of terms, and of metaphysical 
jargou, may be given from Hume's Treatise of Human J^ature^ vol. i. 



Mental Science. lo 

Professor, It will be my business to convince you, 
by actual experiment, I hope, that were the same 
precision of language to be adopted in teaching that 
which is known of the human soul, as has prevailed 
in natural philosophy and mathematics, there might 
be made as great advances, and enjoyed as much 
certainty in Anthrcpsychia^ as in the two last 
sciences. The same word has been used by the 
same writer in two or three different senses, inter- 
changeably; and two terms have been adopted to 
denote in some instances, the same, and in others 
different objects. Nothing has contributed so much 



p. 29. *' An impression first strikes upon the senses, and makes us 
perceive heat and cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain, of some 
kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, 
which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. 
This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces 
the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may 
be properly called impressions of reflection, because derived from it. 
These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become 
ideas; which, perhaps, in their turn, give rise to other impressions 
and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent 
to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and 
derived from them. The examination of our sensations belongs more 
to anatomists and natural philosophers than to moral;- and therefore 
shall not at present be entered upon.**^ 

Any body who can disentangle this skein of terms will obtain more 
credit for his patience than for his intelligence; and were all meta- 
physics like those of Hume, we should advise mankind to waste no 
time upon them. In the language of common sense, an Impression can 
be made, strictly speaking, on nothing but material objects. Impres- 
sions are made on our bodily organs of sense; but in the mind there 
are no impressions, unless by a figure of speech we call our percep' 
tions or conceptions, by that name. In some places, Mr. Hume speaks 
oi perceptions when he writes the word " impr'essionsi" and of the 
conception of oxxf perceptions, when he talks of ** ideas or copies of 
impressions." 



16 Precision in Terma 

to produce your thorny maze as the want of defini- 
tions for important terms, and a strict adherence to 
them when given.* Even President Edwards in his 
" Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will," uses the 
word necessity to denote a physical necessity, and 
sometimes nothing more than the certain futurition 
of an event; in such a manner as to produce no lit- 
tle obscurity. Locke uses the words understanding 
and ideas without much precision; for the first he 



* "The difference in the meaning affixed to words, by different wri- 
ters, is one of the greatest impediments to the discoveries of moral 
truths, and the most difficult to surmount. Complex terms being fre- 
quently composed of many parts, and each pai-t intermixing its own 
signification, they are frequently exposed to different constructions: 
and in controversial subjects, if two authors annex different ideas to 
the same term, they are taking different courses, and Avill soon steer 
out of sight of each others argument. Dr. Reid has justly expatiated 
apon the necessity of accurate definitions, without his having always 
made them; and his pupil. Dr. Beattie, has very seldom regarded 
them. Even that great master of reason, Mr. Locke, who has written 
Jn so satisfactory a manner on the errors occasioned by the abuse of 
words, has involved some of his ideas in great obscurity, through the 
want of due attention to their precise import. Perhaps no philosopher, 
ancient or modern, has taken greater liberties with language than 
Mr. Hume."— Co^aw'5 Ethical Questions. 

**I know that there are not words enough in any language, to an- 
swer all the variety of ideas that enter into man's discourses and rea- 
sonings. But this hinders not that when any one uses any term he 
may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, 
and" to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present 
discourse. When he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends 
to dear and distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so. Therefore, there 
can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, when terms are 
made use of, which have not such a precise determination." — Locke. 

" There is no greater impediment to the advancemeut of knowledge 
than the arhbiguity of words. To this chiefly it is owing that we find 
sects and parties in most branches of science; and disputes, which 
are carried on from age to age, without being brought to an issue."—" 
Reid. 



absolutely Necessary* 17 

calls a single faculty in some places, and in others 
it includes the whole human soiil^ with the exception 
of the ivilL By ideas he sometimes intends notions, 
conceptions, or opinions, and sometimes images of 
the objects of perception, which he supposes to be 
conveyed to the mind. Reid and Stewart also use 
several terms, such as faculty and power^ both 
as synonymous and not synonymous; while they 
employ many other words, about the meaning of 
which mankind do not agree, without accurately 
describing the meaning which they attach to those 
symbols of thought. I am senaible, that the preci- 
sion of language which I have prescribed to myself 
in our conversations, will render my style formal 
and dry; but I flatter myself, that what is lost in 
ease and sprightliness of diction, will be amply 
compensated for by the certainty of the knowledge 
acquired. 

Pupil, Before you proceed to propose your sys- 
tem, Sir, will you have the goodness to state wherein 
consists the usefulness of the science of the human 
soul? May we not think and reason, feel and act, 
while we remain in utter ignorance of it?^ 



* " 'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, 
to human nature; and that however wide anj' of them mar seem to 
run from it, they still return back by one passage or another. Even 
JMathematics, J\atural Philosophy^ and JS^atural Religion^ are in 
some measure dependent on the science of Max; since they lie under 
the cognizance of man, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 
'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might 
make in these sciences, were we thoroughly acquainted with the 
extent and force of human understanding, and could explain the na- 
ture of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in 
reasoning. There is no question of importance, whose decision is not 
B 2 



1 8 Utility of the Science 

Professor, Can you seriously ask, of what use is 
this science? Surely it must be profitable to man to 
understand the nature of his own bodily organs; for 
otherwise he could not employ them aright. You 
would laugh at him who should persist in attempt- 
ing to walk on his hands, to see with his ears, to 
hear with his eyes, and to write with his lips. Of 
how much greater importance must it be for him 
to understand the nature, number, and operations 
of the faculties of the intelligent, sensitive, and ef- 
ficient part of his complex being? The inherent 
parts of the constitution of our souls are like mental 



comprised in the science of man; and there is none, ^vbich can be 
decided Mith any certainty, before we become acquainted -with that 
science. In pretending, therefore, to explain the principles of human 
nature, we in effect propose a complete system of the sciences, built 
on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they 
can stand with any security. And, as the science of man is the only 
solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid foundation we 
can give to this science itself must be laid on experience and obser- 
vation." — Hume's Treatise on Human JVature. 

By quoting some admirable sayings from Mr. Hume, we shall not 
render ourselves I'esponsible for his numerous errors. Mental science 
is built upon consciousness; which Mr Hume calls experience; and 
the testimony of others concerning their consciousness. Our know- 
ledge of the operations of our own minds and of the minds of other 
people, he wouW say we have by experience and observation. His re- 
mark, that mental science lays a foundation for " a complete system 
of the sciences," has been verified in the review of Judge Woodward's 
splendid work on Universal Science, contained in the Anakctic Ma- 
gazine, vol. ix. p. 89, 105, 106. 

1 have there evinced, that a systematic arrangement of all hu- 
man sciences may be founded on the operations of two fp.culties, 
perception and conception; for all our knowledge is of things per- 
ceived through the organs of sense, or of tliings conceived of by the 



of the Human Mind, 19 

©rgans, by which we perform our mental work and 
appropriate our own intellectual activity to the pro- 
motion of our happiness. To know ourselves, is to 
be prepared for profitable exertions, and a cheerful 
discharge of duty. If you are thoroughly versed in 
the science which you are now pursuing, you will 
be able to refer every duty enjoined to the ori- 
ginal constitution of your mind by which it is to be 
performed; you will be able to make accurate dis- 
criminations; will profitably classify the objects of 
your thoughts; will be prepared to investigate every 
other science, by knowing the foundation of human 
reasoning, and the talents which we have received 
for cultivating it; will be. able to detect error and 
defend the truth; and in short will experience all 
the advantages which knowledge can boast over ig-, 
norance. No man can reason well in any science, 
or employ his knowledge to advantage, any farther 
than he is a good, practical metaphysician. The 
utility of the science of the human soul will, how- 
ever, best appear from the developement of the sci- 
ence itself.* 

Pupil. I can say in its favour, that the pursuit of 
it has begun to afford me more permanent pleasure 



* '* We must, therefore, glean up our experiments in this science, 
from a cautious observation of human life, and take them as they ap- 
pear in the common course of the world, by men's behaviour in com- 
pany, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where experiments of this 
kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may hope to establish 
©n them a science which will not be inferior in certainty, and will be 
much superior in utility to any other of human comprehension.*' — 

Hume. 



2© A Desideratum* 

than all the works of taste; and I hope you will ex- 
hibit the elements of it so plainly as to banish from 
the world metaphysical jargon and nonsense, which 
usurping the names of philosophy, wisdom, and me- 
taphysics, have disgusted many, and induced the 
great body of the people to believe, that one who 
would become a metaphysician must renounce com- 
mon sense. 

Professor, A systematic treatise of the kind you 
describe, is greatly to be desired. Such an one does 
not exist; for Dr. Reid, who has excelled all other 
writers on this subject, employed himself rather in 
demolishing an old fabrick, than in building up a 
new one. Professor Stewart is but an elegant com- 
mentator upon Reid, without originality, and with- 
out any comprehensive arrangement of the topics 
of mental science. 



CONVERSATION II. 

The Human Soul defined. — Consciousness. — Judgment. — Axioms.-^- 
Substances. — Attributes. — Mind and Matter distinct things. 

Pupil. Since you last admitted me to your cham- 
ber, Sir, I have paid some attention to Watts on " the 
Improvement of the Mind;" and I beg leave to read 
a passage from him. " If we would improve our 
minds," he says, "by conversation, it is a great 
happiness to be acquainted with persons wiser than 
ourselves. It is a piece of useful advice therefore to 
get the favour of their conversation frequently, as 
far as circumstances will allow: and if they happen 
to be a little reserved, use all obliging methods to 
draw out of them what may increase your own know- 
ledge." Now Sir, I design to ask you questions, 
and shall plead the advice of Dr. Watts in justifi- 
cation of my conduct. 

Professor, I have known you, for some time past, 
to be an expert youth at interrogation; and so, with- 
out apology, proceed, to your full satisfaction. 

Pupil. Well, Sir, what is tlie human soul? 

Professor, It is that part of the complex being 
called man, which thinks, feels, wills, and acts.^ 

Pupil, Why do you call man a complex being? 



* " By the mind of a man," says Reid, "we understand that in liim 
which thinks, remembers, reasons, wills." It is true that mind would 
be distinguished from every other substance, should we merely affirm 
that it is that -which thinks,- but if the description is extended, it seems 
to be desirable to characterize it by such terms as include all its opera- 



22 Of Body and Mind. 

Professor, Because he evidently consists in part 
of a substance which does not think, feel, will, and 
act; which we call body; and of another part that 
does; which is called the soul, or the mind. 

Pupil, How do you know that you have a body? 

Professor, I perceive the properties of a body, 
on which I am conscious that I act. 

PupiL How do you know you perceive proper- 
ties of a body? 

Professor, I am conscious that I perceive several 
of the properties of my body. 

PupiL How do you know that you think, feel, 
will and act? 

Professor, I am conscious of every one of my 
mental operations. 

Pupil, It seems, then, that we have ultimately 
the same proof of a mental operation which we have 
of the properties and existence of a body. 

Professor, The very same; and therefore I as- 
sert, that the basis of natural history, natural philo- 
sophy, and the mathematics, is no firmer than the 
basis of mental science.* 



tions. This, Reid has not done, for the mind is a sensitive as well as 
a cogitative being. Besides, to remember and to reason, are operations 
that come under the general description of thinking. The reader will 
soon conceive that eveiy thing which the mind does may be reduced 
to the four classes of operations enumerated in the text. 

* " It is not matter, or body, which I perceive by ray senses; but 
only extension, figure, colour, and certain othei qualities, which the 
constitution of my nature leads me to refer to something, which is ex- 
tended, figured, and coloured. The case is precisely similar with re- 
spect to mind. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but 
we are conscious of sensation, thought and volition; operations, which 
imply the existence of something which feels, thinks, and wills. Every 



Of Body and Mind, 23 

FupiL But you have not proved yet, that you 
have a soul: you have only shown, that you are 
conscious of your own mental operations. How do 
you know you have a soul? 

Professor, Dr. Reid would have answered, that 
he was conscious of his own existence; but my opi- 
nion is, that consciousness is the knowledge which 
one has of his own present mental operations^ and I 
shall use the word only in this sense. That I exist, 
is a proposition which 1 judge to be true, so soon 
as it is stated to me, or framed by my own mind, 
without any reasoning or reflection on the subject. 
The proposition is self-evident to every man, and 
the act of the mind in judging it to be true, is a 
constitutional judgment, I am conscious that I judge 
myself to exist; and such is the make of our minds, 
that we cannot use a personal pronoun, or an active 
or passive verb, in the first person singular, or plu- 
ral, without having this constitutional judgment. 
There is not a man living, who really doubts his 
own existence: and the reason is, that the Creator 
has so formed, and so governs, the human mind, that 
it ever thus judges, concerning its own being. Should 



man too is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all those sen- 
sations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being; to 
that being which he calls himself,' a being, which he is led, by the 
constit; tion of his naiure, to consider as something distinct from his 
hodv, and as not litble to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any 
of his organs. From these considerations it apjiears, that we have the 
same evidence for the existence of mind, that we have for the exist- 
ence of body; npy, if there be any difference between the two cases, 
that we have stronger evidence for it; inasmuch as the one is suggest- 
ed to us -by the subjects of our own consciousness, and the other 
merely by the objects of our own perceptions." — Stexvart. 



24 Foundations of Science. 

any man wish to judge otherwise, he would find 
himself incapable of doing it, and, therefore, we as- 
sert, that this constitutional judgment is necessary. 

Pupil. You would have me understand, I appre- 
hend, that necessary, or constitutional judgments, 
lie at the foundation of the science of the human 
mind. 

Professor, They are the basis of every science: 
and the foundation on which all our systems of 
knowledge are erected. Do not the mathematicians 
begin their course by settling a few axioms^ And 
what are axioms but self-evident propositions, to 
which every mind, necessarily,- from its constitu- 
tion, gives assent, so soon as the meaning of them 
is apprehended? 

PupiL Some of these constitutional judgments I 
hope to hear you state ere long; but will you no\^^ 
have the goodness to tell me, what is the real essence 
of this thing which thinks, feels, wills, and acts? 

Professor. Here I must confess myself unable to 
answer you in any other way, than by acknowledg- 
ing my own ignorance, and expressing my persua- 
sion, that no man in the present life, will ever enjoy 
the ability of perceiving the essence of any substance. 
One thing I may venture to promise, that when you, 
or any one else, will teach me to comprehend the 
essence of matter, I will explain to you the essence 
of mind. We know no more of the one than of the 
other. 

PupiL How, then, do you know that mind and 
matter are distinct things; and that there is any es- 
sential difference between them? 

Professor, Your question requires something of 



Attributes, SJ5 

a dissertation, for an answer. I must give you some 
preliminary statements too, that you may not mis- 
understand me. Observe then, that I use the words 
mind and soul as synonymous: that any thing to 
which you truly ascribe thought, feeling, volition^ 
or agency, or any or all of these, is what I call a 
soul or mind: and that any thing which is the sub- 
ject of inherent attributes is said to subsist, and is 
called a substance.* 

PupiL But let me know what you intend by in- 
herent attributes^ before you proceed. 

Professor. Any thing attributed to another, which 
appertains to its original constitution, and without 
w^hich it would not be the same thing, is an inherent 
attribute. Were all the inherent attributes of any 
substance to be taken away, v/e should have no 
knowledge of its existence. Thus, should the facul- 
ties of thought, feeling, volition, and agency be taken 
away from any thing which we call mind, we should 
no longer have any knowledge of the existence of 
that mind; nor can we even conceive of a substance 
which thinks, and yet has no faculty for thought; 
which feels, wills, and voluntarily acts, and yet has 
no faculties for performing these mental operations. 



* Substance I find a very convenient word, and having given the 
sense in which I shall use it, I see no objection to it, which will not 
equally militate against Reid and Stewart, when they speak of that 
■which thinks, or of something extended. Mr. Hume tells us, that the 
idea of substance can be derived neither from *' impressions of sensa- 
tion," nor from "impressions of reflection." We assent, whpt then? 
can we not conceive of substance, as well as o^time, space, and a thou- 
sand other things? Mr. Locke and Mr. Hume were both erroneous in 
mantaining that all our ideas are derived either /rem sensation or 
reflection. 

c 



26 Body and Mind 

Let me illustrate what I mean by inherent attri- 
butes^ in speaking of matter. Gravity, extension, in- 
activity, insensibility, and divisibility are attributes 
of every particle of matter ^ which we call inherent; 
because we conceive them to inhere in the very na- 
ture of the thing; and were these all taken away, 
we could form no notion of the meaning of the word. 
7natter. Nothing extended, and inactive would then 
remain. Any number of particles of matter united, 
or organized, consiitute what we call a body. Now 
you ask proof of the accuracy of the prevailing opi- 
nion, that body and mind are two distinct substances. 
Of the essence of any substance, you have already 
learned, that I do not design to speak. Now! af- 
firm, that I am conscious of perceiving some of the 
inherent attributes of one thing which is called an 
egg; and of another, which is called an apple; and 
I judge, that the objects of my perception really 
exist. I cannot doubt their existence. This I find- 
then to be a law of my nature, that I should judge 
the thing which I perceive to have existence. The 
mental operation oi judging implies the existence 
of the faculty which is denominated the judgment. 
This faculty, I am conscious, uniformly operates 
in the same way, in relation to some propositions; 
so that I no sooner understand the meaning of the 
proposition, that the things perceived through the 
bodily organs, called the Jive senses, really exist, 
than I judge it to be true. Every other man of a 
sane mind has, under similar circumstances, a 
similar judgment, which results from the original 
constitution, and the established government of the 
human soul. Of this judgment every rational maa 



distinct Things. 27 

is conscious; and testifies that he is conscious, to his 
companions. I judge, and I am conscious that I 
judge, therefore, that an eg^^ and an apple .are be- 
fore me. Bat I also jud^e^ with a like knowledge 
of my own judgment, that the egg is one substance, 
and the apple another substance; or that they are 
two distinct material substances. This judgment 
follows a previous judgment, that the inherent at- 
tributes of an egg are different from those of an 
apple; which last judgment immediately follows my 
perception of the attributes of one and of the other, 
and my discernment of the difference between those 
which appertain to the one, and those which inhere 
in the other. Thus, I perceive the shape and tex- 
ture, the colour, taste, and fragrance of the apple; and 
then I perceive the shape, texture, colour and taste of 
the egg'. I conceive of a difference between the things 
perceived in one, and those perceived ip. the other; 
and then follows my judgment, that they are differ- 
ent things; each of which is called a substance. Of 
this judgment I am conscious, and therefore I say, 
^' I know that an egg and an apple are two different 
and distinct substances." An tgg is one thing that 
subsists^ to which we attribute a certain number of 
things, that being deprived of, it would no longer 
be recognized as an egg; and an apple is another 
thing that subsists; that is, an apple is another sub- 
stance. In this manner we actually, and philosophi- 
cally discriminate between different individuals, 
whether inanimate, or animate; and between differ- 
ent classes of things. So universal is the practical 
operation of this philosophy, that in every land, he 
would be called a fool, who should affirm, that be- 



2S Mind and Matter 

tween the sun and moon, earth and water, birds and 
men, there is no substantial difference. But you 
wish me to prove, that mind is one substance, and 
matter another. Every man may arrive at personal 
satisfaction on this subject, precisely in the v/ay 
that I do. Thus, I judge involuntarily, and con- 
stitutionally, that somethings which I call by the 
pronoun /, exists. I am conscious that I think, feel, 
will, and act; and I judge that /have faculties for 
thinking, feeling, v/illing, and acting; because think- 
ing is an effect, and a faculty for thinking a cause; 
and because I judge moreover, that every effect 
must have some cause. These faculties are inherent 
attributes of that somethings which I call I; and 
were they all taken away there would remain no- 
thing of which I could have any conception, or de- 
nominate by any personal pronoun. This somethings 
which is the subject of these attributes, I call mind, 
or soiiL I may give it this name to distinguish it 
from every thing, which has not some of the same 
attributes. If I find any thing which has any of 
these attributes, I determine to call that a 77iind too; 
but if I have knowledge of any thing which has 
other attributes, but not one of these, I resolve to 
call it matter s to distinguish it; because I judge 
ihat those are different substances which are the 
subjects of different inherent attributes; and that 
all thinking, feeling, willing, and acting substances 
ahould be classed under the head of mental sub- 
stances; while all things not having in my judgment, 
any of the faculties that produce any of these men- 
ial operations, should be considered as forming an- 
other class, under the caption of material substances. 



distinct Substances, 29 

Do I, then, know of any thing in existence, which 
is to be excUided from the first class, and assigned 
a place in the second? I am conscious, that I per- 
ceive many different objects, around me, in my 
chamber; and one of them, about two feet in length, 
I perceive to be in continual motion, while all the 
rest are stationary. The little moving thing looks 
me in the face, and (probably thinking that I am 
sulky, because I am studious^) cries out, with mean- 
ing forehead and eyes, " naughty papa!" I call the 
thing "my daughter." I am not conscious that she 
thinks, nor can I be conscious of any thing but of 
my own mental operations. But I am conscious, 
that I perceive her make such sounds, with her 
mouth, as I have made from volition, with my own; 
and I judge, that her speaking and my speaking 
are similar effects, that must have a similar cause. I 
know, that I speak from volition alone; and I judge, 
that no one thing could speak without volition: 
therefore I conclude, that my daughter speaks from 
volition. If she performs the mental operation of 
volition, I judge she must have the faculty of voli- 
tion; and if she has the faculty of volition, the thing 
in which that attribute inheres belongs to the class 
of mental substances, I have found, then, another 
mind besides my own, I judge that my soul exists^ 
and I judge., that another soul exists; and the judg- 
ment in one case is as satisfatory to myself as in the 
other. The external actions of my little daughter, 
I call effects, of a thinking cause; and sometimes 
signs of thought., because every effect may be de- 
nominated the sign of a cause. It is a judgment 
that results from my mental nature, that 7, xvho am 
C 2 



30 Mind and Matter distinguished, 

conscious, exist; and that voluntary action proceeds^ 
from a xuilling agent. 

Pupil, I am not impatient, Sir, but it takes you 
a long time to come to the point. 

Professor, Well, I perceive on my paper a small 
thing, which I call a particle of sand; I know, or 
am conscious, that / perceive it; and such is the 
frame of my mind, that 1 judge the object of per- 
ception to have a real existence. I am conscious too, 
that I perceive it to be tangible, solid, extended, and 
divisible; to have gravity, and to be capable of mo- 
tio7i, but not of action; for if left to itself it is sta- 
tionary; but if I act upon it, motion is the result. 
These are some of the inherent attributes of all 
those things which I would classify under the gene- 
ral term matter. Having perceived these attributes 
of the grain of sand, and discerning them to be dif- 
ferent from the attributes of mind, I judge that it 
is a difftrent thing from that called mind; even a 
different substance. The perceptible difference be- 
tween that something which thinks, or feels, or willsj 
or acts, or does dl these things, and the grain of 
sand, is certainly greater than the difference between 
fire and water; and because I perceive in the sand 
attributes which I find not in mind, and do not per- 
ceive in it any of the attributes which I have found 
in the soul, therefore I conclude that matter and 
mind are two distinct substances. In confirmation 
of my own judgment, I have the testimony of all of 
my fellow men, that they have always found in cer- 
tain things the attributes of a material substance, and 
have never found in any of these same substances 
the slightest indications of thought, feeling, volition, 



Mind and Matter distinguished. 31 

or efficiency. The same remarks, which I have made 
concerning the grain of sand, will apply to every 
other thing, whether in a simple, or organized state; 
which is solid, extended, insensible, and moveable, 
but inactive. 

Pupil, And so you have made it appear, that we 
perceive nothing but the attributes of matter, and 
the external indications of mind; and that we are 
as well, and as clearly acquainted with the attributes 
of the former as of the latter.* 

Frofessor. Yes, and that our judgment concerning 
the existence of mental substances, is as solid and 
satisfactory, as that the material substances around 
us exist. 



* ** The essence both of body and of mind is unknown to us. We 
know certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the lasts 
and by these only we can define or describe thera." — Reid. 



CONVERSATION III. 



Faculty defined. — Body. — Simple and Complex Operations. — Essen- 
tial and Incidental Attributes. — Ten Faculties of the Human Mind 
enumerated. — All the Faculties of Man, requisite to account for 
all his actions. 



Pupil, You have frequently made use of the term 
faculty; will you have the kindness to make me 
fully acquainted with the meaning which you attach 
to it? 

Professor. By a faculty^ in general, I intend any 
inherent part of the original constitution of a sub- 
stance by which any distinct operation is performed. 
A body is any number of organized particles of 
matter;* and this may have many bodily faculties. 
Thus the body of a man consists of many members; 
each of which is a faculty for doing something: and 
were all these taken away, there would be no body 
subsisting; any more than if the particles of matter, 
out of which it was organized, were reduced to 
their native elements. 

A mental faculty is any inherent part of the ori- 
ginal constitution of a mind, by v/hich it performs 
any simple mental operation. 



*Dr. Reid says, "we define body to be that which is extended, 
solid, moveable, divisible;" which is the description of matter in gene- 
ral, but not oi body in particular. The definition which I have given, 
corresponds with the most general and approved use of the word. 



Mental Operations . 3 3 

PupiL Bat I would know what you mean by a 
simple mental operation. » 

Professor, Any thing which the mind does, is a 
mental operation: any thing which it performs by 
one of its faculties is a simple mental operation. 
For example; if you see, hear, reason, feel, choose, 
and exert yourself, you perform so many simple 
mental operations. 

PupiL Your distinction would lead me to sup- 
pose, that some mental operations are complex. 

Professor. They certainly are: for it is the mind 
which reads a paragraph in the Freemai-Cs Journal; 
and this implies the perception of the words, to- 
. gether with the apprehension of their meaning. A 
little child m\^\, perceive the words before he could 
read at all. Should you read aloud^ an act of the 
will to make articulate sounds, and the exertion of 
the faculty of agency, together with those already 
mentioned, would be included in reading. 

PupiL It is evident then, because several facul- 
ties are concerned in the several acts, that declaim- 
ing, preaching, pleading, studying, running, fight- 
ing, and praying, are so many complex operations; 
but I wish to know if any of them but studying is 
a mental operation. Are running and fighting acts 
of the mind? 

Professor, Some actions are neither exclusively 
mental, nor exclusively corporal; for mind and body 
both are essential to their performance. We ascribe 
th^m, therefore, to the complex being, man; and 
say that man reads aloud, declaims, preaches, prays 
audibly, pleads, runs, and fights. These actions, 
therefore, which require the co-operation of two or 



34 3Iental Operations. 

more faculties of man, whether they appertain t& 
the body or the mind, we call complex operations: 
but if two or more mental faculties perform the 
act, without the necessary intervention of any cor- 
poral faculty, we call the action performed a com- 
plex mental operation, 

PiipiL It would seem to me, that seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, touching, reasoning, and choosing, 
are all of them complex operations. 

Professor, In the proper place, perhaps I may 
convince you, that they are all simple mental opera- 
tions; or that they are distinct acts, which may 
every one of them be referred to some one mental 
faculty. 

Pupil, It would be strange, indeed, if you can 
convince me that eating is a mental act. 

Professor, Eating and tastings young man, are 
two things, very easily distinguished; and the latter 
is consequent upon the former. Eating is a complex 
operation of an animal, who -wills to receive food 
into his mouth, and does what he wills, by his agency 
upon his corporal faculties, given him for the pur- 
pose. Tasting is a perception of the flavour, or of 
some quality, or qualities of the food eaten. You 
know that in a diseased state of the palate and fauces, 
a' man may eat^ and not taste his food. Hence he 
says, " I have no taste;" and sometimes, to express 
the same thing, " all things taste alike to me." 

Pupil- You have intimated, in a former conver- 
sation, that power and faculty are not convertible 
terms; because, I conclude, you have use for thera 
to signify different things: but if no expression is 



Faculty and Power. 35 

equivalent to that of mental faculty^ we shall be 
sadly circumscribed in language. 

Professor* Our predicament will not be worse 
than that of the mathematicians, who always call a 
triangle a triangle. You may, however, call a men- 
tal faculty a mental organ^ if you choose; and then, 
you will have two names for one thing. 

Pup'iL Your philosophy would restrict the mean- 
ing of the word faculty as Reid has done, when he 
says, " I apprehend that the word faculty is most 
properly applied to those powers of the mind which 
are original and natural, and which make a part of 
the constitution of the mind." 

Professor, I mean by faculty what Reid under- 
stood by " an original and natural power;" but I 
never call a faculty a power; because power is often 
and most properly used as synonymous with ability; 
and includes every thing essential to the production 
of an effect. You can distinguish, between the exist- 
ence of something in our mental constitution, where- 
by we reason, when we reason, and which exists 
when not in operation; which is the faculty of rea- 
soning; and that which .puts the faculty into opera- 
tion, so that we actually reason, which together con- 
stitute the poruer of reasonings can you not? 

Pupil* I remember, at least, that you have else- 
where said, that any thing called a power ^ which is 
not adequate to the production of an effect, is a 
powerless power* What do you think, Sir, of Lord 
Kames's use of the word faculty? He says, " man 
is provided by nature with a sense or faculty that 
lays open to him every passion by means of its ex- 
ternal expressions." 



36 Bifferent Attributes. 

Professor. I think he undoubtedly intended, that 
every man is so constituted, that he has the faculty 
of judgment, by v/hich he involuntarily judges cer- 
tain external expressions to be signs of internal pas- 
sions. This faculty he considered to be as natural 
to the mind as the faculty for smelling; and there- 
fore he calls it a seiise^ or faculty; and would it not 
lead to confusion, I would sometimes call a mental 
faculty a mental sense too. 

Pupil. In our last conversation, you taught me, 
that some attributes of mind and matter are inhe- 
rent: pray do you class all other attributes under 
some general ternci? 

Professor. All attributes are inherent^ or such 
as may be called incidental and extraneous. Any 
thing, which you ascribe to another, which is not 
essential to its subsistence, and which therefore 
may be considered as being without its essence, I 
call an incidental^ or an extraneous attribute. For in- 
stance, a man may have the faculty of reason, with- 
out actually reasoning: the faculti/ I call an inherent 
attribute; but the act of reasoning is i?icidental or 
extraneous. Solidity, gravity, extension, and divisi- 
bility are inherent^ or essential attributes of a body; 
but the colour, the particular figure, the location, 
and the motion of the same body, are .incidental; 
for an ivory ball will have the former attributes, 
whether it is in one place or another; whether it be 
stained red, or is white, and whether it move, or is 
stationary. From this example you will not find it 
difficult to class most of the attributes of subjects 
with which you are intimately acquainted. 

If you please, I shall now claim the privilege of 



Ten Mental Faculties* 37 

interrogating you, on subjects which have been fre- 
quently presented to your attention; and if you have 
doubts about the truth and propriety of any part 
of the system which I have inculcated, you are at 
perfect liberty to express them. 

What are the principal inherent attributes of the 
human mind? 

PupiL They are ten mental faculties; which, for 
the want of some new scientific terms, frequently 
bear the names of the operations which they per- 
form. They are denominated, 

I. The Faculty of Perception. 

II. The Faculty of Consciousness. 

III. The Faculty of Understanding. 

IV. The Faculty of Judging. 

V. The Faculty of Memory. 

VI. The Faculty of Reasoning. 

VII. The Faculty of Conscience, 

VIII. The Faculty of Feeling. 

IX. The Faculty of Volition. 

X. The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. 

To one, or other of these, may be attributed all 
©ur simple mental operations; and to some two or 
more of them, all the complex 'mental operations, 
with which we are acquainted.* 



* " Upon a slight attention to the operations of our own minds," 
says Professor Stewart, *'they appear- to he so complicated, and so 
infinitely diversified, that it seems to he impossihle to reduce them 
to any general laws. In consequence, however, of a more accurate 
examination, the prospect clears up; and the phenomena, which ap- 
peared, at first, to be too various for our comprehension, are foimd 
to be the result of a comparatively small number of simple and un- 
eompounded faculties." (3ondiii.ac remarks, that " Centuries must 

D 



38 Mental Operations, 

Professor. What is wanting to account for all the 
operations of a man? 

PupiL Would we analize, and reduce to their 
proper faculties, all the operations of man, we must 
consider his bodily as well as mental faculties; for 
many things are performed by the co-operation of 
corporal and mental organs. We must also consider 
his powers^ as well 2is faculties. You could not walk, 
for instance, without legs, a volition to use them, 
and the exertion of the faculty of agency over them. 
Neither could you eat without a mouth, and the 
activity of those mental faculties which are requi- 
site to put it in motion. 

Professor, Well, let us defer the consideration of 
the mental faculties till after dinner. 



have passed away before men could have suspected that thought can 
be subjected to laws; and even at this time the greatest number of 
mankind think, without conceiving how it is done." 



CONVERSATION IV. 



Definitions.— Genus and Species.— The Faculty of Perception.—Five 
kinds of Perceptions.— Instrumentality of bodily Organs. — Conscious- 



Professor, We resume the consideration of the 
Ten Faculties of the Human Soulj and I shall ex- 
pect my pupil in giving definitions, to remember 
the opinion of Dr. Reid, " that there are many 
v»^ords, which, though they need explication, cannot 
be logically deftned;" and that " a logical definition, 
that is, a strict and proper definition, must express 
the kind of thing defined, and the specific difference, 
by which the species defined, is distinguished from 
every other species belonging to that kind." Hence, 
'' no word can be logically defined, which does not 
denote a species; because such things only can have 
a specific difference; and a specific difference is es- 
sential to a logical definition-. On this account there 
can be no definition of individual things, such as 
London and Paris.'* They may, however, be de- 
scribed in such a way as to distinguish them from 
all other cities. 

Pup'iL I have found some difficulty result from 
the use of the words gemis^ species^ and individual: 
I should like, therefore, to have them explained 
before we proceed. 



40 Genusy Species, and Individual. 

Professor, The explanation is easy. We have 
perceived many objects, whose essential attributes 
are alike; but whose incidental attributes are un- 
like; and we wish to class them, for our own con- 
venience. If the essential attributes of any number 
of things are alike, we class them together, and say, 
they are of one genus^ or race. Thus we perceive 
fifteen persons, v/ho indicate by their actions, the 
existence of the same mental faculties within; and 
they have evidently the same essential corporal 
members. We say that they are of one genus. For 
this genus we wish a name that shall denote any 
one of the fifteen; and which shall distinguish any 
one, and each one, from any thing which belongs 
to another genus; to the one, for instance, consist- 
ing of animals with four legs; and we call the name 
man; by which any one of the fifteen persons is 
distinguished from a quadruped; and indeed, from 
every thing else, but one of his own genus, or gene- 
ral class of things. When I call a being a man, there- 
fore, every one, who understands the language, 
knows what kind of a thing I mean; but he knows 
not whether I intend a white man, a black man, or 
a red man; that is, he knows not what species of the 
genus I would designate. We find it /convenient, 
therefore, to make subordinate classes; and the 
common rule is, to put those things together which 
are alike in some of their principal incidental attri- 
butes. The colour of a man is an attribute of this 
description; and we say, therefore, that five of these 
fifteen men, being of a white colour, shall constitute 
the species of -white men; the five that are black, 
the species of black men; and the five which are red, 



Genus ^ Species^ and Individuals. 41 

the species of red me?i. Thus, in the genus, which 
contains, by the supposition, fifteen, we have three 
species. Suppose that each species contains a person 
by the name of John. Now I wish to designate one 
of these, so that the person to whom I speak, may 
fix his thoughts on one; that is, on an individual. If 
I call him a man, I point out only his genus, so that 
my auditor knows I do not mean a quadruped, or 
reptile; but he knows not which of fifteen indivi- 
duals I n>ean. If I call him a xvhite man, he knows 
the genus and the species of the thing of which I 
speak, but he knows not which of five white men, 
that constitute the species of the genus, I mean. 
Let me speak, then, of John, the white man^ and 
he understands me to designate an individual, who 
is neither John the black man, nor John the red 
man, nor any one else but the identical one person, 
of whom I designed to have him think. In like 
manner, you may class any number of things, in 
which you can perceive, or apprehend to be, some 
similar and some dissimilar attributes; especially if 
some of them are essential, and others only inci- 
dental. 

Pupil, Might we not have more classes of things? 

Professor. Undoubtedly: you might h^ve the 
provinces, classes, and orders of Judge Woodward; 
and to them add, if you please, a genus and species. 
Thus, a person might be your provincial tt rm; 
2L human person, your classical ii2iVLi^; ^ferncde hu' 
man person^ vour ordinal distifiction; a xvhite female 
human person, \QK-\r generic ■pp-i)ntiorx; a tall white 
fewxde human person, ^- -fic clnsrnption; and 

then Jane, a tall xvhi.- , v; ruun an person, would 

D 2 



10' 42 Cksslfications. 



i ;,; |! 






point out the individual, and distinguish her from 
every thing not a personi from all persons superior 
or inferior to human persons; from all males, who 
might make another order, of the same class and 
province; from all females, that are not white; 
from all females that are short; and^ from all tall 
females of any other name than Jane. 

Pupil Were these classifications to be generally 
made, would Dr. Reid's description of a logical 
definition b^ correct? 

Professor. You dejine a word when you clearly 
describe the thing of which that word is a symbol. 
Of course, you may invent a term, and then define 
it; that is, point out the limits of its use, by clearly 
stating what you mean by it. You may dejine an 
object of which any word is the sign, by clearly de- 
scribing that object, so as to distinguish it from 
every other object. If you will do this I shall be 
satisfied with your answers to my questions. 

What is the faculty of Perception?* 

PupiU The faculty of Perception in man, is that 
inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, 
by which he has knowledge, through the instru- 
mentality of his bodily organs. 



* " The perception of external objects hy our senses, is an opera- 
tion of the mind of a peculiar nature, and ought to have a name ap- 
propriated to it. It has so in al! languages. And in the English, I 
know no word more proper to express this act of the mind than per- 
ception. Seeing, h(^aring, smelling, tasting, and touching, are words 
that expre?;s il>e operations proper to each sense; perceiving expresses 
that which is common to them all."— Da. Reij). 



Perceptioris, 43 

Professor, Give some example of the mental 
operations called perceptions^ or, show what this 
faculty does. 

PupiL I perceive the sun, through the instru- 
mentality of my eyes; I perceive a sound, through 
my ears; I perceive the hardness of a ball, through 
my hand, which touches it; I perceive the fragrance 
of a rose, through my olfactory organs; and I per- 
ceive the acidity of vinegar, through my organs of 
tasting; so that seeing^ hearings touching^ smelling^ 
and tasting are so many mental operations, per- 
formed through the instrumentality of different 
parts of the body. 

Professor* Can you classify all the perceptions 
of man? 

Pupil. All our perceptions are reducible to five 
classes, which take their names from the orga7is of 
senses through which we have them. 

Professor. I presume that you use the expression 
organs of sense^ in this case, as synonymous with 
organs of perception. Be careful always to use it 
in this manner, and then I have no objection to your 
asserting, that man has five senses^ or ^ve kinds of 
perceptions; and of course that he becomes acquaint- 
ed with the attributes of matter only by the men- 
tal faculty of perception. Sense always means either 
perception or conception. But why do you speak of 
perceiving through the instrumentality of the bodily 
faculties?* 



* " That nothing external is perceived till first it make an impres» 
sion upon the organ of sense, is an observation that holds equally in 



44 Perceptions. 

Pupil. Because the bodily organs do not them- 
selves perceivej and because we find, by experience, 
that the soul of a wakeful and sane man does not 
perceive without them. Sometimes, in figurative 
language, the operation of the agent is ascribed to 
the instrument; and hence our eyes are said to see; 
but every one knows, that the eye does not in reality 
perceive even the inverted image of the object, 
which is formed on its retina. Every one knows, 
too, that were the faculty of perception wanting, 
were the soul absent from the material part of the 
complex being, man, the eyes could not see, nor the 
nose smell, nor the hands handle, nor the palate 
taste, nor the ears hear. Hence it is common, and 
strictly philosophical, to say, I see^ I hear ^ I taste^ 
I smelly 1 touch; while by the pronoun used we in- 
tend something evidently different from our bodily 
organs. Here I wish, however, to question my 
teacher. Pray, Sir, if the soul has the faculty of 
perception, which is an essential part of itself, are 
any bodily organs indispensable to the mental ope- 
rations of that faculty? Might we not see, hear, 
touch, taste, and smell, without the instrumentality 
of eyes, ears, and the other members of the body? 



every one of the external senses. But there is a difference as to oup 
knowledge of that impression: in touching, tasting, and smelling, we 
are sensible of the impression; that, for example, which is made upon 
the hand by a stone, upon the palate by an apricot, and upon the 
nostrils by a rose: it is otherwise in seeing and hearing; for 1 am not 
sensible of the impression made upon ray eye, when 1 behold a tree; 
nor of the impression made upon my ear, when 1 listen to a song."*— 
Lord Karnes, 



Perceptions, 45 

Might not the soul, if separated from the body, see 
material objects? 

Professor. You are running furiously into the re- 
gions of speculation. Stop a little, and I will tell you 
all philosophy knows on this subject. When man 
is awake, and in a sane state of mind, he constitu- 
tionally judges, that he perceives only through his 
bodily organs: but when sleeping, a man often has 
mental operations, which he at the time judges to 
be perceptions; which are so much like the percep- 
tions he has had when awake, that he cannot dis- 
tinguish them, either by any difference in their own 
nature, or in his feelings, which are consequent on 
them; but when he awakes, he knows that his eyes 
were closed, and that light did not shine on them, 
when he was conscious of seeing; that no material 
lips uttered sounds, when he heard; and that no 
real object was present, when he embraced and 
kissed a friend. The consciousness which accom- 
panied these nocturnal perceptions, was like the con- 
sciousness of his wakeful hours; and gives proof of 
the actual performance of mental acts of seeing 
and hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting, or of 
nocturnal actions resembling them, without the in- 
tervention of material organs. "A man who is insane, 
in like manner has perceptions, which are purely 
mental, and without the instrumentality of the ex^ 
ternai organs; for he sees angels and devils in the 
air, and hears them address him; or he performs 
such mental operations as a sane man would, were 
visible forms of celestial beings presented to his 
vision; were they to utter real, but seraphic sounds 
in his ears. 



46 Perceptions, 

Pupil, Is not this wholly the work of imagina- 
tion? 

Professor, The imagination of sleeping and in- 
sane persons is frequently very active; but when 
they see a house with their eyes closed, or the face 
of a friend; and are conscious of the act, it would 
be unjust to say, that they are not conscious of a 
perception^ when they readily distinguish between 
perceptions and the work of the imagination. If 
bodily organs v;ere absolutely essential to perceiving, 
we should undoubtedly see objects in the position 
of their images on the retina; so that we should see 
all the heads of our friends occupying the place of 
their feet.* 



* " There is no phenomenon in nature more unaccountable, than 
the intei'course that is carried on between the mind and the external 
world: there is no phenomenon which philosophical spirits have shown 
greater avidity to pry into and resolve. It is agreed by all, that this 
intercourse is carried on by means of the senses; and this satisfies the 
Yulgar curiosity, but not the philosophic. Philosophers must have some 
system, some hypothesis, that shews the manner in which our senses 
make us acquainted -with external things. All the fertility of human 
invention seems to have produced only one hy[)othesis for this pur- 
pose, which, therefore, Ijath been universally received: and that is, 
that the mind, like a mirror, receives the images of things from with- 
out, by means of the senses: so that their use must be to convey these 
images into the mind" — "There are laws of nature by which the 
opera clous of the mind are regulated; there are also laws of nature 
that govern the material system; and as the latter are the ultimate 
conclusions which the human faculties can reach in the philosophy of 
bodies, so the former are the ultimate conclusions we can reach ia 
the philosophy of minds." — "It is evident, therefore, that the pic- 
tures upon the retina are, by the laws of nature, a mean of vision; 
but in what way they accomplish their end, we are totally ignorant." 
---Pb. Eeis. 



Gonsciousness, 47. 

FupU. It would be a very natural inference from 
your doctrine, that a disembodied spirit could per- 
ceive visible and material objects, as truly as any 
man who has bodily organs at his command. 

Professor, I shall not object to such an inference. 
At any rate, we know that God is a Spirit, without 
bodily organs, and that he beholds the works of his 
hands. He has mental perceptions of material ob- 
jects; and has formed men in his own image; but 
while they continue in the world, his good provi- 
dence has connected their ordinary intercourse with 
matter, with material organization. 

Pupil. Have you not, dear Sir, • restricted too 
much the use of the words perceive and perception? 
It is customary for a person to say, '^ I perceive 
your meaning: I perceive the truth." In short, men 
talk about perceiving every object of thought, whe- 
ther visible or invisible. 

Professor. It is true: and they use the words very 
indefinitely, or else figuratively. It is not improper 
to use the word perceive as we do the verb see^ figu- 
ratively, for mtnx.2\ seeing. Thus we see or perceive a 
truth, when we conceive of the meaning of a propo- 
sition, and judge it to be true. But in philosophical 
discussions, we should avoid" indefinite and figura- 
tive expressions as much as possible, if we would 
arrive at certainty in mental science. I never use, 
therefore, perception^ for any act of conception^ or 
mental seeing of immaterial things. 

What is the faculty of Consciousness? 

The faculty of Consciousness in man, is that in- 
herent part of the original constitution of his soul 



48 (Consciousness. 

by which he has immediate knowledge of all his 
own mental operations.* 

Professor. We are conscious in every instance, 
by an act of consciousness, or a mental operation, 
bearing that name. Now I would ask, have we as 
many acts of consciousness as we have other men- 
tal operations? 

Pupil, Undoubtedly we have an act of conscious- 
ness, for every other mental operation, of which we 
are conscious. 

Professor, Is every act of consciousness subse- 
quent to, or co-existent with, the mental operation, 
of which it is the object? 

Pupil, You have taught me, that consciousness 
is the only ultimate source of knowledge upon the 
subject of mental science; and I cannot say, that I ' 
am ever conscious of performing two mental ope- 
rations at once. I must conclude, therefore, that an 
act of consciousness is immediately consequent upon 
every other mental operation. Thus, I perceive and 
am conscious that I perceive; I conceive, and am 
conscious that I conceive; I remember, and am con- 
scious that I remember. The act of consciousness, 
however, is performed so immediately after each 



* ** Conscious7iess is a word used by philosophers, to signify that 
immediate knowl,edge which we have of our present thoughts and 
purposes, and, in general, of all the present operations of our minds. 
Whence we may observe, that consciousness is only of things present. 
To apply consciousness to things past, which sometimes is done in 
popular discourse, is to confound consciousness with memory; and all 
such confusion of words ought to be avoided in popular discourse. It 
is likewise to be observed, that consciousness is only of things in the 
mind, and not of external thin s/' — Dn. Reid. 



Consciousness* 4$ 

other operation, that lam insensible of any lapse 
of time; and should not wonder if some should 
deem consciousness and the object of it, in any par- 
ticular case, simultaneous. 

Professor, Of what use is the faculty of con- 
sciousnessP 

Pupil. Without it, we could not know that we 
think, feel, will, and have efficiency. Consequently 
we could never have knowledge of our own existence, 
or of our mental identity. We could never predicate 
any thing of ourselves, nor act as, responsible, moral 
agents. Besides, consciousness is as essential to men- 
tal science, as perception to our knowledge of per- 
ceptible objects, and of the phenomena of natural 
philosophy. We could not testify concerning any^ 
thing done by the mind, without consciousness, any 
more, than concerning things extraneous to the 
mind, without the faculty of perception. 

Professor. Which source of knowledge is the 
most "satisfactory, perception or consciousness? 

Pupil. At first thought, people would generally 
say, '•^perception; for we are more certain of no- 
thing, than of what we see, hear, smell, touch and 
taste." Yet, upon reflection, every one will judge, 
that there is no higher certainty in our perceptions 
than in our consciousness; for we may with pro- 
priety ask a man, how he knows, that he sees the 
sun, hears the sound of a cannon, smells the fra- 
grance of a rose, tastes the flavour of an orange, 
and touches a marble surface; and he must answer, 
" I am conscious that I do these things;" so that 
the certain knowledge of owv perceptions the Dselves 
consists in our consciousness. We know that we 



50 Consciousness, 

see, hear, smell, taste and touch, only by our fa- 
culty of consciousness. Could we doubt concerning 
the operations of this faculty, v/e might doubt whe- 
ther we perceive at all; and consequently whether 
any external objects of perception exist. 

Professor. And thus we should be driven to 
Bishop Berkeley's theory, that there is no material 
substance in existence: and thence to Hume's, that 
impressions and ideas are the only things that exist. 

Pupil. Pray, Sir, is our consciousness the result 
of volition, or not? 

Professor. If I will to perform an act, and to be 
conscious of it; I find an act of consciousness fol- 
lows the determined act; but I cannot suspend my 
consciousness by a volition; and generally I am 
conscious without any volition on the subject. Could 
we cease to be conscious at pleasure, it would be 
equivalent to the power of destroying our own men- 
tal existence, by a volition. Should such a power 
be given to man, he could escape from the world, 
and the government of his Maker. 



CONVERSATION Y. 



The Faculty of Understanding or Conception.—Different Operations 
of this Faculty. — Imagination. — Discernment.- Comprehension.— 
Apprehension. — Intuition. — Some general lav/s of Conception.— 
The importance of this Faculty. 



Professor, What is the Faculty of Understand- 



ing: 



Pupil, The faculty of understanding in man, is 
that inherent part of the original constitution of 
his soul, by which he has knowledge of things 
which are not perceived through the instrumenta- 
lity of the senses.* 

Professor, Do you distinguish The Understanding 
from a faculty of understanding? 

Pupil, By a faculty of understanding we intend 
that particular faculty which has just been described; 
but the expressions, The Understandings and The 
Intellect^ are often used to comprehend all the fa- 
culties of the human mind, except those of feeling, 
volition, and agency. To the understandings or the 
intellect^ belong the faculties of Consciousness, Per- 



* *' It is plain that one sense cannot judge of the objects of another; 
the eye, for instance, of harmony, or the ear of colours. The faculty 
therefore, which views and compares the objects of all the senses, 
cannot be sense." Price's Beviexv, y. IS. In other words, he might 
hvLve said, conception is &n act of mind disXinetArom perceptio?^. 



o2 The Understanding. 

ception. Understanding, Judgment, Reasoning, Me^ 
mory, and Conscience. 

Professor, The understanding' or the intellect^ 
then, comprehends seven faculties, called intellectual^ 
of which that of understanding' any thing' is one. 
Has this faculty any other name? 

PupiL It is called Conception by Dr. Reid and 
others; for by it we take in a subject,ybrw a notion 
of a thing, or have an idea of it. We conceive of 
the meaning of a term, a clause, a proposition, and 
a sentence. Mathematical points and lines, are ob- 
jects of conception^ which cannot be perceived. All 
abstract terms^ such as virtue, vice, goodness, state, 
faculty, power, liberty, and man, denote objects of 
, which we have knowledge only by this faculty. 
The science of numbers, or arithmetic, and all 
the sciences commonly included under the terms 
mathematics and metaphysics^ morals and theology^ 
have their origin in the operations of Conception. 
We c^xiTiOt perceive^ but we can conceive of number, 
space, quantity, time, spirit, substance, relation, 
moral obligation, guilt, and the Deity. 

Professor, The operations of the faculty of un- 
derstanding are numerous: can you classify them? 

Pupil. I have never attempted itj and think it 
would be very difficult to do it, in any other manner 
than by referring them to the objects upon which 
they terminate. Thus, for instance, all conceptions 
of images formed by the mind, of things which do 
not really exist, I would put together in one ^lass, 
and term them imaginations.^ 

* " I may conceive or imagine a mountain of gold, or a winged 
MovBt\ but no man says that he perceives such a creature of ima|;ina^ 



Acts of Conception, 53 

Professor, So that The Imagination is nothing but 
the faculty of conception employed in forming images, 
I frankly confess, that The Imagination is not, in 
my opinion, a faculty distinct from that which con- 
ceives, or forms notions of things. 

Can you name some other principal operations of 
this faculty of understanding? 

Pupil. Discernment is an operation of the mind, 
in which it conceives of some difference between two 
or more objects. 

Comprehension is a firm conception of some 
extensive or complex object. We discern differ- 
ences; we comprehend difficult and complicated 
things. 

Apprehension is any act of the mind in under- 
standing the meaning of a statement. Thus, a per- 
son speaks to me; I will to attend to him, that I 
may understand him; and when I do it, I say, " / 
apprehend your meaning.'^ It is a figurative expres- 
sion, and literally signifies to take hold oi any thing. 
I may apprehend the meaning of a proposition with- 
out passing any judgment upon it. 

Intuition is any such conception of the meaning 
of a proposition, as is immediately followed by a 
judgment that it is true. This is also a figurative 
expression, taken from the act of looking into any 
thing. 



tion. Thus perception is distinguished from conception or imagina- 
tion." 

*' Let it be observed therefore, that to conceive, to imagitie^ to ap- 
prehend, when taken in the proper sense, signify an act of the mind 
which implies no belief or judgment at all."— i?e/(/. 

E 2 



54} Complex IdeaSc 

Professor, When the mind, therefore, imagineSj 
discerns^ comprehends^ apprehends^ or performs an 
act of intuition^ it is the subject of different species 
of conceptions* 

Pupil, Pray, Sir, has man any complex ideas? 

Professor, Every idea is a conception; and every 
act of conception is a simple operation, Man has, 
therefore, no complex ideas. He conceives, however, 
of complex objects; even as he may see a complex 
object; and yet the act of seeing is simple. 

Pupil, Has man any abstract ideas^ 

Professor, Man conceives of the meaning of ab- 
stract terms, or has ideas of certain things, which 
he resolves to consider as abstracted from certain 
other things that he knows to be connected with 
the former. For instance, I conceive of t\it figure 
of an ivory ball, abstractad from the colour, and 
other attributes of the ball. Here the idea is one 
simple thing, that may be conceived of as abstract- 
ed from all other mental operations, and even from 
the efficient of it; and the object of the idea is a 
figure, which is a terra that denotes something that 
.may be considtred abstractedly from all other attri- 
butes of any substance. Abstract terms, or names of 
things that may be considered abstractedly from 
other things with which they are always connected, 
there certamly are; but of complex, and abstract 
ideas, I know nothing by my own consciousness, 
besides what I have here disclosed.^ 



* "A great philosopher," Dr. Berkeley, " has disputed the received 
opinion in this particular, and has asserted, that all general ideas are 



Laws of Conception* 35 

From your own consciousness of what passes in 
your mind, can you give any general laws of con- 
ception? 

Pupil. A few, I think; for I find, that I conceive 
of every mental operation which I remember to 
have performed: and I can renewedly conceive of 
any remembered past conception, by a voluntary 
exertion to do it. 

Professor, And hence, you naturally conclude, 
that other persons whose minds are similarly con- 
stituted, can do the same, and lay it down as a ge- 
neral observation, or law of mental operation. 

Pupil. An example may be given, thus: I per- 
ceive a fair female form; I close my eyes, and per- 
ceive it no longer; but I remember that I did per- 
ceive it; I will to conceive of it; and immedistely I 
do conceive of it; so that the feeling consequent 
upon the conception^ is hardly distinguishable from 
that v^^^hich followed tht perception. 

Professor. Can you conceive of all objects of per- 
ception? 

Pupil. Every object of perception is an object of 
conception. This is another general rule; but all ob- 
jects of conception are not objects of perception. 
Thus, I conceive of seeing, liearing, smelling, tast- 



nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives 
them a more extensive signification, and makes them recal upon oc- 
casion, other individuals, which are similar to them." ** 'Tis a princi- 
ple generally received in philosophy, that every thing in nature is 
individual, and that it is utterly absurd to suppose a triangle really 
existent, \vhich has no precise proportion of sides and angles. If this, 
therefore, be absurd m. fact and reality j it must also be absurd ia 
idea" — Hume, 



36 Laws of Conception. 

ing, and touching, but I cannet perceive a thought, 
a circle around the earth, or the distance between 
the sun and our planet. 

Moreover, I find, that one man in his present 
state, often has different conceptions of the same 
object; and that similar conceptions of the same ob- 
ject differ in the degree of their vigour and vivacity. 
The state of my body and of my mind, I find by 
experience also affects the conceptions of the human 
mind, both in their nature and degree. 

Professor. Can you give any general laws con- 
cerning the origin of our conceptions?^^ 

Pupil. I can account for them generally, in no 
other manner than by saying, that man has a facul- 
ty of conception, and therefore it is as natural to 
him to form conceptions as to breathe. From what 



* " Wpon a slight attention to the operations of our own mindsj they 
appear to be so complicated, and so infinitely diversified, that it seems 
to be impossible to reduce them to any general laws. In consequence, 
however, of a more accurate examination, the prospect clears up; and 
the phenomena, which appeared, at first, to be too various for out* 
comprehension, are found to be the result of a comparatively small 
number of simple and uncompounded faculties, or of simple and un- 
compounded principles of action. These faculties and principles are 
the general laws of our constitution^ and hold the same place in the 
philosophy of mind, that the general laws we investigate in physics, 
hold in that branch of science. In both cases, the laws, which nature has 
established, are to be investigated only by an examination of facts; 
and in both ^ases, a knowledge of these laws leads to an explanation 
of an infinite number of phenomena:." — Sieivart. 

" Now, as the act of moving large masses, has its laws in the facul- 
ties of the body, and in Ihe levers which our arms acquire the power 
of using; so the act of thinking has its laws in the faculties of the 
mind, and in the levers [ poxvers] which our understanding has like- 
wise learned to use." — Condillac. 



Origin of Conceptions, St 

has been already said, it will be evident, that many 
of our conceptions are occasioned by our percep- 
tionsj as those perceptions are occasioned by the 
existence of external objects. Our social relations 
give rise to other conceptions; and we never attend 
to the use of our own language by any one, without 
having some apprehension of the meaning of the 
speaker, or some conceptions concerning him, and 
the subject of his discourse. Hence, the notions of 
men very much depend upon education, taken in 
its most extensive sense; upon the times in which 
they live; the events which occur; the temperament 
of their constitution; and the circumstances of their 
existence. 

Professor, Are our operations of understanding 
the result of our volitions or not? 

PupiL Many of them result from volition, and 
many of them do not. The same is true of percep- 
tions. Now when I perceive something without 
willing it; or even when I will not to perceive it; I 
find that an act of conception involuntarHy succeeds 
it. Thus, I will not to see an obscene picture; some 
one unexpectedly presents it before my eyes; I see 
it: I close my eyes, and conceive of it, even in op- 
position to my volition never to think of it again* 
So far, therefore, as our perceptions are involun- 
tary, our conceptions may be originated without,_or 
even against our will. 

Were it otherwise with us, a man could not be 
placed in a state of trial by his Maker, unless the 
man should previously will to be put into a state of 
trial for probation. 

Professor* Your remarks are just. This faculty 



58 Conceptions* 

of conception, and its operations, are peculiarly im- 
portant to man; for without it he would have no 
science, or systematic arrangement of knowledge, 
concerning any subject. He might, indeed, wtre his 
other faculties to continue in operation, perceive 
external objects, feel, will, and act, but he could 
have no language superior to that of brutes. Be- 
sides, it will soon appear, that our judgments, rea-^ 
sonings, emotions, conscience, and most important 
volitions, are dependent on our conceptions. 



CONVERSATION VI, 



The Faculty of Judging. — Objects of Judgment. — A Truth. — AFalse= 
hood. — Classification of Judgments. — They are . Cfdnstitutional or 
Acquired. — The former are consequent on Consciousness, Fercep= 
tion, Conception, Memory or Conscience. — The latter result from 
Reflection, Reasoning or Testimony. — Believing considered. 

Professor. What is the Faculty of Judging?* 

Pupil The faculty of judging, or The Judgment 
in man, is that inherent part of the original consti- 
tution of his soul, by which he decides that any 
proposition is true or not true. 

Professor, You intentionally make a proposition^ 
in every case, the object of an operation of the 
judj^ment, I presume. 

PupiL I do; because every operation of the mind, 
except it be a feelings terminates on some object, 
distinct from the operation itself; and because I 
am conscious, that when I judge, some proposi- 
tion, some statement, expressed or understood, is 
the object of it. Not to judge some proposition to 



* Of the act oi judging. Dr. Reid remarks, that it **is an operation 
of the mind, so familiar to evei^ man who has understanding, and its 
nante is so common am' so well understoo'', that it needs no defini- 
tion " We are all conscious of judging, and we can have no stronger 
evidence of the fact Still, -^ ^ think a correct definition, would prevent 
or silence objections. Jtidging is a mental decision that a proposition 
's true or false. 



66 Acts of the Judgment, 

be true or false, would in our apprehension be, not 
to judge at all."^ 

Professor, Can we perform any operation of judg- 
ing, without some previous mental act? 

Pupil* We must conceive of a proposition, before 
we can judge that the proposition is true or not 
true; so that there can be no act oi judgment with- 
out some previous conception. This is one general 
law of mental operation. 

Professor. Is there not some reason to suppose^ 
then, that judging is rather a complex^ than a simple 
operation of the human mind? 

Pupil, No more than there is reason to think, be- 
cause a horse goes before the cart, and the cart 
comes after him, that they are not distinct things. f 



* The proposition which is the object of judgment, need not be 
expressed by sounds or letters. It is sufficient that it is conceived of 
fey the mind, " There may be judgment which is not expressed. It is 
a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it by affirmation or 
denial, is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit and not expressed. 
Nay, it is well known that men may judge contrary to what they af- 
firm or deny; the definition," (that judging "is an act of the mind, 
whereby one thing is affirmed or denied of another,") " therefore 
must be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is 
•nly another name for judgment." — Reid. 

■J- « Aulthough there can be no judgment without a conception of 
the things about which we judgej yet conception may be without any 
judgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a 
proposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be 
expressed by a word or words, which maice no complete sentence. 
When simple apprehension is employed about a proposition, every 
man knows that it is one thing to apprehend, a proposition, that is, 
to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to 
be true or false. It is self-evident, that every judgment must be either 
true or false; but simple apprehension or conception can neither be 
trwe nor false, as was shown before. One judgment may be contradio- 



Acts of the Judgment. 61 

The fact, that our Maker has so constituted our 
minds, that we perform our mental operations in a 
certain order, no more destroys the distinctness of 
them, than the order observed in the production of 
flowers and fruits evinces that they are the same. 

Professor* What is the object of every true judg- 
ment? 

Pup'iU A truth. 

Professor. And what is a truth? 

Pupil, 1 shall quote my teacher's language. " Any 
proposition in which is predicated any thing which 
was, is, or will be, in relation to an object, is a truth. 
On the other hand, that proposition in which any 
thing is predicated of an object which neither was, 
nor is, nor will be, is a falsehood." Of course, every 
untrue judgment has for its object a falsehood. 
*'The adjective true denotes something pertaining 
to truth. A true proposition is a truth^"* 

Professor. Can you classify all human judgments? 

Pupil. They are either true or false^ and thus 
may be divided into two classes. 

Professor. These two classes would include all; 
but such a classification would be of little service 



tory to another; and [but] it is impossible for a man to have two judg- 
ments at the same time, which he perceives [conceives] to be contra- 
dictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same 
time without any difficulty. That the sun is greater than the earth, 
and that the sun is not greater than the earth, are contradictory pro- 
positions. He that apprehends the meaning of one, apprehends the 
meaning of both. But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true 
at the same time. He knows that if the one is true, the other must be 
false. For these reasons, I hold it to be certain, that judgment and 
simple apprehension are acts of the mind, specifically different."— 

Reid, 

F 



62 Classification of Judgments, 

to the cause of science, unless you would give \xb 
a list of truths and falsehoods. Do you think of no 
classification more important to the science of mind? 

Pupil. All judgments of the human mind are 
either constitutional or acquired. 

Professor, Distinguish these two classes. 

Pupil. Constitutional judgments are such as im- 
mediately follow some previous mental operation, 
without requiring any induction, or experience. 
They result from the constitution of our minds, and 
are common to all men of sound mind. Acquired 
judgments result from some voluntary, inductive 
process, from testimony, or from experience. 

Professor. Can you reduce constitutional judg- 
ments to specific classes? You know they are nume- 
rous. 

Pupil. We may refer them to the different men- 
tal operations upon which they are consequent, and 
from which they seem spontaneously to arise. 

1. The co7isciousness of the mind is followed in 
every man, by the constitutional judgments, that he 
exists; that he performs the mental acts of which he 
is conscious; that another did not perform them; and 
that his mental operations are not all alike in species 
and degree* No man ever doubted these proposi- 
tions, if we may judge from the universal language 
of mankind; and all men decide that they are true, 
so soon as they form any just notions of conscious- 
ness. 

2. Perception is immediately followed by many 
constitutional judgments. We are so constituted, 
that we no sooner perceive external objects, than 
we judge, that they exist; that they exist without 



Classification of Judgments* 63 

us; that they have such qualities as we perceive in 
them; and that they are perceived through the or- 
gan, which is the instrument of their perception. 
For instance, when I see a horse running full speed 
towards me, I judge that there is a horse, that he 
is running towards me; that he is of a bay colour; 
and that he is not something else than I perceive 
him to be. In like manner, when we know the 
names of things, and perceive them, we judge that 
whatever we perceive really exists, and that our 
senses do not deceive us. These judgments are com- 
mon to all; and hence Berkeley and Hume, while 
they adopted a theory which excluded the actual 
being of all material objects, as firmly judged, in 
spite of their efforts to the contrary, as any men, 
that the ground was under them, and the sky over 
them; that the bodies of their fellow men were 
around them; and that all the objects of their per- 
ception existed, and were such as they perceived 
them to be. Were these constitutional judgments 
not to result from our perceptions, these perceptions 
would be of no practical use in life; for should we 
see a precipice in our path, and not judge, that a 
precipice was there, we should never will to avoid 
it; nor could we conceive of danger from any mate- 
rial substance. 

3. Memory gives rise to other constitutional judg- 
ments; for without any effort, learning, or experi- 
ence, we judge, that our own mental actions, which 
we remember, actually had existence: and that rve^ 
who remember^ did exist. If we remember to have 
heard any one speak, we judge that he did speak; 
and hence in giving testimony, we are said to affirm 



6^ ConstitutioJial Judgments* 

or deny. In testifying, we publish our constitutional 
judgments, that result from memory; for, when we 
affirm, that an arraigned person murdered his bro- 
ther in our presence, we declare that we remember 
to have seen the murderous act performed, and that 
we judge the fact to correspond with our remem- 
bered perception. If we should not judge things to 
have been as we remember to have perceived them, 
our memory would be of no practical utility. All 
4nen, however, are constitutionally constrained to 
judge, that they actually have perceived, conceived, 
judged, inferred, felt, willed, approved, remember- 
ed, been conscious, and acted, as they remember 
they have acted, been conscious, remembered, ap- 
proved, willed, felt, inferred, judged, conceived, 
and perceived. 

4. Many of our conceptions are followed hy judg- 
ments^ for which we can account in no other manner, 
than by saying, that we are so constituted that we 
thus judge, v/ithout reasoning, or any voluntary 
effort. All those conceptions which are properly call- 
ed acts of intuitioji^ are of this description; while 
other conceptions may, or may not be followed by 
judgments, according to the circumstances of those 
conceptions. Thus, I conceive of the meaning of the 
proposition, '-^ I read yesterday ^ and from the cir- 
cumstance that / reynemher to have done it, or am 
told by a credible witness that I did it, I judge it 
to be a truth. But intuition^ without any thing else 
connected with it, is the occasion of all those judg-t 
ments, which being expressed in words, are called 
axioms^ or. self-evident propositions. For example; by 
barely looking into the thing, by intuition^ I discover 



Constitutional Judgments, 65 

and judge, that there can be no effect without an 
adequate cause. We no sooner conceive of the 
meaning of this proposition, by looking into it^ that 
is, by intuition^ than we judge that it is a truth. 

Professor. Let us call these acts of the judg- 
ment, then, that immediately result from intuition, 
intuitive judgments. In most sciences these are the 
most important of our judgments, because all sys- 
tematic arrangements of knowledge are founded on 
axioms. The constitutional judgments, however, 
that are consequent upon perceptions^ are most im- 
portant to the common transactions of life. 

Proceed in your account of constitutional judg- 
ments. 

Pupil, I can think of only one other source of 
them; and therefore I remark, 

5. That an act of conscience is not only preced- 
ed by some judgment, but is also followed imme- 
diately by some constitutional judgment. The action 
of which we disapprove^ we judge ought not to have 
been done. Now conscience approves or disapproves 
of actions, when compared with some moral law. If 
we approve of any contemplated action, we judge 
that it ought to be done. We find too, by consult- 
ing our own consciousness, that we judge a moral 
agent to be praiseworthy or blameworthy, commend- 
able or censurable, according as we approve or dis- 
approve of his moral conduct. 

Professor, Are you satisfied, that these are con- 
s:itutional judgments? 

Pupil, I am; for while a man's conscience per- 
forms diflferent operations at different times, rela- 
tive to the same object; and while different men 
F2 



66 €o72stttiitional Judgments^ 

mutually oppose each other, in their acts of appro- 
bation, and disapprobation; still, every man judges, 
at the time in which he really disapproves of any 
moral action, that it ought not to be done. It is 
common to all men, to judge immediately after the 
operation of conscience on the subject, that men are 
to be justified or condemned, according to their ap- 
probation or disapprobation of their moral conduct. 

Professor* Hence if the conscience is erroneous, 
our judgment, concerning the obligation to perform 
certain moral actions, will be erroneous also. 

Are not some constitutional judgments immedi- 
ately consequent upon reasoning, feeling, willing, 
agency, and even judging? 

Pupil, V^ tx^ feeling used for that species of per- 
ception which you have called touching^ as it some- 
times is, but not by yourself, I should say, that 
every feeling through the instrumentality of a bo- 
dily organ, is followed by ^ judgment^ that we feel^ 
through that particular organ. It is probably, how- 
ever, more correct to say, that the consciousness 
and conception of a feeling are followed by a judg- 
ment, that something has occasioned it. 

Professor. It is true, we judge, that there can be 
no feeling without some cause of feeling; but this 
is an intuitive judgment^ tantamount to our intui- 
tive knowledge of the truth, that there can be no 
effect without a cause. 

You have already stated, that our consciousness 
of judging, reasoning, feeling, willing, and agency, 
is followed by constitutional judgments, that we, 
who are conscious, exist; and that we perform the 
mental operations of which we are conscious. 



Constitutional Judgments, . 67 

You have before stated too, that immediately 
after perception, we judge concerning the bodily 
organ of perception, that we have perceived through 
it. Hence, if you prick a man in the thumb or great 
toe, he instantly perceives it by the sense of touch, 
and has both a judgment that he was pricked in the 
toe, or thumb, according as the fact may have been, 
and a feeling consequent upon the perception. 

This instantaneous judgment concerning the place 
and the mode of our being touched; and indeed, 
concerning the organ, or part of an organ employed 
as an instrumental cause of any perception, is de- 
signed, by our Maker, to regulate our voluntary 
exertions, for the preservation of the body. Without 
it, we should not know to what part of the body we 
should apply preventives or remedies. The painful 
sensations that immediately follow some percep- 
tions, are designed to make us immediately xvill to 
apply some remedy or defence to the part, which 
we judge to be the organ of that perception which 
occasions the sensation. Thus I perceive that I 
touch some sharp instrument. This act of perceiv- 
ing is in my mind. Instantly I have a painful sen- 
sation; and I judge that I touch it with the hollow 
of my right foot. The painful sensation induces me 
to will the removal of the sharp instrument; and 
my judgment directs my hand to the place affected. 
Were I destitute of a painful sensation in this case, 
I might not choose to remove the offending object; 
were I destitute of judgment concerning the organ 
touching the instrument, I should as readily move 
my hand for relief to my left elbow as to the hollow 
of my right foot. 



@8 Judgment, 

Pupil, Is not every sensation immediately fol- 
lowed by a constitutional judgment, concerning the 
cause of that sensation? 

Professor, From intuition we judge, that there 
is no effect without a cause; and consequently so 
soon as we conceive of sensation as an effect, we 
judge that it must have a cause; and hence we learn 
to look for the cause. These constitutional judg- 
ments, I have before said, are the result of concep- 
tions and not of sensation. If any constitutional 
judgment were immediately consequent upon sen- 
sation, we should naturally expect it would relate 
to the perception which occasioned it. Thus I per- 
ceive the drawing of a blister plaster on my wrist, 
and I feel a painful sensation* If any judgment 
should constitutionally follow the sensation^ it would 
naturally be this; that my perception, through the 
wrist, is the occasion of my painful sensation. Now 
I find, by my own consciousness, that I no sooner 
have a perception through the wrist, which is a part 
of my organ of touch, than I judge from perception 
that my wrist is the part affected; but I find I must 
have some reflection, and must conceive of some 
connexion between my perceptions and sensations, 
or between the application to my wrist, and the 
painful sensation, before I judge that my pain is 
produced by the blister plaster. I should think, 
therefore, that this judgment concerning the cause 
of sensation is acquired^ and is dependent upon ex- 
perience, and some previous intuitive judgment. 

Pupil. But why should not sensation be followed 
by a judgment concerning the instrumental cause of 
it, as well as perception? 



Acquired yudgments. 69 

Professor, Our business is to ascertain, in mental 
science, what mental operations actually are per- 
formed, and not tp conjecture what might be. 

It will appear, however, in its proper place, that 
our sensations themselves are all consequent upon 
perceptions; so that if a judgment concerning the 
organ of perception immediately 'follows the per- 
ception, there is no need of another judgment, to 
the same effect, consequent upon sensation. 

Pupil, I wish to know, if we could ever have 
any correct judgments concerning , the nature of 
Reasoning, Feeling, Willing, Agency and Judg- 
ment, without having first performed these mental 
operations? 

Professor, I think not; but then you will please 
to remember, that our judgment concerning the na- 
ture of these operations is consequent upon our 
conception of them; immediately after the perform- 
ance of the acts themselves. Wq jud^e; then are con- 
scious of judging; then judge that we actually have 
judged; then conceive of the nature of the act of 
judging; and then judge that the act is such as we 
conceive it to be. The same is true of the other 
operations just mentioned; apd vf ithoMt conceiving 
of the nature of them, we never form any judg- 
ment concerning their nature. 

Let us now hear what you have to offer concern- 
ing acquired judgments. 

Pupil, Acquired judgments include all operations 
of the judgment which do not result immediately 
from our constitution. We denominate them ac- 
quired^ because we learn to form them. We arrive 



TO Refiective Judgments, 

at them by reflection^ reasonings and attention t» 
testimony. 

Professor, Judgments resulting from reflection, 
may be called reflective judgments. Of this descrip- 
tion are the judgments formed on the bench, and m 
the common acts and intercourse of life, from the 
consideration of a variety of circumstances. Our 
experience is a common subject of reflection; and 
from the two, we judge, that fire will burn us; that 
water will flow down an inclined plane in future; 
that the wringing of the nose will bring forth blood; 
that the sun will rise to morrow; and thousands of 
of similar judgments. 

The result of every course of reasoning is an in- 
ductive judgment; and of all our judgments, these, 
even while they are most applauded among men, 
are most liable to impeachment, and subsequent 
condemnation. Constitutional judgments are never 
reversed by us; reflective judgments sometimes are; 
inductive judgments frequently are. 

Have you any distinct appellation for those judg- 
ments which have some testimoriy for their object? 

Pupil, Believing is an operation of the faculty of 
judging, which has some proposition which is a 
matter of testimony for its object. The proposition, 
~" I think," I judge to be true, because I am con- 
scious of thinking. It is constitutional with every 
man, who thinks and is conscious, thus to judge, 
so soon as he conceives of the proposition. But if 
you assert, that you are now thinking of faith ^ I 
believe the assertion to be a truth. I cannot know 
that it is true, by any other faculty which I possess 
than that of judgment. The ground of my judgment 



Believing^ 71 

13 your testimony; and my previous judgment con- 
cerning your veracity. 

Professor. Is an act of believing- or of faith, an 
acquired judgment? Do we not constitutionally ac- 
credit testimony? 

Pupil, The utterance of truth or falsehood, is a 
voluntary act. Indeed, if men speak at all, it is from 
volition. If they speak what they judge to be truth, 
or falsehood, it is from volition to do so. 

Now we find it to be a fact, that all men choose 
to speak the truth, until they think that some benefit 
will result from speaking falsehood, or from con- 
cealing the truth. This is a general law of human 
nature. 

Professor. But why do men naturally choose to 
speak the truth, under the circumstances which you 
have stated? 

Pupil. I am conscious, that the utterance of what 
I think to be truth, and the recollection that I have 
spoken the truth, are followed by pleasing emotions; 
while the utterance of known falsehood is attended 
with painful ones. I c/zoc?5f, therefore, to speak the 
truth, and not to speak falsehood, because of the 
pleasure consequent upon the former, and the pain 
that I know by experience "attends the latter.' I 
judge, moreover, that the experience of other per- 
sons corresponds with my own. Hence all men 
blush and feel shame, at the consciousness of lying, 
unless they have become in some measure hardened 
by habit. Hence, men naturally feel anger at the 
person who accuses them of intentional falsehood. 

Professor, It is the constitution of our minds 
which has connected painful emotions with con- 



j^2 Believing. 

sciousness of lying, and agreeable ones with the 
consciousness of personal veracity; and it is our ex- 
perience of this constitution, which induces us to 
form the habit of uttering truth at all times, unless 
when we conceive that some advantage, which we 
prefer to these agreeable emotions, or on account of 
which we are willing to endure the painful ones, 
will result from telling an untruth. 

Pupil, This constitutional connexion, I remem- 
ber to have heard you say, constitutes a predisposi- 
tion in all men to utter truth. 

There is also in men, a constitutional predispo- 
sition to believe the testimony which they hear. It 
is constituted by the natural connexion which sub- 
sists between the painful feelings consequent upon 
the discovery that we have been deceived, and the 
agreeable feelings which we find consequent upon 
the discovery, and even the accrediting of truth. 
To believe our neighbour, when he speaks, is natu- 
rally agreeable; to disbelieve him, unpleasant. Hence 
children believe the testimony of their parents, and 
of all who speak to them until they learn to doubt, 
in consequence of having experienced deception. 

Professor, If then, mankind have a natural pre- 
disposition in their mental constitution to speak 
truth, and to accredit testimony, I ask again, if be- 
lieving is not a constitutional^ rather than an ac- 
quired judgment? 

Pupil, Had no obliquity of the human mind oc- 
curred, perhaps it might have been constitutional 
with us to give our assent to every statement made; 
and credulity would never have been knov/n: but 
the facts now are these; that we find in mankind a 



Believing. 73 

constitutional predisposition to veracity and cortfi- 
dence; and that, nevertheless, no article of testimony, 
when proposed to us, is at once, from the consti- 
tution of our minds, judged to be true. I affirm, 
therefore, since every act of believing terminates on 
some proposition which is a matter of testimony, 
and since we do not constitutionally judge the tes- 
timony to be true, that believing is not a constitu- 
tional judgment. It is acquired^ and commonly in 
the following manner. 

We consider the character of the testifier; and 
if we judge that he neither can, nor will utter false- 
hoods, then we subsequently judge that which we 
know he has testified to be true. Hence, the act of 
believing any one's testimony, is commonly subse- 
quent to some prior judgment concerning the author 
of the testimony. It is owing to this, that a judge 
considers the character of a witness, when he wishes 
to form a just estimate of the testimony which he 
gives; for we well know, that the solemnities of an 
oath v/ill not induce some men to tell the truth to 
their own real, or conceived disadvantage. 

When a person is previously judged by us to be 
a competent witness; to be a man of integrity, des- 
titute of an unwise credulity, and well acquainted 
with the subject of which he speaks, we very readily 
judge that his testimony is true. On the other hand, 
if a notorious liar, a foolishly credulous person, and 
one manifestly ignorant of the subject concerning 
which he testifies, should utter the truth in our 
presence, his testimony would not be accredited, 
unless in our judgment some other circumstances, 
G 



74 Believing- and Asseiit. 

with which we are acquainted, should corroborate 
it. 

If we judge a proposition to be true from our 
own reflection on it, or from intuition, we ought 
not to call this judgment an act of believing. 

Professor. Yet men frequently say, that they be-* 
lieve any proposition, which they judge to be true; 
whether it be a matter of testimony or not. Is this 
correct language? 

Pupil, Certainly not, if they would desire to dis- 
tinguish things by a difference in words, which are, 
or should be, the signs of conceptions^ or ideas, or 
of some other mental operations. I think the word 
belief has be^n very generally used for other acts 
of judgment than those of which it is properly de- 
scriptive, in consequence of our figuratively as- 
cribing acts of testimony to objects that cannot lite- 
rally testify. Thus we say, that our senses testify; 
when really they speak nothing; and hence we talk 
of believing them. This will do well enough in figu- 
rative, poetical, rhetorical discourse; but not in 
scientific discussions, or didactic theology. 

Professor. What we personally know to be true, 
we should say we judge or knoxv to be true; and 
when we judge that some statement is true, which 
another declares is true, not because we have per- 
sonal knowledge on the subject, but for some other 
reasons, we should use the language of belief. 

Pupil. What is assent? 

Professor. Ir is a judgment, resulting from re- 
flection, that some proposition which anotiier states 
to us is true. 

Pupil. What is dissent? 



Conviction and Persuasion, 75 

Professor, It is a judgment that some proposition 
which another declares to be true, is not true. 

Pupil, Is consent a judgment? 

Professor, It is generally used to denote a voli- 
tion to comply with some proposed agreement, or 
to acceed to some proffered terms. It is not a judg- 
ment. 

It may not be superfluous to remark, that an act 
of beliefs and an act of faith are synonymous ex- 
pressions; that 2LUY judgment of the truth of a pro- 
position, which results from meditation or the exer^ 
tions which others make to produce the judgment 
in our minds, is called A conviction; and that any 
judgment^ which moves us to a volition to act in 
conformity with that judgment, is called A persua- 
sion. 



CONVERSATION VII. 

The Faculty of Memory. — Objects of Memory. — Local Memory. — 
Classification of the Operations of Memory. — Recollection. — Re- 
membrance. — Memory essential to some Conceptions. — Time. — 
Duration. — Futurity. — Identity. — Knowledge of our own continued 
Mental Identity. — Personal Identity. 

Professor, What is the Faculty of Memory? 

Pupil. The Faculty of Memory in man, is that 
inherent part of the original constitution of his 
soul, by which he has present knowledge of his past 
mental operations. 

Professor. You make mental operations the ob- 
jects of memory: are there no other objects upon 
which the acts of this faculty terminate? 

Pupil. I judge, that there are not; because I am 
conscious of remembering nothing but mental ope- 
rations. 

Professor. Do you not retnember your absent fa- 
ther's face? 

Pupil. It is very commonly said, that we remem- 
ber material objects; but when I carefully examine 
my own mind, I find, that I am conscious of re- 
membering my perceptions^ and even my conceptions 
of my father's face. I remember too, the feelings 
which were consequent upon the sight of his face. 
I remember^ moreover, that I have formerly remem- 
bered these things. In short, I remember, at differ- 
ent times, the simple operations of each faculty; and 



Memory* 77 

those complex ones which result from two or more 
faculties; but I remember nothing but what has 
passed in my own mind. 

Professor. I cannot say that I am conscious of 
remembering any thing else: for had I never seen 
West's celebrated painting of Christ healing in the 
temple, I should not say that I remember it; and 
when I use such language, my meaning is, that I 
remember my seeing it» In the same manner, when 
we commit words to memory, so as to repeat them, 
memoriter, we remember our perception of them, 
either by the eye or the ear. Hence, a memoriter 
preacher, when delivering his discourse, remembers 
the perceptions which he has had of the words, pa- 
ragraphs, and pages of his manuscript; so that he 
" turns over leaves in his mind;" as I have heard 
one say he did, when reciting it to the people. 

Be it remembered, however, that it is a much 
more profitable employment to remember concep- 
tions, judgments and reasonings, than perceptions of 
words, or other things. 

A man who remembers his perceptions through 
his eyes, more readily than any other mental opera- 
tions, is said to have a local memory; or a memory 
that is particularly exercised about positions and 
places. 

A man who can more easily remember concep- 
tions, judgments, and reasonings, than his percep- 
tions of words, has acquired one of the most im- 
portant habits of memory. 

Pupil, I know a person who can remember the 
date of the birth of every relative which she has, 
and they are numerous; but hardly any thing else. 
G2 



78 Different Operations 

Professor. She will serve as an example of local 
memorij, I knew a man too, who, from the inspec- 
tion of maps, could accurately describe the position 
of every known country, river, sea, lake, ocean, and 
mountain under the sun; and he hardly remembered 
any thing else. The origin of this local memory 
will be explained when we treat of hahit. 

Can you classify the operations of human me- 
mory? 

PupiL They might be arranged into ten classes, 
corresponding with the ten faculties of the human 
mind, whose operations are remembered. 

Professor, That would be a very natural classifi- 
i:ation. Do you think of any other? 

Pupil. All our operations of memory are per- 
formed either without, or with, voluntary effort to 
produce them: and thus may be divided into two 
classes. 

Any act of memory which is consequent upon 
some volition, is called an act of reminiscence or 

RECOLLECTION. 

Any act of memory not resulting from some vo- 
lition to recollect, is called remembrance. 

Recollection, therefore, is consequent upon some 
volition to recollect; but I may rememher without 
willing to do it; and even when I desire and xvill 
not to do it. An act of memory may be either recol- 
lection or remembrance. 

Professor. Do you conceive of any resemblances 
between the faculties of Consciousness and Memory^ 
and their respective operations? 

PupiL Consciousness has for its objects nothing 
^ but our own mental operations. The same is' true 



of Memory* f% 

of memory.. Could we cease to be conscious^ or to 
rernejnher^ at pleasure, in consequence of simply 
willing not to be conscious, and not to remember, 
we might escape from all punishment; and even 
from the moral government of parents, civil rulers, 
and our Maker himself. These are resemblances. 

Professor, State the most prominent difference 
between Consciousness and Memory. 

PupiL We are conscious of present mental ope- 
rations; we remember the past. Thus consciousness 
makes us know what we are now doing; and me- 
mory, what we have done. Memory gives per- 
petuity, or at least continuance to our knowledge. 

Professor. Could we have any knowledge of time^ 
or duration^ without memory? 

Pupil. We conceive of time and duration: we do 
not remember them: but as we should probably have 
no conceptions of perception without having actually 
seen, heard, smelt, touched, and tasted; so it is 
most likely we should never have conceived of time 
and duration^ had we never remembered past men- 
tal operations. At any rate, should we conceive of 
perceptions, of time, of duration, and of futurity, 
without having exercised oi^r senses and memory, 
our conceptions would be of that class which we 
have termed imaginations. 

Professor, We find it to be a law of our consti» 
tution, that some conceptions of some things, shall 
be subsequent to some acts of perception or of me- 
mory. I have particularly observed in children in- 
dications, that they had no conceptions of the mean- 
ing of the terms, to-day^ yesterday and to-morrow; 
no conceptions of time past, duration, and futurity; 
until they had exercised the faculty of memory. 



80 Of Memory. 

Often I told my little daughter, when two years of 
age, that " to-morrow I would do something if we 
should live;" and she has answered, " yes. Papa, 
we live;" and for a considerable time could not 
conceive of the difference between living now^ and 
at some future time. Memory, therefore, is actually 
exercised by children, before they learn to conceive 
of time. 

PupiL Dots personalidentzttf consist m conscious- 
ness^ as Mr. Locke affirms that it does; or in Me- 
moryP 

Professor. In neither. Identity is an object oicon* 
ception; not of consciousness^ nor of memory. In 
forming an idea of identity^ we cojiceive of some 
being as having existed in past time, and as existing 
at present, or at some subsequent time; so that with- 
out having some notion of past and of present time, 
we could not conceive of identity. Memory, there 
fore, is as necessary to our conceiving of identity, 
as it is to our conceiving of past and present time. 
We next conceive^ that this being which now exists, 
is the same which did exist; and this is our conception 
of the identity of a being. If we conceive, that any 
thing now is., and from any past time has continued 
to be essentially what it was^ we coJiceive of iden- 
tity; and if we judge that this conception is a con- 
ception of a truth or of a falsehood, we judge con- 
cerning the identity of the thing; that it is the same 
thing that it was, or that it is not the same thing 
that it was. 

I perceive a watch hanging over the mantle-piece. 
I conceive of the meaning of the proposition, that 
watch is the same which hung there yesterday. This 



Of Identity. 81 

is a conception concerning identity. \ judge the pro- 
position to be a truth; and this is a judgment con- 
cerning the identity of the watch. 

Now let me arise and examine the watch. It has 
the same appearance externally, which I remember 
I perceived it had yesterday. I still judge it to be 
the same. Let us open it. The wheels that I ex- 
pected to find within are not to be seen. I reverse 
my judgment concerning identity^ and say, this is 
not the same watch which hung here yesterday. 
The identity of the case I recognize; but it is not 
the watch that it was; for some of the essential 
parts of the watch are gone. Now let me take it to 
a watch-maker; and let him supply all the internal 
parts of a watch. I still recognize the identity of 
the case; but I jadge that the internal parts are nexv^ 
It is no longer the same watch; unless by watch I 
mean merely the case of a watch. 

Again, let us suppose that on opening the watch, 
instead of finding any wheels gone, every thing 
appears within and without, as I remember the 
watch I took down from the same nail did yester- 
day. I now judge this to be the very same watch I 
took down yesterday; because it looks like the same 
and I know there is no other silver watch in my 
house. Under present circumstances I cannot doubt 
its identity. But I may have a wrong judgment in 
this case, for here come ten audible witnesses, who 
all testify, that one of them took down my silver 
watch from that nail last night; that they took it 
to an artist; that he melted the silver case, in their 
presence; and that he melted every internal part se- 
parately; but having done all this, he refashioned 



82 Of Identity* 

the whole again, in the very mould in which it Was 
made, so that every part now appears just as it did 
before it was i educed to a fluid; and that they re- 
stored it to the nail. I believe the witnesses: can I 
predicate identity of this watch, and of the watch 
that hung there yesterday? I cannot. Had I seen 
each part in the crucible, in a fluid state, I might 
have said, these are the identical particles of silver 
which composed my case; and these the identical 
particles of brass that composed the wheels; and co 
of the rest: but this is a new^ another watch; formed 
out of the materials of the old one. Want of con- 
tinued existence as a watch has destroyed its iden- 
tity as a watch. 

Let us now change the subject, and instead of a 
watch, speak of a particular human soul, or mind. 
This mind now exists: and has the ten constituent 
faculties of every human mind. If we judge this 
same mind existed at some time before the present, 
and has now the same faculties which it then had, 
without having ceased to be, between the two given 
points of time, we predicate of it identity. Should 
this mind, however, be annihilated, or cease to be; 
and should another be erected like it, it would be 
another^ and not the same mind. 

Pupil, I remember you have said in your Quar- 
terly Theological Reviexv^ " that mental identity con- 
sists in the continued existence of all the constituent 
mental faculties of that mind of which we predicate 
identity. Take away any one of the ten faculties 
from any human mind, and the identity of that mind 
would cease." The identity of the other faculties 
might be continued, but the mind constituted by 



Mental Identity. 83 

ten faculties would cease to exist; and the being 
that should retain the nine would be a different 
mental being from any now called human. 

Professor, Can you discriminate between mental 
identity^ and the knowledge which the mind has of 
its identity? 

PupiL Very easily! for a man may be in a swoon; 
he may be destitute of all mental operations; and 
yet his mental faculties may all continue in exist- 
ence, and be the very same that had being before 
the swoon* 

" Our knowledge of our own mental identity we 
have by the operations of consciousness and memory; 
which has led many erroneously to suppose, that 
personal identity consists in consciousness, or in 
memory, or in both. We might as well say that the 
identity of a table consists in consciousness^ as that 
the identity of a moral agent consists in knowings 
that he is the same being to-day, that he was yes- 
terday!" garter ly Theological Review, 

Professor, Tell me, then, since you have ex- 
plained what you mean by mental identity^ how a 
man comes by his knowledge that he is the same 
mental being that existed and acted yesterday? 

Pupil, I perform a mental action; I am conscious 
of it; and upon being conscious, constitutionally 
judge, that I now exist. Again, I remember t\i2it I 
was conscious in some past moment; and I consti- 
tutionally judge, that I did then exist. Now should 
the question be started, whether this thijig denoted 
by /, that I call myself bt- a mind or not, I should 
answer, that by /, or myself I mean one individual 
mind. Should it be demanded, Is your mind that 



84 Mental Identity. 

did exist, and now exists, one and the same mindf 
I answer, that I judge it, upon reflection, to be the 
same, in all its constituent faculties; for I am con- 
scious of now performing all the different mental 
operations which I remember that I did perform; 
whence I infer^ that the mind is possessed of the 
same faculties, and is essentially the same. 

Professor. But how do you know, that you have 
not ceased to exist between the time of your present 
consciousness, and that past time in which you re- 
member that you did perform certain actions? 

Pupil. I now remember, that when I was two 
years of age, I saw my paternal grandfather incline 
his chair backwards, until he tumbled over; and 
from my constitution I judge, without being able 
to doubt the truth of my judgment, that /, who now 
remember, now exist; and that /, who now exist, 
did then exists when I remember to have seen what 
occurred. That I, who now exist, am the same in- 
dividual that did then exist, is implied in the con- 
stitutional judgment, that /, who now remember^ did 
then exist. 

Now, if I state the proposition, I have continued 
to exist from the time of the most remote mental 
iteration which I remember^ until the present time, 
in which I remember it, without any cessation of 
being; I conceive the meaning of it, and judge that 
it is a truth. 

Professor. You do indeed thus judge, and so 
does every other rational man. All, who remember, 
judge, that they have continued to exist, uninter- 
ruptedly, from the time in which they remember 
any thing; but the question is, how come they by 



Mental Identity. 85 

this judgment? Is it a constitutional or an acquired 
judgment? Answer this question, and you will then 
show, hoxv a man obtains knowledge of his continued 
mental identity. 

If the judgment is constitutional^ it will be in- 
stantly formed in your mind, without any reasoning 
or deliberation on the subject. If it is constitutional, 
no circumstances can make you seriously doubt it. 

To assist you in forming a correct opinion on 
this subject, let me state a fact. 

Some years ago, a man in Northampton in Mas- 
sachusetts, took his axe, his beetle and wedges, and 
went into the woods to cut, and split, some fencing 
stuff. He went alone, and soon after returned in a 
state of delirium. He continued an active, ingenious, 
crazy person, for seven years. Near the expiration 
of that time, he began to indicate approaching sanity 
of mind; when one day, standing by his fire, and 
instantly turning round, he asked, " Boys, have you 
brought in that axe, the beetle and wedges?" 

" What axe, father?" asked his sons. 

" Why, the one I just left in the woods," said he: 
I had a pain in my head, and came home, and left 
it, with the beetle and wedges." His sons and fa- 
mily told him, that seven years ago, he went into 
the woods; that he had been disordered in mind 
ever since; and that they never had been able to 
find the implements which he then carried with 
him. 

He went with his sons to the spot, on which he 

had left his farming utensils. The helve of the axe, 

and the whole of the beetle, except the iron rings, 

had mouldered under the leaves, and returned to 

H 



86 Mental Identity, 

dust. The axe, and the wedges, and the rings were 
brought home; but the restored naan never was 
able to remember any thing that occurred during 
seven years; and could judge, only from testimony^ 
and reflection^ that he had continued to exist during 
that portion of his life. His judgment of his con- 
tinued identity was certainly acquired. The truth of 
the anecdote may be relied on: I had the account 
from the late President Dwight, a native of North- 
ampton. 

Pupil, This man constitutionally judged, that he 
existed, at each, and every time, in which he re- 
membered any one of his mental operations. 

Professor. All men do the same. 

Pupil. Could we then remember something for 
every moment of our existence, we should consti- 
tutionally judge, that we had existed in every mo- 
»ient, from the present, to the most remote, time, 
in which we remember any thing done. 

Professor, True; but then no man does remem- 
ber something done by himself, in every moment of 
time, during which he judges that he has continued 
to exist; and hence no man constitutionally judges 
himself to be the subject of a continued mental 
identity. 

Pupil, Then the judgment that a man has con- 
terning his own continued mental identity, must be 
acquired; and I am confident that all men have it; 
for no man judges, that he has at any one time 
ceased to exist, since his existence began; and all, 
from time to time, remember certain things, which 
induce the judgment, that they existed at each par- 
ticular time referred to by memory. All remember 



Mental Identitij. 87 

too, some of their mental operations which were 
performed during sleep; and hence judge that they 
exist in time of sleep. In this way they seem to ar- 
rive at the judgment, that they have never ceased 
to exist, since they can remember any thing. 

Professor, One thing, then, is certain, that if a 
man has ever, for a moment, ceased to exist, since 
his mental existence began, he does not knov/ it: 
for he judges that he existed at every time of per- 
forming any remembered actj nor can he believe it, 
for no one has ever testified to his temporary ex- 
tinction of mental being. 

PupiL I should like to hear your account oi per- 
sonal identity. Do you distinguish it from mental 
identity? 

Professor. When we speak of a human person^ 
we mean an individual man, consisting of body and 
soul. Neither the one nor the other alone consti- 
jtutes a person. Now the question may be asked, 
can personal identity be predicated of any one who 
passes from infancy through all the usual changes 
to old age? 

The most important part of the human being, the 
mind, continues essentially the same, from the cra- 
dle to the grave. The body-undergoes numerous 
changes; but there are portions of it, which continue 
from the birth to the dissolution of the frame, by a 
process of corruption. Perfect personal identity, 
therefore, cannot with truth be predicated of any 
man, at two different periods of his life; and yet 
the identity of the mental being, the moral agent, 
may be predicated of one from his birth, to any fu- 
tore period of his existence. 



38 Personal Identity » 

Pupil, What, then, does an old man mean, when 
he says, " I am the very s2iVf\Q person that you knew, 
when I was a little boy?" 

Professor, He intends to assert his mental iden- 
tity, and the fact, that he who now thinks and 
speaks, was once the inhabitant of the little frame 
of the boy mentioned; which frame has grown and 
changed, from time to time, until it presents its 
present appearance of an old man. 



CONVERSATION VIII. 



The Faculty of Reasoning. — Premises. — Conclusion. — A Syllogism.— 
Classification of Reasonings. — Demonstrative and Probable Reason- 
ings. — Metaphysical and Mathematical Reasonings. — Analogical, 
Analytic, and Synthetic Reasonings. — Reasonings a priori, h. poste- 
riori, ad absurdum, and ad hominem. 



Professor. What is the Faculty of Reasoning? 

Pupil. The faculty of Reasoning in man, is that 
inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, 
by which he infers conclusions from premises. 

Professor. What is the result of every operation 
of reasoning? 

Pupil. An inferred judgment.* In reasoning we 
always deduce something before unknown from 
something previously known. 

Professor* What is logic? 

Pupil. The science of Reasoning: or a systematic 
arrangement of all we know about the operations of 
the Faculty of Reasoning. 



* " Reasoning is the process by which we pass from one judgment 
to another, which is the consequence of it. In all reasoning, therefore, 
there must be a proposition inferred, and one or more from which it 
is inferred. And this power of inferring, or draAving a conclusion, is 
only another name for reasoning; the proposition inferred, being call- 
ed the conclusion, and the proposition or propositions, from which it 
is inferred, the premises "-^Reid. 

H2 



90 Reasoning. 

Professor. Could any man reason without having 
some previous operations of judgment? 

Pupih He could not, for reasoning implies some 
previous judgments and an inference from them. 
Without admitted axioms, or self-evident proposi- 
tions, or acquired judgments, reasoning could never 
commence; but when by reasoning we have estab- 
lished any judgment, it may be used as one of the 
premises, from which we derive another conclusion. 

Professor. Your account would make every act 
of reasoning imply a syllogism, expressed or under- 
stood. 

Pupil. A syllogism is nothing more than the ex- 
hibition of a process of reasoning. It consists of 
three propositions, the two first of which are called 
premises^ and the last the conclusion. 

It very frequently happens, however, that we 
state one truth, and infer another from it, without 
naming one of our premises, because it is so obvious 
as to be understood by every one. An argument of 
this kind is called an Enthymeme. Thus we might 
say, " because God is a just being, the just man will 
be justified by him." The last clause of this sen- 
tence is an inference; the first clause is one of the 
premises, from which it is derived; and the other 
is understood. The whole chain would be express- 
ed thus: 

By a just being a just man will be justified: 

God is a just being: 

Therefore, a just man will be justified by him. 

The i&rst of these three propositions is a truth, 
30 generally known and admitted, that in reasoning 
from it, few would take the trouble to state it: and 



Reasonings, 91 

in like manner, we omit thousands of axioms, and 
generally admitted principles of reasoning. 

Professor, Can you classify human reasonings? 

PupiL They are either true or false. The rea- 
soning of any one, in any particular instance, is false, 
when the inference from the premises is not a le- 
gitimate one, or when either of the premises is false. 
An inference may be legitimate, and yet false, when 
either of the premises is false; and the reasoning 
may be false, when an illegitimate conclusion is 
drawn from true premises. 

Professor, What is the usual difference between 
the reasonings of a/oo/and 2i madman? 

Pupil. Tht fool states true premises^ and infers 
from them an illegitimate conclusion. His infe- 
rences do not naturally, and in the view of rational 
men, flow from his premises. The madman^ on the 
other hand, states false premises and argues conclu- 
sively from them. Should we admit his premises we 
could not avoid admitting his inferences. 

Professor* You may give another classification 
of human reasonings. 

Pupil. Dr. Reid has said, " The most remarkable 
distinction of reasonings is, that some are probable, 
others demonstrative." Hence, I should say, that 
in probable reasonings, the" conclusion is probably 
true; but in demonstrative reasonings, the conclu- 
sion is demonstrably true. Demonstrative reason- 
ing is called demonstration. 

Professor. What is the prominent distinction be- 
tween probable and demonstrative reasonings? 

Pupil. In demonstrative reasoning, each of the 
premises is judged to be certainly true, and the con- 



92 Logic* Definition, 

elusion is judged necessarily to result from them: 
but in probable reasonings one at least of the pre- 
mises admits of some doubt. 

Professor. Give an instance of demonstration. 

Pupil. Things which are equal to the same, are 
equal to one another: 

The sum of seven and three, and the sum o(Jive 
and jfive are equal to the same number, ten: 

Therefore the sum of seven and three, and the sum 
of Jive and five are equal to one another. 

The first proposition in this syllogism is a ma- 
thematical axiom; the second is an intuitive judg- 
ment, and neither the one nor the other of these 
premises can be doubted by any offe, who under- 
stands the meaning of the terms used. The conclu- 
sion necessarily follows; and a different conclusion 
cannot be judged even possible. 

Professor. In DuncarCs Elements of Logic, we 
have a similar example. 

" Every number that may be divided into two 
equal parts, is an even number: 

The number eight may be clivided into two equal 
parts: 

Therefore the number eight is an even number." 

Here the first proposition is a definition of a word; 
and if you judge it to be correct, from a conception 
of the meaning of the terms, the conclusion will 
inevitably follow; for every man will, from intuition, 
judge, that the second proposition is true. 

Pupil. But I judge, that the definition is not cor- 
rect; for it would prove every number to be an even 
number. Thus^i;^ as w^ell as eight may be divided 
into two equal parts • Two and a half are ^ part of 



Reasonings. 93 

iive, equal to two and a half^ the other part of five. 
Thus every number may be divided into two equal 
parts. He would have been correct had he said, 
"Every number, the units of which may be di- 
vided into two equal parts, is an even number:" 
for we could not divide the units composing the 
number five into two equal parts. One unit would 
remain after we had made two equal parts, each of 
which should contain twoj and by the definition we 
are to make two even parts by the units, without di- 
viding a single unit into halves. Hence txvo^ fi^^''-) 
six, eighty and ten are called even numbers; for they 
can be equally divided without leaving a unit for 
the remainder; and Q?ie, three, fi'^^t seven, and nine^ 
are called uneven or odd numbers; because the units 
that compose them cannot be divided into two equal 
numbers of units. 

Professor, You are correct. Duncati^s Logic 
might, without any detriment to the cause of 
science, be dismissed from our colleges. Can you 
give as good a criticism on Dr. Reid's division of 
demonstrative reasonings into metaphysical and ma- 
thematical reasonings. You know he says, " The 
reasonings I have met with that can be called strict- 
ly demonstrative, may, I think, be reduced to two 
classes. They are either metaphysical, or they are 
mathematical." 

Pupil, Mathematics, strictly speaking, are things 
learned; and metaphysics include all things known 
concerning the nature, relations, operations and at- 
tributes of all beings which exist. Mathematical rea- 
sonings, therefore, ought to include all reasonings 
concerning things" learned; and metaphysical rea- 



94 Reasonings, 

sonings, all reasonings concerning all beings, oi 
every description. Some have restricted the mean- 
ing of mathematics and metaphysics; so as to denote 
by the former, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra, 
geometry, trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, 
astronomy, and the mensuration of solids,* and by 
the latter, the science of all immaterial substances. 
But such a restriction would not suit Dr. Reid's 
classification of reasonings; for the axioms of ma- 
thematical science, (using mathematical in the re- 
stricted sense.) are such propositions as the mind 
of man, from intuition^ judges to be true; and so 
partake of a metaphysical nature. It is extremely 
difficult, therefore, to class our reasonings of a de- 
monstrative kind, under the two heads of metaphy- 
sical and mathematical^ whether these words be used 
in a restricted, or in their most extensive sense. 
The fact is, deinonstrative reasoning may be em- 
ployed in any, and every science, which contains 
axioms^ or is founded on constitutional judgments. 

Professor, Well: give me an example of Proba* 
ble Reasoning, 

Pupil, What the sun has done uninterruptedly 
for a thousand years past it will do to-morrow: 

The sun for a thousand years past has uninter- 
ruptedly illuminated the portion of earth on which 
we live: 

Therefore the sun will to-morrow illuminate it. 
Of the truth of the first proposition in this conca* 
tenation, we cannot be certain, unless the Creator of 
the sun and earth should assert it. It is possible the 
sun may not illuminate Philadelphia, and the ad- 
jacent country. It is possible j in the nature of things, 



Reasonings, 95 

that it should be annihilated. Were this first propo- 
sition infaUibly certain, as a self-evident truth is to 
our minds, the inference could not be doubted; the 
first could not be otherwise than as it is stated. The 
reasoning, therefore, is not demonstrative: and it 
cannot be demonstrated that the sun will shine here 
to-morrow. He may be completely shorn of his 
beams, for a day, or a month, or for ever. Probably^ 
therefore, might with propriety be inserted in the 
first of these premises, and in the conclusion; as it 
may in every instance of probable reasoning. What 
the sun has done uninterruptedly for a thousand 
years past, it will probably do to-morrow. There- 
fore, it \Y\\\ probably shine on us to-morrow. 

Professor. Were it deducible from any self-evi- 
dent truth, that day and night, seed time and harvest, 
summer and winter, should never cease while the 
world exists, that they should not cease would 
probably never have been made a matter of direct 
revelation. 

Probable reasonings admit of many degrees of 
probability; and \x^on judgments which are probably 
true, we are obliged to act in the greater part of our 
affairs.* 



* *' Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative 
by this, that it admits of degrees; and of all variety of them, from the 
highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption. We cannot 
indeed say a thing is probably true upon one very slight presumption 
for it, because, as there may be ])robabilities on both sides of a ques- 
tion, there may be some against it; and though there be not, yet a 
sligl.'t presumption does not beget that degree of conviction which is 
implied in saying a thip;; is probably true. But that the slightest pos- 
sible presumption is of the nature of a probability, appears from hence, 



96 Analogical Reasoning 



'6-. 



Analogical reasonings are nothing more than a 
species of probable reasonings, in which one or both 
of the premises is a matter of analogy. The syl- 
logism you have just given is an instance; for the 
proposition, that what the sun has done it will con^ 
tinue to do^ is a judgment which we learn to form 
from analogy. 

A few other distinctions I will name. They re- 
spect modes of reasoning. 

When we form judgments by observation and 
experience, or in any other way, concerning indivi- 
dual things, and make them the premises whence 
we infer general or universal truths, we are said to 
pursue the analytic mode of reasoning. Thus, we 
judge from observation, that one gravid substance 
gravitates to the centre of the earth; as Sir Isaac 
Newton judged, that the apple did. Again, we 
judge from what we perceive, that another, and 
another, and another, similar substance does the 
same; until we have formed this judgment concern- 
ing every gravid body, with which we are acquaint- 
ed. Then we reason thus. 

Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. gravitate 
towards the centre of the earth: 

Wood, stone, lead, water, earths, &c. are all the 
gravid bodies with which we are acquainted^ 



that such low presumption, often repeated, will amount even to a 
moral certainty. Thus a man's having observed the ebb and flow of 
the tide to-day, affords some sort of presumijtion, though the lowest 
imaginable, that it may happen again to-morrow; but the observation 
of this event for so many days, and months, and ages together, as it has 
been observed by mankind, gives us a full assurance that it will." 

Bntler's .Analogy. 



Modes of Reasoning, 97 

Therefore, all the gravid bodies with which we 
are acquainted gravitate towards the centre of the 
earth. 

The first of these propositions should enumerate 
in the place of the £ffc. which we have introduced 
for the sake of brevity, every gravid substance, with 
which we are acquainted, and then the inference 
would be as certain as those constitutional judg- 
ments which follow our perceptions. 

Should we choose to adopt the synthetic mode of 
reasonings we might now make some general truth 
one of our premises, and from it infer some parti- 
cular truth; thus: 

All the gravid bodies with which we are ac- 
quainted gravitate towards the centre of the earth: 

Stone is one of the gravid bodies with which we 
are acquainted: 

Therefore, stone gravitates towards the centre of 
the earth. 

You will readily apprehend, that many sciences 
are reared by analytical reasonings; but that being 
already established they may be taught in the syn- 
thetic method, I do not affirm that every systematic 
arrangement of knowledge, on any subject, called a 
science, is made by analytical deductions j for many 
constitutional judgments are themselves general 
principles. Those sciences which are generally in- 
cluded under the title of natural philosophy and na- 
tural history, are all formed originally by analy- 
tical reasonings: but arithmetic, algebra, geometry, 
trigonometry, spherical trigonometry, astronomy, 
and mensuration of solids, have grown out of the 
synthesis of axioms and definitions* 

I 



98 Modes of Reasoning, 

Pupil, Do not the sciences of natural philosophy 
and history depend very much upon analogical, 
probable reasonings? 

Professor. Undoubtedly they do; and therefore 
I wonder, that men of sense should deem natural 
philosophy any more capable of certainty than men- 
tal science. The conclusion, that all gravid bodies 
will gravitate to the centre of the earth to-morrow^ 
is derived from nothing more certain than analogy; 
and from analogy alone can the natural historian 
judge, that all human bodies which he has not dis- 
sected, have viscera essentially similar to those 
which he has dissected; and that the same medi- 
cines in similar circumstances, will produce similar 
effects, on the living subject to-morrow, which they 
have done to-day. 

Pupil. I have heard old logicians talk much about 
reasonings a posteriori^ a priori^ ad absurdum^ and 
ad hominem. Will you explain them? 

Professor, Reasonings a priori^ are inductions 
concerning effects from their causes. The premises^ 
of course, in a priori reasonings, must predicate 
something concerning the cause of a thing; and the 
conclusion from the premises, some inference con- 
cerning an effect of that cause. I give an example, 
from Dr. S. Clark, on the being and attributes of 
God. 

A Being in his own nature infinite, omnipresent, 
and inielligent, must be infinitely wise: 

The Supreme Being is in his own nature, infi- 
nite, omnipresent, and intelligent: 

Therefore the Supreme Being must be infinitely 
wise. 



Modes of Reasoning, 99 

Here the nature of the Supreme Being is consi- 
dered as the cause of his infinite wisdom; which is 
an infinite, unchangeable effect, of this Infinite, 
Unchangeable Cause. 

Reasonings a posteriori^ are inductions concern- 
ing causes from their effects. The premises, in 
reasonings of this kind, must predicate something 
concerning effects. One example will suffice. 

Every intelligent creature must have had an in- 
telligent Creator; 

Man is an intelligent creature: 

Therefore man must have had an intelligent 
Creator. 

Here man is the effect^ concerning which it is 
predicated, that he must have had an intelligent 
Creator: and the Creator is the cause of man's ex- 
istence; concerning which cause we infer, that he is 
intelligent. 

Reasoning ad absurdum^ is an act of reason in 
which you infer some absurd proposition^ with a 
design to establish the converse of that conclusion. 
This mode of reasoning is adopted, because it is an 
undisputed principle of reasoning, that if a proposi- 
tion be false^ the converse of it must be true: and if 
a proposition be true^ the converse of it must be false. 
Thus we may assert. 

That God is a good beings or 
That God is not a good being. 

Each of these propositions is the converse of the 
other; and every one will readily judge, upon the 
slightest examination, that if either is true, the other 
must be false. 

Reasoning ad homznem^ is a reasoning at a man; 



100 Reason* 

or an act of reasoning in which you take a man's 
own propositions, whether true or false, for your 
premises, with a design to refute some of his asser- 
tions, or to convince him of some truth. 

PupiL Do you make any distinction between 
Reason^ and iho. faculty of reasoning f 

Professor, The faculty of reasoning" is sometimes 
called the Reason of a man; but reason more com- 
monly denotes the result of our intellectual opera- 
rations. Hence we say, that our reason teaches us, 
such and such a truth. A reason for an action, is a 
motive; and the reason of an event, means the occa- 
sion or instrumental cause of that event. 



CONVERSATION IX. 



The Faculty of Conscience. — Proof that all men have this Faculty.— 
Other names for the same thing. — Some general Obseryations and 
Laws concerning the Operations of Conscience.— Operations of Con- 
science always occasion certain Feelings. 



Professor, What is the faculty of Conscience? 

Pup'iU The faculty of conscience in man, is that 
inherent part of the original constitution of his souly 
by which he performs mental operations of a re- 
ligious character. 

Professor, You would have it understood, I pre= 
sume, that the religion of which you speak in this 
case may be either true or false ^ rational or absurds 
Scrittural^ Deisttcal^ or Atheistical, 

Pupil, I would; because all men have a religion 
of some sorty as we judge every rational being, who 
has a conscience, must have; but I should be far 
from deciding, that all religions are equally good, 
or that one may be contradictory to another, and 
both be true. 

Professor, How do you know that all men have 
a conscience? 

Pupil, All men with whom we are acquainted, 

or of whom we have ever read, approve of some 

moral actions, and disapprove of others; according 

to the moral law which they have either formed or 

12 



102 Conscience. 

adopted. The law may, in the judgment of others, 
be reasonable or unreasonable; but so long as a man 
approves of the law, in his own mind, he will ap- 
prove of conformity to it, and disapprove of the 
transgression of it. 

Now every act of mental approbation, or disap- 
probation, is a mental operation of which a man is 
conscious; and which, every man may readily be 
convinced, is distinct from any operation of any 
othtr faculty. It is because men are conscious of 
these acts of conscience, and judge them to be dif- 
ferent from other simple operations of the soul, that 
they have given them distinct names. 

From the general principle, that there can be no 
effect without an adequate cause, we infer, that all 
men who approve or disapprove of any moral action, 
must have a faculty of mind by which they perform 
these operations: and this faculty we call Conscience. 
Some denominate it the Moral Faculty^ and others 
the Moral Sense, 

Professor., How do men commonly express their 
approbation or disapprobation of moral actions? 

Pupil. They affirm or deny, that they are right 
or xvrong. They say, that such particular actions 
ought^ or ought not to be done: and that they are 
either morally good^ or morally evil. In short, their 
modes of expressing the dictates of their consciences 
are very numerous. Had' they no consciences, they 
would never speak of a sense of moral obligation^ 
rectitude^ virtue^ piety^ and religion; unless they 
were to imagine things, of which, from experience, 
they could form no conceptions. 

Professor. The fact that men either mentally ac-- 



Conscience, 103 

cuse or excuse themselves, for their own conduct, is 
another proof that they have consciences: and their 
attempts to make other men approve or disapprove 
of certain courses of conduct, are evidence that they 
think other men have consciences as well as them- 
selves. 

PupiL May not every operation of conscience be 
resolved into judgment and feeling'^ and so be ac- 
counted a complex, instead of a simple operation? 

Professor, After mature reflection upon what 
passes within me, I feel constrained to express my 
judgment, that the approbation or disapprobation of 
a moral law or action, is neither a judgment^ nor a 
feelings but a single act, that seems to partake of 
both. I am conscious that I judge the proposition, 
men ought not to steals to be true: I am conscious 
of certain feelings too, consequent upon this judg- 
ment; and I am conscious, moreover, of approving 
of the proposition as a rule. The acts of ^w^a^mj^ 
this moral rule to be true, and of feeling content- 
ment with it, or love for it; appear to my mind to 
be as distinct from a conscientious approbation of it, 
as any acts of memory from those of reasoning. As 
a particle is a word distinct from every other part 
of speech, and yet partakes of the nature of a verb 
and of a noun, so it appears to me, that an act of 
conscience partakes of the nature of a judgment and 
of a feeling, and yet is distinct from each, and every 
other kind of mental operation. 

It is by this faculty that I experience what is 
called a sense of obligation^ and a sense of account- 
ability. 

Perhaps you are able to enumerate some general 



i©4 ' Conscience* 

laws concerning the operations of conscience, which 
will serve to distinguish them from other mental 
acts. 

Pupil. I am conscious of approving' or disapprov- 
ing actions only when I remember that I have com- 
pared them with some rule of moral conduct, and 
judged them to be conformable or not conformable 
to it. 

Professor, Every operation of conscience, then, 
relative to moral actions, presupposes an act of the 
judgment. 

Pupil, Certainly; for I never approve of any ac- 
tion without previously judging that it is right; that 
is, conformable to some rule of action, which I have 
laid down. 

Again; I never judge any law to be reasonable, 
equitable, and obligatory, without some previous 
conception concerning it: the same is true of my 
judgmenr concerning actions; it is consequent upon 
some conception of them, and of their relation to a 
law: so that my moral approbation is consequent 
upon my judgment, and my judgment upon my con- 
ceptions. 

Professor, Ultimately, then, our dictates of con- 
science are dependent on our conceptions; and hence 
we learn the importance of having right concep- 
tions, or a right understanding of things; for if a 
man verily thinks, (conceives and judges,) that he 
ought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth, 
his conscience will approve of the action. Hence 
we hear of the blinding and perversion of conscience. 
It is by having a darkened understanding, that men 
approve of what is wrong in the judgment of more 



Conscience. 105 

enlightened and exalted minds. If you would pro- 
duce in a man a good conscience, rectify his con- 
ceptions and judgments. 

PupiL It must be owing to this connexion be- 
tween the operations of Conception and Judgment, 
and those of Conscience, that the most ignorant 
people, generally speaking, are the most vicious. 

Professor. Undoubtedly; their consciences in 
many cases are not exercised at all; and in other 
instances, from wrong notions concerning law, duty, 
and the nature of moral actions, they approve of 
moral evil. 

PupiL It is another peculiar law of Conscience, 
that if a man acts contrary to his own moral appro- 
bation, he immediately disapproves of his own trans- 
gression. In figurative language. Conscience alv/ays 
makes a man condemn himself, for not doing what 
she approves, and for doing what she condemns. A 
similar law exists in relation to no other mental ope- 
ration. We may act contrary to any other mental 
operation, and she will not infallibly condemn us. 
Indeed she often approves of our yielding our own 
judgment, for the sake of peace; and requires oppo- 
sition to some of our most ardent emotions; but if 
any man dare to act contrary to his Conscience, 
however uninformed, or misinformed, she may be, 
Conscience will surely scourge him. It is for this 
reason she has been called the Vicegerent of God 
in the soul; and is often compared to an impartial 
Judge. 

Professor, Dr. Reid has very well remarked; 
" Conscience prescribes measures to every appetite, 
affection, and passion, and says to every other prin- 



106 Conscience* 

ciple of action, so far thou mayest go, but no fur- 
ther. We may indeed transgress its dictates, but 
we cannot transgress them with innocence, nor even 
with impunity. We condemn ourselves, or, in the 
language of Scripture, our heart condemns usy when- 
ever we go beyond the rules of right and wrong, 
which Conscience prescribes. Other principles of 
action may have more strength, but this only has 
authority. Its sentence makes us guilty to ourselves, 
and guilty in the eyes of our Maker, whatever other 
principle may be set in opposition to it. It is evi- 
dent, therefore, that this principle has, from its na- 
ture, an authority to direct and determine, with re- 
gard to our conduct; to judge, to acquit, or to con- 
demn, and even to punish; an authority which be- 
longs to no other principle of the human mind." 

Pupil. It is another law of Conscience, that every 
act of disapproving of our own past conduct, should 
be immediately followed by some emotion of shame^ 
self- contempt^ or disgust with ourselves: and ano- 
ther, that disapprobation of the past conduct of 
others should occasion in us the emotions oi disgust, 
aversion^ discontentment ^ contempt or indignation in 
relation to them. 

On the other hand, approbation of our own or our 
neighbour's past moral actions, is immediately fol- 
lowed by some agreeable affection in our own minds. 

Professor, Operations of Conscience, then, are 
always productive of pleasure or pain. 

Pupil. And in this way Conscience rewards or 
punishes men in the present life. 

Professor, Is there any distinction between those 



Conscience, 107 

operations of conscience, which respect the conduct 
of other men; and those which regard ourselves? 

Pupth When we approve or disapprove of our 
own conduct, our consequent emotions are more 
ardent, than those which ordinarily follow our ap- 
probation or disapprobation of the conduct of our 
fellow men. This has led Dr. Wylie to divide the 
operations of conscience into those of seoscience and 
heteroscience; or into acts of conscience that respect 
ourselveSy and acts of conscience that respect others* 
These may be considered as two classes of opera- 
tions performed by one faculty. Our general rulcj 
therefore, may be expressed thus: acts of seoscience 
are commonly followed by emotions more pleasing 
or more painful than those which are consequent 
upon heteroscience^ 



CONVERSATION X. 



The Faculty of Feeling.— Feelings distinguished from other Mental 
Operations. — One general Law of Feelings. — Classification of all 
Human Feelings.— Sensations considered. — Three Appetites. — 
Uses of the Avord Taste.~Emotions.-~Description of the principal 
Affections of Man .-—A rule concerning inordinate Affection. — Re- 
gard. 



Professor, What is the faculty of Feeling? 

Pupil, The faculty of feeling in man, is that 
inherent part of the original constitution of his soul, 
by which he experiences feelings. This is the sen- 
sitive faculty.* 

Professor, Can you define those mental opera- 
tions that you c \\ feelings? 

Pupil. If I cannot define them, I am conscious 
of them, and therefore I know that I am the sub- 
ject of them. I can distinguish them from all other 
mental operations, by stating this fact, that they 
have no object distinct from themselves; whereas 
every other mental operation has some object upon 
which it terminates. If I perceive it is some object 
without the mind, which is presented through our 



* " It is the mind that feels; it is to the mind alone that the sensa- 
tions belong," says CondiUac, very truly; but feeling he unhappily 
uses for perceiving, and sensations for perceptions. Hence he says, 
*' we hbve nve sorts of sensations. The iToind feels through sight, 
hearing, smell, taste, and chiefly through touch." 



, Pleasure and Pain, 109 

bodily senses; if I conceive^ it is of some substance, 
or attribute, or image, or meaning of a word, clause, 
or sentence; if we judge or reason^ some proposition 
is the object; if we are conscious or have memory^ 
it is of some mental operation; if we approve or dis- 
approve^ it is something of a moral nature; if we 
wi//, it is to do, or not do, some action; and if we 
exert our efficiency^ it is upon some mental faculty 
or bodily organ; but if we feel^ it must be some 
feelings and nothing else. 

Professor, In what consists all human happiness 
or unhappiness? 

Pupil, In human feelings. Were we destitute of 
these, we should feel neither pleasure nor pain. All 
the happiness or unhappiness, which we derive from 
our thoughts^ is inherent in the feelings which they 
produce; for, if we have any degree of the one or 
the other, we feel it. 

Professor, It seems necessary for you to define 
the word thought; that no misconception may arise 
from the manner of your using it. 

Pupil, Any operation of any one of the seven fa- 
culties of The Understanding, I call a thought. 
Agency, volition, and feeling are mental operations, 
which we exclude from the^ catalogue of thoughts; 
and they are excluded in all languages. 

Professor, You would assert then, I suppose, as 
a general rule, that men never have any feeling ex- 
cept in consequence of some thought, volition, or 
efficiency,^ 



* " It is a fact universally admitted, that no emotion or passion ever 
starts up in the mind without a cause: if 1 love a person, it is for good 

K 



110 Classification oj Human Feelings, 

Pupil. Upon self-examination, I judge, that every 
feeling I ever had, was preceded by some thought, 
volition, or efficiency, which was the occasion of it. 
If our feelings were not dependent on some previ- 
ous mental operation, or upon some antecedent, it 
would be very absurd to inquire, what is the occa- 
sion of our having one feeling and not another; or 
why we feel as we do. If we give the reason for 
QMY feeling in any particular instance, it will uni- 
formly prove to be some thought^ volition^ or men- 
tal agency* 

Professor* Human feelings are very numerous: 
can you classify them? 

Pupil, I can recite your classification, which 
seems to me to be correct. 

" All human feelings may be divided into sen- 
sations and emotions. 

" Our Sensations* are those feelings which are 
immediately consequent upon omx perceptions of ob- 
jects without the mind, through the five bodily 
organs of sense. 

" Our Emotions are ihost feelings which are con- 
sequent upon other mental operations than our per- 
ceptions^ by the organs of sense. 



qualities, or good offices: if I have resentment, against a man, it must 
be for some injury done me: and I cannot pity any one who is under 
no distress of body nor of mind." — Lord Karnes. We must conceive, 
we shouid say, of some good quality, or office; of some injury, or of 
some distress, before we can feel love, resentment, or pitz/; for we 
may feel if all these are imaginary things; but we cannot feel without 
some conception of them as real. 

• " Sensations," says Price, " is only a mode of feeling in the 
mind."— JBmew of Morals, p. 19. 



Classification of Human Feelings, 111 

^' Emotions are subdivided into Affections and 
Passions. 

" Affections are those emotions of the mind which 
are naturally pleasurable to us. 

'•^Passions are those emotions of the mind which 
are naturally painful to us. 

" This brief classification includes every feeling of 
which we are conscious."* 

Professor, According to this account of sensa- 
tions^ they are always consequent upon perceptions. 
How do you know that men do not feel through 
their bodily organs when they have no perceptions? 
Is it not common for men to say, " I feel that this 
is smooth, this rough, this soft, and this hard?" Do 
they not tell you, that they feel pain in their eyes, 
when oppressed with too much light; and in their 
fingers when they are cold? 

Pupil* It is customary, indeed, for people to say, 
that they feel., whenever they perceitie any thing; 
and they speak of feeling"^ as if it were equivalant 
to perception,, because every perception is followed 
instantly by a feeling of some kind. Feeling too is 
often used for touching; but because a feelings dis- 
tinct from the perception of a thing by the touchy is 
consequent upon every act of touching, we should 
distinguish in our language between touching and 
feeling. 

Professor. Now, for the proof that the particular 
kind of feeling which we call sensation is always 
consequent upon perception. 



* Quarterly Theological Review, voil. i. p. 454. 



112 Sensations, 

Pupil. Well, then, when I put my finger upon 
a polished surface, I am conscious that I touch or 
perceive something smooth; and I am conscious that 
I have an agreeable sensation immediately following 
the perception. When I touch a rough, and espe- 
cially a prickly substance, I am conscious that a 
very difFerent/^^/i/z^, or sensation^ immediately fol- 
lows the act of touchin^^ from what I experienced 
when I touched something smooth and polished. I 
find the same to be true, when I attend to any ope- 
ration of seeing, hearing, smelling, or tasting: so 
that my consciousness teaches me, that every per- 
ception to which I attend, is followed by some sen- 
sation: and no man can say that his perceptions to 
which he does not attend, are not thus followed, 
unless he can testify to that of which he knows no^ 
thing. 

That I never h2iv^ 2i sens alio n^^ but in consequence 
of some perception, I deduce from the fact, that I 



* Dr. Hartley has well said, ** Sensations are those internal feel- 
ings of the mind, which arise from the impressions made by external 
objects upon the several parts of our bodies.*' Another sentence that 
deserves, from its obvious truth, to be cited, can scarcely be found in 
Lis " Observations on J^Ian.^* That work is a fanciful attempt to ex- 
^>Iain ho-w all mental operations may be imputed to the instrumental 
agency oi vibratio7is in the injiiiitesimalivhite me diiUary particles in the 
substance of the brain, spinal marroio^ andnerves. That there are an}' 
such vibrations he has not pi'oved; and no one can affirm, from his 
own observation, feeling, reason, consciousness, or experience of any 
sort. Dr. Hartley, however, admits, that these vibrations are merely 
the instrumental, and not the efficient causes, of sensations, and other 
mental operations^ so that he no more accounts for the intercourse 
between the soul and body than those >vho confess it to be inoompre_ 
Lensible. 



Sensations. 113 

am able to trace my sensations to some antecedent 
perceptions. 

Again, I know that objects of perception have 
been sometimes presented to my bodily senses, and 
that I had no sensations in consequence of their 
physical action on my body, until I perceived them. 
For example, I have been walking the streets in 
such a state of mental occupation, that I have not 
perceived a friend whose image, I subsequently 
learned, must have been formed on the retina of my 
eyes; and not perceiving him, I had no such a sen- 
sation of a pleasurable nature as always follows the 
perception of his animating face. Had my sensation 
been immediately dependent on physical impression^ 
I should have had a pleasing sensation from the 
image of my friend in my eye, without perceiving 
him. I give another instance. I have been so en- 
gaged in study for some time, as not to perceive 
the pricking of a pin; and I felt no painful sensation 
until I had perceived it. 

Professor, All who have attentively examined 
their own mental operations, must have found, that 
the faculty of Conception, and several other facul- 
ties, are often so busily engaged as not to afford 
the faculty of Perception leisure, or opportunity, to 
operate. Hence a very thoughtful man may ride 
through a fine country, and perceive very few of 
its beauties. Such a person is frequently called an 
absent man; for indeed he seems to be like one ab- 
sent from the objects of perception that surround 
him. When engaged in writing, I do not hear the 
conversation, which passes in the usual tone, in my 
chamber; and very frequently mental science so 
K2 



^14» Sensations* 

engages my Reason, Judgment, Memory, and Con- 
eeption, that the shrill voices of my children, pulling 
at my knee, to ascend into my lap, are scarcely per- 
ceived, while the same action of the modulated at- 
mosphere on my ears, at other times, would be the 
occasion of my hearing every syllable. So long as I 
do not hear the noise of my children, it gives me 
no painful sensation. 

Pupil. Your remarks have brought to my re- 
membrance this fact, that men who feel acute sen- 
sations of pain, from the gout, rheumatism, or other 
disease, may for a time, by close attention to some 
important, interesting study or business, avoid feel- 
ing the pain. 

Professor, By their energetic attention to some 
intellectual subject, they preclude, for the time, all 
perception of objects through their senses; especially 
the operation of inflammation, or other disease, upon 
the organs of touch; and so have no sensations^ be- 
cause they have no perceptions. Not long since, I 
was wounded on the knee; and the pain was intense 
so long as I perceived any thing through my knee; 
but for a little time, when I could deeply engage 
my mind in the study of mental science, or theolo- 
gical inquiry, or devotional exercises, I had no sen- 
sations of pain from my knee, because I ceased to 
perceive through the wounded part. 

I lay it down, therefore, as a fundamental law, 
that man has no sensation except in consequence of 
some antecedent perception. 

Can you reduce our sensations to classes? 

PupiL They may be divided into as many classes 
Sis we have species of perceptions, or bodily organs 



Sensations, 115 

of sense. They are sensations consequent on seeing, 
hearing, smelling, touching, or tasting.* In each of 
these classes we may find as many sensations as 
we have ever performed acts of perception. Every 
distinct colour, when seen, is the occasion of a dis- 
tinct sensation; and so is every modification of 
figure, v/ith every other visible object. 

Professor, What do you mean by The Appetites 
of man? 

Pupil, Any sexual sensation, any sensation from 
hunger, and any sensation from thirst, is an appe- 
tite. The appetites of course include three species of 
sensations, which are the most powerful and influ- 
ential. The word appetite is derived from appeto, 
to catch at, or earnestly seek any thing. The appe- 
tites, figuratively speaking, may be said, to catch at^ 
or earnestly seek^ that which will gratify them. 

" Our other sensations generally derive their 
names, when they have any, from the qualities of 
external things, which, being perceived, occasion 
those sensations. Usually we couple an adjective, 
descriptive of the quality, with the verb feel. Thus 
we say, I feel hot, I feel cold, I feel warm, &c."f 
The philosophical explanation of these expressions 



* ** Every feeling, pleasant or painful, must be in the mind; and yet, 
because in tasting, touching, and smelling, we are sensible of the im- 
pression made upon the organ, we are led to place there also the plea- 
sant or painful feeling caused by that impression; but, with respect to 
seeing and hearing, being insensible of the organic impression, we are 
not misled to assign a wrong place to the pleasant or painful feelings 
caused by that impression; and therefore we naturally place them ia 
the mind, where they really are." — Lord Kames. 

t Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 457. 



116 Sensations, 

is this. I perceive hot air^ or some other hot sub- 
stance; I have a sensation of a peculiar kind, conse- 
quent upon the perception of heat: I perceive cold 
air, water, ice, or some other cold substance, and 
have a sensation from the perception of coldness; 
I perceive warm air, or something else of a warm 
quality, and I have a sensation of warmth, Cold^ hot^ 
and warm are adjectives, that must agree with some 
noun, or name of a thing, of which they denote some 
quality. 

*» If we touch a rough object, the feeling conse- 
quent upon the perception of the roughness by the 
touch, we call a sensation of roughness* In like 
manner, we speak of feelings, or sensations, of 
smoothness, hardness, softness, and the like. A great 
multitude of sensations are consequent upon our 
perceptions through the eye, for which we have no 
distinguishing terms. Every different effect pro- 
duced in or upon the body, being perceived, occa- 
sions a distinct feeling. Thus from the pricking of 
a pin we have one sensation; from the act of pinch- 
ing, another; from the gout in the system, another; 
from tasting twenty different liquors, twenty more; 
and instead of naming each distinct and different 
sensation, we merely say, that we feel pleasure or 
pain, in the part of the body, which we judge to be 
the organ affected, or the bodily instrument of the 
particular perception, that occasions the feeling."* 

Professor. What do you mean by pleasure and 
pain? 



* Quarterly Theological Review, vol. i. p. 458. 



Taste, Emotions* 117 

Pupil. '•'• Pleasure and pain are attributes of feel- 
ing; and the feeling really is in the mind. We say 
the pain is in one of our bodily organs of percep- 
tion, merely because we have the painful sensation 
through the instrumentality of that organ. For the 
same reason we say the pleasant taste is in our 
mouth."* 

Professor, What do you mean by taste? 

Pupil. An act of tasting is a mental perception 
through the mouth, palate, and tongue. An act of 
tasting is sometimes called a taste; and the sensa- 
tion consequent upon this act of tasting is also fre- 
quently called a taste. The term moreover is figu- 
ratively used to denote nice discernment^ especially 
in works of imagination, and the lively emotions 
consequent upon that nice discernment. 

Accurate discrimination upon moral subjects^ ac- 
companied by lively emotions^ is frequently called 
moral taste. 

To apply taste to the operations of Conception, 
Judgment, Emotions, and the works of Imagina- 
tion, such as painting, music, and sculpture, will 
answer in figurative, but not in philosophical dis- 
course. 

Professor, Under the general term feelings you 
have included sensations and emotwns; and under 
the term emotions you include affections and pas- 
sions. Let us have your account of the affections. 

Pupil. Every one is conscious of having those 
mental operations which we call affections,^ and is 



Quarterly Theological Review, tol. i. p. 458. 



118 Various Affections 

able to conceive of them. It is only requisite to de- 
scribe, and distinguish them as clearly as possible. 
All of them we cannot be expected to enumerate; 
for not all of our emotions have distinct names. 
Many of them require a circumlocution to express 
them. 

The account which I give is but a recitation, with 
a few interpolations, from the ^arterly Theological 
Review. Among the AFFECTIONS we enume- 
rate, 

I. Love, which is a pleasing emotion, consequent 
upon the conception and judgment, that some ob- 
ject is lovely, either on account of some of its in- 
herent attributes, or because it is calculated, to pro- 
mote some agreeable feeling in ourselves. 

The emotion of love ^ is a generic expression, which 
includes several species; which are designated, gene- 
rally, according to the object upon which the men- 
tal operation terminates, or else according to the 
relation of the person who loves. Hence we have, 
1. Paternal love, which is the love a father exer- 
cises. 2. Maternal love, which is the love a mother 
feels. 3. Conjugal love, which is the love married 
persons exercise towards each other as partners. 
4. Filial lovey which a sister exercises. 5. Fraternal 
love, which a brother feels. 6. Social love, which is 
the love of society. 7. Personal, or Self-love; which 
is the love of ourselves. 8. Selfishness, which is the 
inordinate love of one's self. 9. Benevolence, which 
is love of the happiness of others. 10. Complacencyy 
which is the love of an object for its inherent attri- 
butes, or for its own sake. 11. The love of fame ^ 



of the Human Mind, 119 

the love of knowledge^ the love of power ^ and the 
love of happiness^ which need no explanation. 

II. Joy is another strong affection, consequent 
on some thought of an event or object, past, pre- 
sent, or expected, which we deem very desirable 
for ourselves, or in relation to others.* When we 
think again of any source of joy, and feel a new, 
similar emotion, we are said to rejoice, " Gladness 
is an inferior degree of joy; it may be excited by 
Incidents, agreeable or disagreeable in themselves, 
which are not of sufficient moment to raise the ec- 
stasies of joy."f 

III. Contentment is an affection consequent up- 
on our judgment, that the thing with which we are 
contented, is not to be dispraised, blamed, or high- 
ly commended. It is a feeling which often results 
from contemplating conduct, circumstances, cha- 
racters, or events that neither displease, nor afford 
much, if any, positive gratification. 

IV. Satisfaction is an emotion which we ex- 
perience, when we judge, that any object is fit, 
suitable, reasonable, or what might have been ex- 
pected; or in consequence of thinking of the accom- 
plishment of some desire. Hence we say, " we are 
satisfied with your conduct,^' when any one has 
conducted as we should have desired him; and 
hence the Christian says, in relation to the Supreme 



* "In no situation doth joy rise to a greater height, than upon the 
removal of any violent distress of mind or body; and in no situation 
doth sorrow rise to a greater height, than upon the removal of what 
makes us happy." — Lord Karnes. 

t Cogan's Philosophical Treatise, p. 64 , 



120 Afcctiom, 

object of this affection, " I shall he satisfied, xvhen 
I axvake in thy likeness J'^ 

V. Cheerfulness is a moderate affection which 
we experience, in consequence of some thought about 
objects with which we are contented. It has for its 
object generally our present state, and future pros- 
pects. It is a feeling which occupies a place between 
gladness and contentment; being inferior to the first, 
and superior to the last. It is generally of longer 
continuance than any more ardent emotion. 

VI. Desire is an affection which we feel in con- 
templating an object, which we love, and do not 
possess; or an action, that we judge would promote 
our happiness by being accomplished. A Wish is 
the verbal expression of a desire. 

VII. Hope is an affection consequent upon the 
desire of some object, which we judge to be both 
good and probably attainable. We may desire that 
which we think we shall never be able to obtain;* 
but we hope only for that, which we have some 
expectation that we, or others, shall obtain, or re- 
ceive. 

VIII. Delight is an ardent emotion which we 
experience on obtaining an object desired or hoped 
for; or in consequence of juf^ging something to be 
what we highly approve of, and ardently love. 

IX. Confidence is an emotion consequent upon 
some act of faith, in relation to the word of the 



* Full conviction of the impossibility of gratifying any desire, will, 
however, commonly prevent the recun-ence of desire, after the thing; 
of which we despair. 



Affections. 121 

person in whom we confide. We never confide in 
any person, without previously judging that he is 
true, and competent to promote the happiness we 
expect. 

X. Gratitude is an emotion consequent on a 
judgment, that some one has intended to confer, or 
has actually conferred, a favour on us. 

Thankfulness is the name we give any grate- 
ful emotion, when it moves us to a verbal expres- 
sion of our gratitude^ and the actual expression of 
gratitude is thanksgiving, 

XI. Resignation is an emotion which we feel 
in consequence of some judgment, that it is wise, 
proper, best, or necessary, upon the whole, to yield 
our will to the will of another. It is an affection 
which often moves us to resolve, that we will make 
no resistance. 

XII. Patience is an emotion consequent upon a 
judgment that it is reasonable and best to wait and 
endure. It is a feeling which moves in us the de« 
termination to suffer without complaining. 

XIII. Humility is an emotion that results from 
some thought of comparative unworthiness. Of 
course, it implies some previous judgment, that the 
person or law, with which we compare ourselves, 
is worthy and excellent. 

XIV. Meekness is an emotion which we expe- 
rience, subsequently to some thought of insult or 
injury, and to a persuasion that it is not right, or 
suitable for us to avenge the insult or injury. It is 
that feeling which prevents our choosing to retaliate, 
Christ felt meekness^ when he was sensible of the 
injury done him, and yet opened not his mouth, 

L 



122 Affections^ 

XV. Pity is an emotion consequent upon oui*' 
judgment that another suffers pain, or is exposed 
to suffering, and a desire to afford relief. 

Some may question whether this should not be 
called a passion instead of an affection; but appeal 
being made to consciousness, the last umpire in 
matters of this sort, we are compelled to say, that 
we have never felt pity without having some degree 
of satisfaction in the emotion. 

XVI. Esteem is an emotion consequent upon 
our appiobation of a person's moral character, or a 
judgment that the object esteemed possesses worth, 

XVII. Respect is a feeling consequent upon 
a judgment, that a person possesses some degree, 
at least, of both wisdom and goodness. 

Veneration is a name given to a high degree of 
respect, for persons eminent in wisdom and good- 
ness. 

XVIII. Reverence is an emotion consequent 
upon some thought of a being, whom we judge to 
be great and powerful, as well as wise and good; 
or of something appertaining to such a being. Holy 
reverence regards aj^erson, or the attributes of a 
person, divinely great, powerful, wise, and good: 
and hence we are said to feel holy reverence for 
God and his house; for his word and ordinances. 

XIX. Admiration is a sudden emotion, con- 
sequent upon the thought of something sublime, or 
more than commonly excellent in some respect. 

XX. Surprise is an emotion that results from 
the apprehension of something novel and unex- 
pected. 

XXI. Wonder is an emotion consequent upon 



Affections. 12S 

the apprehension of something deemed strange, or 
unaccountable. 

Astonishment is a name given to a very great 
degree of wonder. 

XXII. Amazement is a feeling consequent upon 
some thought of something novel, unexpected, great, 
and intricate. 

XXIII. Curiosity is an emotion consequent 
upon the judgment that something new to us, may 
be perceived, understood, or felt, to the promotion 
of our happiness. 

Professor » How do you know that Surprise, 
Wonder, Astonishment, Amazement and Curio- 
sity, should not be classed with our passions? 

Pupil. I know from my own experience, that 
they afford me pleasure; and I judge that they are 
felicitous to others, for those who have felt these 
emotions desire to feel them again; and take pains 
to excite them. The chief pleasure experienced in 
attention to a play, a novel, and a volume of travels 
or history, consists in the mental operations of this 
kind, which are excited by such attention. The 
pleasure found in these mental affections, induces 
men to travel far from home; or sit for hours in the 
odious atmosphere of a theatre. It is the pleasure 
found in these emotions that induces the ignorant 
to listen to every tale of horror, superstition, ima- 
gination, and wild romance. 

Professor. Since all our affections are, in their 
own nature, felicitous, will it not follow, that every 
affection is lawful an«l proper? 

PupiL It is to be remarked, that we may feel 
an affection for an improper object; or for a proper 



124 Affections, 

object in an unreasonable degree; and every such 
emotion is called an inordinate affection. When an 
inordinate affection induces an evil volition^ it is 
said to be a malevolent affection. It should be re- 
membered, moreover, as a general law of feeling, 
That every inordinate affection produces some 
passion^ which is in some degree painful. Selfish' 
ness^for instance^ is an inordinate love of one's self, 
which invariably occasions in the person who exer- 
cises it, some emotion of pride, grief, anger, resent- 
ment, shame, or the like. 

Professor, Is not Regard an affection? 

Pupil. Regard is a general term, used to denote 
any emotion exercised in relation to any object. 
Hence we have aff'ectionate and passionate regards. 
I regard a man, if I feel any emotion relative to 
him, whether it be good or bad, pleasing or pain- 
ful. If I have no regard to a man, he excites in 
me no emotions, whether favourable or unfavour^- 
able to himself. 



CONVERSATION XI. 



Account of the Human Passions. — Lawful Passions. — Some general 
Laws of Feeling. — Sympathy, Commiseration, Compassion, defin- 
ed. — Relative Importance of the Intellectual and Sensitive parts of 
our Mental Nature. 



Professor, Let us now have your description of 
the Passions of man. 

Pupil, I shall proceed with my recitation from 
your Review; and intersperse a few of my own re- 
marks. 

Professor, Proceed; and make such alterations 
and remarks as you deem meet. 

Pupil, Among the PASSIONS we enumerate, 

I. Hatred, which is an unhappy feeling, con- 
sequent upon some painful sensation, or some 
thought of an object which we judge to be hateful 
in itself, or unfavourable to ourselves, or to some 
one whom we love. It is an emotion directly oppo- 
site to love, 

II. Sorrow is' a strong passion consequent upon 
some thought of an event past, present, or ex- 
pected, which we judge to be very undesirable for 
ourselves, or in relation to others. 

III. Grief is an emotion, consequent upon the 
disapprobation of some conduct in ourselves, or in 
some one whom we love or esteem. We haU the 

L 2 



126 Human Passions. 

bad conduct of our enemies; but we grieve only for 
ourselves, or some beloved object. 

IV. Sadness is a passion of some continuation, 
consequent upon some thought of the loss of, the 
want of, or the despair of, something good, but 
not in an exalted degree. It is a feeling inferior to 
sorrow and grief, but superior to discontent. 

V. Discontent is a passion that we experience 
in consequence of some judgment, that the thing 
with which we are discontented deserves to be dis- 
praised or censured, but not in a great degree. It 
generally refers to some state, or substance. 

VI. Dissatisfaction is a passion which we 
find consequent on some judgment, that the object 
of our dissatisfaction is unfit, unsuitable, unreasona- 
ble, or different from what we might have expected 
or desired. 

VII. Disappointment is the passion which we 
feel in consequence of not obtaining some expected 
good. 

VIII. Despair is a deep and settled passion, con- 
sequent on a full conviction, that there is no longer 
any reason to hope for some object which we desire. 

IX. Aversion is a passion, dependent for its 
existence on the thought of something so offensive 
in its own nature, that we wish to think of it no 
more. Figuratively speaking, we wish to turn away 
our mind from an object of aversion. 

X. Disgust is a strong emotion, consequent 
upon some strong disapprobation of some person 
or conduct, on account of something in him or his 
conduct, obscene, base, mean, or vulgar. 

XI. Ingratitude is a feeling consequent upon 



Human Passions, 127 

the remembrance of a favour done or intended, and 
some hatred of, or disgust at, the benefactor. 

XII. Pride is a feeling, which one experiences 
in consequence of some judgment of his own com- 
parative worthiness. 

It is 3n emotion which we always experience, in a 
greater or less degree, when we think of ourselves 
more highly, and of others less highly, than we 
ought to think. 

XIII. Vanity is a passion, consequent upon a 
judgment, that we excel others in something, for 
which we desire them to admire and esteem us. It 
moves a man to display his mental, or other endow- 
ments, of which he is vain. 

XiV. Suspicion is an emotion, consequent on 
some sentiment, that persons or things probably 
are not, or will not be, what they appear, or promise 
to be. 

A Doubt is the expression of some suspicion 
concerning the truth of a proposition. 

XV. Jealousy is a passion, consequent on some 
fear th another has obtained, or will obtain, some 
good, which we had hoped to enjoy ourselves. 

XVI. Anger is a passion, consequent upon some 
, thought of an insult, or injury, intended or expe- 
rienced. It is a feeling, which often moves the will 
to purposes of resentment, or of revenge. 

Wrath is a strong, but Rage the strongest spe- 
cies of anger. 

XVII. Fretfulness is a feeling, which we ex- 
perience in consequence of some unpleasant sensa- 
tions, or disappointments, or vexations, which we 



128 Human Passions. 

judge to be of no great magnitude; and yet, of which 
we will to complain. 

XVIII. Vexation is a painful emotion, conse- 
quent upon a rapid succession of little occurrences, 
contrary to our desires, and calculated to interrupt 
the train of our thoughts, or to impede the course 
of our business. 

XIX. Fear is a passion consequent upon the 
judgment, that we, or the objects for which we fear, 
are in danger of experiencing some kind of evil. 

Terror is a high degree of fear, in consequence 
of some great evil apprehended. 

Dread is long continued fear, especially of evil, 
the nature of which we do not fully comprehend. 

XX. Horror is a passion, that results from the 
thought of sometliing peculiarly, or unexpectedly, 
evil, in one's character, conduct, or situation. 

XXI. Indignation is a strong emotion, result- 
ing from our thoughts concerning some action or 
conduct, which we judge peculiarly meritorious of 
feelings of resentment, and the manifestation of dis- 
pleasure. 

XXII. Resentment is an emotion consequent 
on some thought of an insult or injury, and a judg- 
ment that it is fit, best, or right, to evince our dis- 
pleasure against the offending party. 

XXIII. Contempt is an emotion, that immedi- 
ately follows our judgment that a person is desti- 
tute of wisdom, power, and goodness, and deserves 
to be treated accordingly. 

XXIV. Disdain is a feeling, that results from 
the judgment, that a person, or an action is not only 
destitute of wisdom, power, and goodness, but is 



The Passions. 129 

calculated to dishonour all who have intercourse 
with the one, or do not feel indignation at the 
other. 

XXV. Envy is an emotion, consequent on a con- 
ception of something desirable that is the property 
of others, and the feeling of selfishness. It is that 
passion which would induce the volition to appro- 
priate the envied object to ourselves, could we do 
it with impunity. 

XXVI. Malignity is a feeling, exercised in re- 
lation to sentient beings, in consequence of some 
emotion of hatred, anger, envy, suspicion, jealousy, 
or other passions of which they have been the oc- 
casion. It induces us to wish them injury. 

Malice is an inferior degree of malignity; and 
is excited by, and employed about little things. 

XXVII. Cruelty is a passion consequent upon 
the conception of suffering, hatred to the sufferer, 
and a desire to inflict pain unnecessarily. 

XXVIII. Lust is a passion consequent on some 
volition to indulge some appetite, or other feeling, 
in an unlawful manner. 

XXIX. Shame is a passion, that results from a 
conviction of the disgrace of some one in whom we 
feel interested; or from the ktiowledge of our own 
weakness, folly, inferiority, wickedness, or expo- 
posure to disapprobation and punishment. 

Professor. Your list is sufficiently extended. What 
do you mean by malevolent passion? 

Pupil. Any passion which ordinarily induces m 
the mind which feels it, an evil volition. 

Professor. Since all oar passions are in their own 



130 The Passions, 

nature infelicitous, I would ask, whether any ot' 
them may be lawfully indulged? 

Pupil. In an evil world, or in a state in which 
there are any evils, there must be objects to which 
some passions are suitable. Hence any passion ex- 
ercised in relation to a suitable object, and in a 
reasonable degree, is called a suitable^ reasonably 
lawful^ or sacred passion. 

It is also to be had in remembrance, as a general 
law of feeling, That suitable^ reasonable^ lawful or 
sacred passions are always followed by some agreea- 
ble affection. Ultimately, therefore, it is for our hap- 
piness to exercise right passions, notwithstanding 
they are in their own nature, in some degree painful. 

Professor. If I hate base, mean, and unworthy 
conduct, I am conscious that I subsequently find 
satisfaction^ from thinking that I have felt as I 
ought to have done. " We may be said to find hap- 
piness in hating evil, feeling aversion from sin, fear- 
ing God, having holy resentment^ being disgusted 
with obscene conduct; and in grief sadness^ sorrow^ 
and even shame, for such things as we know ought 
to excite these emotions in us; not because the pas- 
sions themselves are agreeable, but because they are 
instantly followed by some affection that is. We love^ 
esteem^ or respect ourselves for these passions; or 
we feel some degree of gladness, contentment, or 
satisfaction because we have felt as our consciences 
tell us we ought to have done; or the hope of ap- 
probation, or of other rewards, springs up in the 
soul."* 

* Quarterly Theological Review, rol i. p. 465. 



Laws of Feeling. 131 

Having tak,e« a general survey of human feelings, 
perhaps yoU can state some other laws, than those 
which we have already contemplated. 

Pupil I think I can a few. 

Rule I. The nature and degree of every feeling, 
whether it be a sensation, passion, or affection, are 
dependent on, and according to, the nature and de- 
gree of the antecedent bodily or mental operation 
which is the occasion of it. 

Professor, Give a brief illustration of this rule. 

Pupil, If I attend to objects of perception, my 
acts of perception will be weak or vigorous, in pro- 
portion to the impression on my bodily organs; and 
my sensations will in kind, and in vivacity, ardour, 
strength, or weakness and dulness, be in proportion 
to the perceptions which occasion them. My affec- 
tions and passions, in like manner, will be propor- 
tionate to the vigour or debility of those conceptions, 
judgments, or other operations of mind, that give 
rise to them. 

Professor. Very good. Give another general rule 
concerning feelings. 

Pupil. Rule II. The contemplation of a feeling 
in others, when we do not judge it to be an evil 
feeling, is commonly followed>by a similar feeling 
in our ownjninds; which is called a fellow-feeling. 

Rule III. The contemplation of any feeling in 
another, which we disapprove, at the time, com- 
monly excites in us disgust. 

Professor, What do you understand by Sympa- 
thy? 

Pupil. When our thought of any passion^ felt by 
another, is the occasion of our experiencing a simi- 



i 32 Laxvs^ of Feeling\ 

lar passion, it is called an act of Sympathy, or a 
sympathetic emotioju^ 

Professor. What do you mean by Commisera- 
tion? 

Pupil. Commiseration is sorrow experienced 
by us, in consequence of some conception of the 
misery of another. 

Professor, What is Compassion? 

Pupil. *' Any sympathetic emotion occasioned by 
the despair^ sorrow^ g^ief sadness., or fear of ano- 
ther, we call Compassion." 

Professor, It seems to be a general conclusion 
from your whole account of the operations of the 
heart .^ and the intellectual faculties., " that our Crea- 
tor has made the intellectual paramount to the sen- 
sitive part of our mental nature." He designed that 
our understanding should regulate our passions and 
affections; and that our perceptions through the 
bodily organs, should limit our sensations. 

In this, our heart has the pre-eminence over our 
intellect^ that all our happiness consists in the ope- 
tions of the former. 

Pupil. It may be added, that all our unhappiness 
too, cbnsists in our feelings; but it is the province 
of intellect to promote such feelings as are agree- 
able, and to prevent such as are painful. 



* *' Emotions are raised in us, not only by the qualities and actions 
of ot.heis, but also by theii- feelings: I cannot behold a man in distress, 
withovit pai'taking of his pain; nor in joy, without partaking of his 
pleasure."— Zorrf Karnes, 



CONVERSATION XII. 



The Faculty of Volition, or the Will.— Some contemplated actioa 
the object of every Volition.— Desire and Preference different froni 
Volition.— The Will a dependent Faculty.— Perception and Con- 
ception the only independent Faculties of the Mind.— Definition of 
Volition and VIotive. — Inducement and Motive distinguished.— 
Several general Rules concerning Volition. — An Inference concern- 
ing the importance of regulating our Thoughts. 

Professor. What is the faculty of Volition? 
PupiL The faculty of volition in man, is that in- 
herent part of the original constitution of his soul, 
by which he chooses, determines, resolves, purpo- 
ses, or wills, to perform, or not perform, any con- 
templated action, of which he judges himself ca- 
pable. 

Professor, You make some mental or bodily, 
some simple or complex, operation, the object of 
every volition: and by your definition would have it 
understood, that no man ever has a volition to per- 
form, or not perform, any action of which he judges 
himself absolutely incapable. 

Pupil. Such seems to me, to be a correct defini- 
tion of an operation of the faculty of volition, which 
we use as synonymous with The Will. 

Professor. How do you know, that all men have 
this faculty of volition? 

Pupil, All men declare their coasciousness of 
M 



134 Objects of Volition, 

willing in certain cases; and there could be no act 
of volition without the requisite faculty, unless there 
could be an effect without an adequate cause. 

Professor* Do we not choose external objects? 
If a pear and a peach are before me, may I not say, 
that I choose the peach, and that my volition ter- 
minates upon a peach, rather than upon any con- 
templated action? 

Pupil, Desire is a feeling which may have a 
peach for its object; and many have confounded an 
operation of the will, w^ith this emotion of the heart. 
If two things are presented to my contemplation, I 
am said to prefer that which I most love^ desire^ or 
esteem: but if I choose that which I prefer^ the 
meaning of this elliptical expression is, that I 
choose^ or will to take, or to receive, or to possess, 
that object which I prefer to something else. When 
apples, pears, and peaches, are all presented to your 
view, and you choose peaches^ the meaning of the 
expression is, that you choose to take^ or receive^ or 
eat peaches. The question in the mind is, " which 
shall I take?" and the volition is, " I will take 
peaches." 

If men accurately distinguish between their feel- 
ijjgs and volitions^ they will find in every instance, 
that a volition respects nothing but a contemplated 
action. 

Professor, Does the faculty of volition in man 
ever act independently of all his other mental facul- 
ties? 

Pupil. Never; if I may judge from my own con- 
sciousness. I find, that I perceive without any pre- 
vious operation of any other faculty than that of 



The Will dependent. 135 

Perception: I conceive too, independently of any- 
other mental operation, in many instances; so that 
Perception and Conception are independent facul- 
ties, that originate thought, or that may be said to 
have a sort of creative mental ability. It is not so 
with any other faculty, for if we are conscious or 
remember^ we must be conscious of, or remember, 
some mental act: if we judge or reason^ or approve^ 
we are dependent on conception or some other act, 
for the object about which we judge, or reason, or 
exercise our conscience in approbation, li wt feel^ 
it is in consequence of, and in dependence on, some 
antecedent mental operation; and if we exert our 
faculty of agency^ it is in obedience to volition. In 
like manner, if we will, it is to do, or not do, some- 
thing of which we have conceived; so that some no- 
tion of an action to be done, or not done, is essential 
to the existence of a volition. Besides, if I will, it 
is in consequence of some other mental act, than 
the mere conception of the action which is the ob- 
ject of volition; it is from some motive; so that the 
Willis more dependent on previous mental opera- 
tions than any other faculty of the mind. It re- 
quires at least a conception of its object and a mo- 
tive. 

. Professor. The dependence of which you now 
speak, is not any thing extraneous to the mind; but 
a dependence of one faculty upon one or more fa- 
culties of the same mind. 

PupiL Yes, it is a constitutional dependence; that 
has its origin in the mental nature which the Creator 
has given, and the laws by which he governs human 
minds, as certainlv as the material universe.. 



136 Volitions, Motmes^ 

Professor, In what sense do you use the term 
volition? 

Pupil. It is a general term, that includes every 
operation of the faculty of the will; whether that 
operation be called a determination, a choice, a reso- 
lution^ a purpose, an intention, an act of xvilling, a 
will, or any thing else. 

Professor* What is a motive to volition? 

Pupil. Any simple or complex mental operation, 
or operations, which figuratively speaking, move, 
induce, excite, or occasion any volition, are the 
motive to that volition. 

Professor. Of course, every volition presupposes 
a motive, and there are as many motives as voli= 
tions in existence, and no more. Do you distinguish 
between a motive and an t72ducementP 

Pupil. Any simple mental operation, which of 
itself does not constitute a motive, but which in 
connexion with one or more other mental opera- 
tions, often does constitute a motive, we call an 
inducement. Hence an inducement may be consider- 
ed as any constituent part of a motive. I will give 
an example. I judge that a vexatious servant de- 
serves to be flogged; but this judgment alone does 
not make me will to flog him. Immediately after, 
I judge that the servant will be ruined if I do not 
correct him. 1 judge also, that I am bound in duty 
to flog him; and from these three judgments taken 
together, I am induced to will that I will flog the 
boy. Neither of these judgments alone moved me 
to this volition; but each in conjunction with the 
other, conspired to induce me to determine that I 
wo«ld flog him. Here the oction of fogging a boy, 



and Inducements,, lo7 

IS the object of my volition;- the motive for this vo- 
lition consists of three distinct judgments; and each 
of the jjLidgments is ati inducement, 

A sufficient inducement^ and a motive to volition 
are equivalent expressions; but by motive we always 
mean, that which actually is the true reason of our 
xvilling in any particular instance. Ask a man why 
he chose, willed, or determined, as he actually did, 
in any case; and if he candidly and intelligently 
answers the question, he will present his motive for 
the volition. But if he states several things, no one 
of which singly moved him to volition; but all of 
which together did; each single thing is an induce- 
7nent. 

Professor, Why do you define motives to be 
those mental operations that move us to volition f 
May not some external object, some creature of 
sense, some written arguments, or some speech ut- 
tered, be a motive? 

Pupil, An external object must be perceived, or 
conceived of, by the mind, before It can have any 
influence on the will: we say, therefore, that the 
perception of external objects, and not the objects 
themselves, or some conception of them, is the mo- 
tive^ or inducement to volition," presented by external 
objects. A speech never moves us to any volition 
unless it be heard, or understood, or conceived of, 
or in some way thought of, by the mind: and argu^ 
menu are nothing to any man, before he forms some 
notion of them: so that, strictly speaking, nothing 
but mental operations can be motives to volition in 
any human mind. 

When a writer or speaker talks of presenting ^uq^ 
M2 



5 38 Laws of Volition. 

fives to his readers or hearers, he intends to make 
such statements as being heard, read, or thought of 
in some way, will by these mental operations move 
ihcm to some desired volition. It is the thought of 
the mind concerning a proposition, or its feelings 
consequent upon the thought, and not the proposi- 
tion itself, that constitutes a motive. 
. Professor, It is unquestionably one of the inva- 
riable laws of the human mind, that the Will never 
operates except in consequence of some motive* Can 
you now state any other laws of volition? 

PupiU Any human feeling may be an immediate 
motive to volition. 

Any operation of conscience may be an immediate 
motive to volition. 

A simple operation of consciousness never proves 
a motive to volition. The same is true of a simple 
operation of Perception, Conception, Volition and 
Agency. 

Any operation of the judgment concerning our 
duty, interest, convenience, happiness, or unhappi- 
iiess, or concerning the fitness or unfitness, the pro- 
priety or impropriety of any action, may be a 
motive to volition. 

Any inferred judgment concerning the things 
just mentioned, may be a motive to volition. 

The memory of any past volition to choose in any 
particular way, may be a motive to a future vo- 
lition. 

The meraorij of any operation which we Judge we 
can perform if we will, and of any agreeable feeling 
that followed it, may be a motive for a volition to 
periorm a similar action. 



Laws of Volition. 139 

The memory of any past motive may constitute a 
future motive to volition. 

The memory of any promise may be a motive for 
•willing to perform the promised action. 

Professor. In laying down these rules, I presume 
you judge, that what commonly has taken place 
7nay take place again: for we all remember that we 
have repeatedly chosen from such motives as you 
have described, and it is reasonable to conclude, 
that v/e, and other beings like us, may do it again. 
Pupil I can no more doubt, that men may in 
future do, what they have commonly done in ages 
past, than I can doubt whether the sun will arise 
to-morrow; or whether fluids will continue to roll 
down an inclined plane. 

Professor, A motive consisting of a single men- 
tal operation may be called a simple motive; and a 
motive consisting of two or more mental operations 
may be called a complex 7?iotive. Can you name any 
simple motives? 

Pupil. I sometimes have a volition immediately 
consequent upon some feelings and a conception of 
the action which is the object of volition. 

Professor, The conception of the action willed is 
essential to every volition; and it is also essential, 
that we should not judge ourselves absolutely inca- 
pable of the action. These are pre-requisites to 
every volition. But these pre-requisites existing, a 
simple feeling may be a motive for willing immedi- 
ately to perform any contemplated action, that we 
have not judged ourselves incapable of performing. 
This simple feeling is consequent upon some intel- 
lectual operation; but it is the feelings when it ex- 
ists, that constitutes the motive. 



140 Laws of Folitioii, 

Professor. In the same manner, any single feel- 
ing, operation of conscience, act of the judgment, 
result of reasoning, or act of memory, that moves 
us to a volition, is a simple motive; but when we 
will in consequence of two or more inducements, 
the motive is complex. 

Professor. The greater part of our volitions, I 
think, are the result of complex motives. Ixvill to 
eat, we will suppose. If I thus will, because I now 
have a pleasant sensation from tasting food, and for 
this reason alone, my motive for willing to eat is 
simple: but if I not only feel present pleasure in 
tasting, but judge that eating is necessary for my 
sustenance; and from both these considerations, will 
to eat another mouthful, the motive is complex. 
Again, if I would not eat another mouthful merely 
because I now feel an agreeable sensation from the 
last, but if I will to eat it, from the present sensa- 
tion in conjunction with remembrance or recollection 
of past pleasure derived from eating, and a judg- 
ment that I shall feel the better for eating it, my 
motive is again complex, and is constituted of three 
distinct inducements; viz: a sensation, an act of me- 
mory, and a judgment. 

Have you any other rules of volition to give? 

Pupil. That which has been a motive to a particu- 
lar volition in a man, at one time, and in one state of 
body and mind, may not prove a motive to a similar 
volition, at another time, and zvhen he is in a diffe- 
rent state of body and of mind. 

Similar feelings^ however, in the sa7ne man, ge- 
nerally occasion similar volitions, unless they are 
counteracted by some dictate of the Judgment err 



Laws of Volition. 141 

Consciences or by some memory of painful feelings^, 
that formerly resulted from an action similar to the 
contemplated one. For instance, a man who has for- 
merly chosen to eat, from the sensations of hunger, 
will, when hungry, generally determine to eat again, 
unless his judgment informs him, that his health 
requires a temporary abstinence, or his Conscience 
approves of his deferring the act of eating, until he 
has discharged some more immediately urgent duty. 
Let a physician seat himself at table, and he will 
eat, if he is hungry, and does not judge that it is 
best for him to abstain; or if his Conscience does not 
require him to visit a patient, before he gratifies his 
appetite. The same is true of other men, with a 
change in the objects of duty, to which Conscience 
may call them. 

It is our knowledge of this rule, that enables us 
to anticipate very accurately how men will act, when 
certain appetites crave indulgence, or when any 
given emotion is excited in the heart. 

Every body knows, that men -will choose to act 
as their sensations induce them^ unless Judgment^ 
Reason^ Conscience^ or Memory^ or all of these^ pre- 
sent stronger inducements^ and so furnish a motive 
for resisting^ denying^ and subduing their sensations. 
Hence, if men will to act at all from their sensations, 
without giving the Judgment, Conscience, Reason, 
and Memory time to be exercised about the action, 
they invariably will act according to their sensa- 
tions. 

The same rule holds good in relation to our 
em.otions. If men will and act hastily, they com- 
monly act out their feelings; or they will to act 



f 42 Laws of Volition. 

from the emotions of the moment. These are rasli 
men. 

Hence, every man knows, that anger will move 
that man, who feels the passion, and acts suddenly, 
without consulting any other faculty than that of 
feeling, to purposes of retaliation and revenge. 

Professor. A little attention to human character 
and conduct, will convince men of the truth of this 
rule, that any man who has many ardent feelings 
consequent upon his perceptions; and comparatively 
few consequent upon his operations of Conscience, 
Reason, Judgment, and Memory, will generally be 
governed in his volitions, by objects of sense. 

Pupil, Might you not have given another rule, 
prior to this; that a man who more generally exer- 
cises his perception^ than his Conscience, Reason, 
Judgment and Memory, will have more sensations- 
than feelings of any other kind; and so will in his 
Volitions be mainly a sensual man? 

Professor, The truth of your position cannot be 
denied. You might have added, that a man who 
employs his faculty of Conception in the work of 
imagination, more than all his other intellectual fa- 
culties, will have more feelings consequent on ima- 
ginations, than on the operations of Judgment, 
Reason, Conscience, Memory, and Perception; and 
if he wills from his feelings mainly, as men gene- 
rally do, his Imagination will control his Will. 
This man is styled a visionary^ or ro7nantic being. 

Pupil. A person such as you have now described, 
would be justly deemed insane^ I think. 

Professor. The most general rule, with which I 
am acquainted concerning volitions is this, that a 



LaTVS of Volition. 143 

marCs habitual volitions are as his habitual feelings: 
for there is scarcely any motive of which some feel- 
ings or a design to promote some feeling, is not a 
constituent part. 

Pupil, Of course, since a man's feelings are as 
his thoughts, and his volitions are as his feelings, 
his volitions must ultimately be as his thoughts. 
" As a man thinketh so is he." 

Professor. And hence v^e infer, that it is a mat- 
ter of unspeakable importance, by education, reve- 
lation, and every other practicable way, to regulate 
a man's thoughts. 

Could we secure the right operation of the seven 
faculties of the understandings and employ them ex- 
clusively about desirable objects, we should then 
infallibly secure the exercise of right feelings^ and 
Qf right volitions. 



CONVERSATION XIll 



The Faculty of Agency or Efficiency. — An Operation of this Faculty 
distinguished. — Proof of the Existence of this Faculty. — Objects of 
our Efficiency. — Some Opet;ations of Man that are ordinarily per- 
formed without Volition, ma^ be performed from Voluntary Exer- 
tion. — How the Mind exerts an Agency on the Botly is unknown 
by us. — The Operations of our Efficiency on our different Mental 
Faculties considered. — On the Consciousness, Perception, Concep- 
tiftp, See. 



Professor. What is the faculty of Agency? 

PupiL The faculty of agency in man, is that in- 
herent part of the original constitution of his soul, 
by which he performs from volition, or instinct, any 
action. 

Professor* Agency and efficiency you will use as 
synonymous expressions. Any operation of the hu- 
man mind, you will bear in mind, moreover, is 
called an action; but a mental agency^ exertion^ ef- 
fort^ or efficiency^ is only such an actio7i as we per- 
form in consequence of a volition to do it, or of some 
Instinct. 

PupiL I think I have understood your distinc- 
tion, ever since I read your NOTES to the first 
American Edition of Dr, Reid^s Works, You have 
there said, '' We think^ zve ruill^ we act. Here are 
three mental operations, which belong to three 
different faculties. The first belongs to the under- 



Faculty of Efficiency, 145 

standing, the second to the will, and the third to a fa- 
culty not the least important, which metaphysical wri- 
ters have not honoured with a distinct name and place 
in their systems. It is the faculty of agency^ which 
has generally been confounded with The WilL There 
could be no agency without the Will, or some In- 
stinct, any more than will without thought; but 
these things ought not to be confounded. The fa- 
culty by which we will, is not the faculty by which 
we DO what we will. They are as distinct as the 
volition to walk, and the act of walking, which is 
consequent upon the volition; or as the perception 
of an external object, and the judgment that it ex- 
ists. It is true, that where the power of doing any 
thing exists, the performance of it immediately fol- 
lows the will to do it immediately; because the 
Author of our constitution has thus connected voli- 
tion and agency; but the faculty of the will may ex- 
ist, and operate, after the power of agency is gone. 
I judge that I can speak; I will to speak; but the 
power of doing the thing which I will, was, without 
my knowledge, previously taken away. In this case 
my Creator has separated the power of agency from 
the power of volition. Should I continue, from any 
derangement of intellect, to think that I coald speak, 
I might continue to will, without producing the ac- 
tion of speaking."^ 

Prof&ssor. How do you know that you have any 
faculty of efficiency? 



* Upon the principle, that I may do what I will with my own prg- 
perty, I have altered a few words in the foregoing extract. 

N 



146 Faculty of Efficiency, 

Pupil, I am conscious of exerting an agency in 
consequence of a volition. I am conscious of a vo- 
luntary efficiency; and this efficiency I judge to be 
an effect, which must have some cause. I judge too, 
that the mind which is conscious of a voluntary ef- 
ficiency must be the cause of this efficiency. But it 
could not be the cause of this efficiency, without 
being adequate to it, for it is self-evident, that every 
effect must have an adequate cause* Now this in 
the human mind, which renders it adequate, under 
certain circumstances, to voluntary efficiency, I call 
the faculty of efficiency in the human mind. That 
other men have a similar faculty, I believe from their 
testimony, and mfer from the analogy between their 
actions and my own. 

Professor. Have the operations of the facult)' of 
Efficiency any objects? If they have, what are they? 

Pupil, An operation of the faculty of efficiency 
in man, has for its immediate object, either his 
body, or some of the faculties of his own mind. 

Any bodily action which we judge we can per- 
form, we exert ourselves to perform, whenever we 
will to do it : and we find that most of our bodily 
organs are excited by our mental efficiency. If I 
will to open my mouth, my faculty of efficiency so 
operates upon the muscles of my mouth, through 
the nerves connected with those muscles, that I ac- 
tually open ^my^outh. If I will to speak, my fa- 
culty of doing what I will, so operates upon my 
mouth, lungs, tongue, larynx, and other organs of 
speech, that they inhale, expire, and modulate the 
air expired, in such a naanner as to produce all the 



Faculty of Efficiency, 147 

variety and combinations of articulate sounds, of 
which vocal language is composed. 

If I will to walk, my faculty of agency operates 
upon the nerves connected with the muscles of my 
legs, in such a manner that the action of walking is 
produced. 

In short, any voluntary animal operation which 
a man performs, is the result immediately of his 
faculty of agency, and only mediately of his faculty 
of volition; for the will has the government of the 
body only through the faculty of agency. 

Professor, Many of our bodily operations are 
performed ordinarily without any volition to pro« 
duce them. The muscular distending and contract- 
ing of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the 
winking of our eyelids, the peristaltic motion of the 
intestines, and breathing, are of this description; 
hence they are called involuntary animal operations: 
but although they are generally involuntary, yet we 
find that the faculty of agency has some ability to 
reach some of them; and that some of them may 
be voluntarily performed for a little time. Hence, 
if I will to cease from breathing for a short time; 
or to inhale more air than is natural, by breathing 
oftener than is usual; or ta inhale a greater quan- 
tity at a time, by a longer inspiration than is com- 
mon; or to wink at a certain time; I find that my fa- 
culty of Agency executes my volition. By inhaling 
more air than is natural too, in any given time, I 
may voluntarily, if I know this will be the effect, 
increase the muscular action of the animal heart. 

By knowing the effect of certain medicines on 
my system, by experience, or judging of them from 



148 Mental Agency on the Body, 

analogy, I may also, voluntarily, produce changes 
in the state of my fluids, and even of the solid parts 
of my body; and thus exert a physical agency upon 
my own animal frame. 

The principal concern of our faculties of volition 
and agency, however, with our body, is to produce 
such bodily operations as are never performed with- 
out the exertion of either a voluntary, or an in- 
stinctive efficiency upon the human frame. We 
never eat, drink, speak, read, walk, sit, ride, stand, 
nor labour, in any of the mechanical or fine arts, 
without the voluntary employment of our faculty 
of efficiency, upon the requisite bodily organs. 

Pupil, Can you tell me, Sir, how the mind exerts 
its efficiency upon the body? 

Professor, I frankly confess, that I cannot: and 
moreover I affirm, that no one has ever yet done it. 
I do not proceed so far as to assert, that no one 
will ever be able to do it; for it becomes not me to 
say, to what extent the faculties of the human mind, 
and the boundaries of human knowledge, may be 
enlarged. The fact that mind operates on matter 
we know, but of the mode of operation we cannot 
conceive. This is no more mysterious or incredible 
than another fact, that matter operates on matter, 
in most instances in an inconceivable way. The 
modus operandi in every chemical process is a 
mystery. 

In the animal frame, we have learned, by various 
experiments, that muscular motion is dependent on 
the action of the nerves upon the muscles; for if the 
nerves that lead to any limb are divided, or tied, 
the muscular motion, that used to result from the 



Mental Agency on the Body* 149 

operation of voluntary efEciency, will no longer take 
place. The spinal marrow is the great trunk of the 
inverted tree of nerves, in the human body, of 
which the brains are the root; and if the spinal mar- 
row be broken, the limbs of the body supplied with 
branches of nerves issuing beyond the broken place, 
will be as incapable of voluntary and instinctive 
motion, as the limbs of an oak of growth beyond 
the point of truncation. A dog with a broken back, 
that drags his hind legs after him, is an illustration 
of this truth. 

Cut off the communication between the brains 
and any part of the nerves growing out of them, and 
the muscles upon which the truncated nerves are 
laid, will no longer obey the will, and of course, 
the bones into which the muscles are inserted, will 
cease to be moved at volition. Hence it is inferred, 
that the mind must first act upon the brain, and de- 
pendent nerves, before the muscles and bones can 
move according to the exertion of voluntary or in- 
stinctive mental efficiency. These are facts; but how 
the nerves act upon the muscles, that is, how one 
material organ acts upon another; and how the fa- 
culty of mental efficiency operates on the brain and 
other nerves, no one has ever shown; nor are we, 
at present, able to show. It remains one of the se- 
crets of nature. It is as difficult for us to conceive 
how the mind acts upon the brain and nerves, as to 
conceive how it might operate directly on the mus- 
cles, bones, and blood. It is as impossible for us, 
at present, to conceive at all of the mode of mental 
agency upon any part of the body, or of the mind, 
as to conceive of the essence of the substance of 
N2 



150 Mental Efficiency. 

matter, of the operation of a chemical solvent, of 
the nature of the action of the gastric juice, or of 
the nature of the causation of attraction, cbhesion, 
and gravitation. 

Let us not, however, reject the knowledge which 
we do possess, because we do not know every 
thing, which we conceive it would be desirable to 
understand. 

Let us now inquire concerning the operations of 
the faculty of Efficiency upon some of the other 
faculties of the human mind. What can you do in 
and with your own mind, when you will it? 

PupiL I find, when I will to be conscious^ and 
endeavour to do what I will, that an act of con- 
sciousness immediately follows both the volition and 
the exertion: but I find also, that if I exert myself 
to refrain from being conscious, I cannot ej^ect my 
purpose; so that my faculty of agency cannot stop 
the operations of consciousness. It has been -pre- 
viously shown, that for a wise reason, this faculty 
has not been subjected to Volition, and its executor, 
Efficiency. 

Professor, Well, proceed to review our faculties 
in the order in which we have treated of them. Per- 
ception is the next. 

Pupih I often perceive, through my eyes, ears, 
nose, and organs of tasting and touching, without 
any voluntary exertion to produce my perceptions: I 
even perceive frequently in direct opposition to my 
voluntary exertions, 

I am conscious, however, that I frequently make 
exertions to perceive, and that perceptions of such 
objects as are to be perceived, are immediately 



3Iental Efficiency. 151 

consequent upon the voluntary employment of my 
bodily organs. If I will to see my wife, that is in 
the room, and exert myself to do it, my eyes are 
turned towards her, and I see her. If I will not to 
see her, my mental agency closes my eyelids, or 
turns away my face, and I do not perceive her. I 
have a similar control over my other sensesj for I 
can feel, what is to h^felt^ and so on, by a voluntary 
exertion to do it; and, to a certain extent, I can re- 
frain from hearing, by stopping my ears; from smell- 
ing, by holding my nose; from future tasting, by 
keeping my mouth shut, and free from the thing 
to be tasted; and from touching many things, by 
keeping my body free from any contact with them. 

We are, therefore, in the present world, perci- 
pients, partly from voluntary exertion, partly with- 
out it, and partly contrary to it: so that in percep- 
tion we are subjected only in part to our own self- 
government. 

The most effectual way to prevent the perception 
of any object, which we cannot remove from our 
senses, is to remove from it; and if we can do 
neither of these, we may sometimes prevent per- 
ception by vigorously employing some of our other 
mental faculties, about some interesting subject. If 
I sit still, and make no exertion, I smell the offen- 
sive effluvia of boiling cabbage from the kitchen^ 
but if I closely apply myself to" any object of con- 
ception, judgment, conscience, affection, or passion, 
I do not perceive any thing fetid in the air which I 
breathe. 

The faculty of Conception^ or of Understanding, 
is often acted upon by the faculty of Efficiency. If 



152 Voluntary Efficiency, 

I remember any conception, and will to have a 
similar mental operation, I find that voluntary ex- 
ertion will put the faculty of conception in opera- 
tion, so that I again conceive of the same thing. 

When I will to employ this faculty in forming 
imaginations^ without previously conceiving of the 
mental images which I shall form, I find that vo- 
luntary exertion vfiW^Mt the imagination to work. In 
this way all works of imagination are produced. If 
the faculty of agency did not affect the imagination 
in this way, no voluntary work of the imagination, 
such as a novel, or a face which a painter never 
saw, or a figure such as a statuary never perceived, 
could ever be the result of design, and intelligent 
exertion. 

Again, when I will to employ my faculty of un- 
derstanding upon any particular subject, and to 
render my faculty of perception and other faculties 
subservient to it, my faculty of agency will produce 
reading, or some other kind of mental employment, 
in which conception will be principally engaged. 
Hence, if I will to study a particular subject, my 
exertion will produce repeated conceptions upon 
the subject, many of which will, and many will not, 
assume the form of mental propositions: and thus 
conception furnishes, as it were, raw materials to 
the Judgment, Reason, Conscience, and Feeling. 

Professor. You have spoken oi reading and of 
study: we must have a definition of these terms be- 
fore we proceed. 

PupiU Reading is a complex operation of the 
mind: and consists of a voluntary perception of cha- 
racters and words, printed, written, or painted, to- 



Studying and Revery, 153 

gether with an effort to conceive of the meaning of 
them. 

Professor. This is a very good description of 
reading to one's self, without any enunciation of 
the words; but reading aloud is a still more complex 
operation; for it implies an agency which is partly 
voluntary, and partly instinctive, upon the organs 
of speech, as well as of seeing, and conceiving; so 
as to produce the actual seeing of characters, that 
denote things; the conception of the things denoted; 
and the utterance of the sounds, for which, as well 
as other things, the characters stand. 

Pupil. Well, study, I think is the employment 
of any intellectual faculty upon any subject, in con- 
sequence of some voluntary exertion to understand 
that subject. 

Professor. But what am I doing, if my mind is 
busily employed in thinking upon various subjects, 
without any voluntary exertion to limit it to any 
particular subject? 

Pupil. You are engaged in a revery; you are 
thinking, to be sure, but you are not studying. 

Professor. I fear there is much revery and little 
studying in the minds of most men. But not to in- 
dulge ourselves in a revery, proceed in your dis- 
course upon Efficiency, 

Pupil. The faculty of fudging, will not imme- 
diately yield to any mental agency upon it, so as 
to form a particular judgment correspondent to our 
will and desires; but if I will to employ my judg- 
ment about any particular proposition, I can do it^ 
by a voluntary exertion, until I come to some de« 
cision upon that subject; or else will to suspend 



1 S4f M en tal Efficiency • 

my judgment upon it; or resolve on some other 
mental pursuit. I may take a circuitous course of 
operation on my faculty of judgment, so as to ren- 
der its decisions conformable to my predominant 
feelings, by voluntarily considering such concep- 
tions, arguments, and other judgments, and such 
only, as are most likely to produce any desired 
judgment: and in this way, do men commonly per- 
vert their judgment. 

Professor, We may exert an efficiency ijidirectly 
and mediately on our judgment, you mean to say; 
but not immediately. This is true, especially of our. 
acquired judgments; but our constitutional judg- 
ments generally, will not yield to any mental oppug- 
nation. Hence, it is truly said, we cannot always 
judge ^s we feel; we cannot always believe as we 
desire; but that men find no great difficulty in work- 
ing themselves into a ^^/z^ correspondent with their 
feelings, on many subjects. 

In relation to the Memory we may remark, that 
if we will not to remember^ we cannot cease to re- 
member at will. Every act of recollection is depen- 
dent on the operation of the faculty of Efficiency 
on the Memory. In many instances, however, we 
exert ourselves to recollect some past mental acts, 
which we judge we must have had; and are unable 
to effect the thing which we have willed. Memory, 
therefore is only partially under the control of our 
voluntary agency. 

PupiL The faculty of Reasoning never operates 
except in consequence of some voluntary efficiency 
upon it, but the nature of the inference depends on 
pur conception of the premises, and not at all upon 



Mental Efficiencij, 15 5 

volition or efficiency. In paralogisms^ or instances 
of false reasonings, a non sequitur as it is called, or 
a conclusion -which does not result from the pre- 
mises, may be attached to them, that shall be any 
thing, which we have previously determined to 
make it; but since this is not reasoning, but a pre- 
tence of reasoning, our remark, that an inductive 
judgment does not depend on any voluntary agency 
on the reasoning faculty, remains unimpeachable. 

The subjects of reasoning are determined on by 
the will, so that we always reason from voluntary 
exertion, and on voluntarily selected subjects. In 
preparing and presenting these subjects, by its 
agency over other faculties, the efficiency has great 
influence. 

Our conscience can be acted on by our efficiency, 
only mediately^ through our Conceptions, Reason- 
ing, and Judgment. We must change our mental 
views of a law, of obligation, and of conduct, be- 
fore we can alter our approbation or disapprobation; 
and should we desire, and will, most earnestly to 
approve immediately of what we disapprove, or the 
reverse, our conscience would not obey our volun- 
tary exertion. Hence conscience often reproves and 
condemns us, in spite of our desires and volitions 
to the contrary. Could we change the dictates of 
conscience at pleasure, conscience would not be a 
better guide than feeling, to the path of duty. Con- 
science may be moulded by the hand of education, 
and must always operate according to the know- 
ledge tvhich we have; so that we must exert our 
agi-r,cy upon something anterior in operation to 
conscience, before we can reach that moral faculty; 



156 Me7ital Efficiency* 

It is happy for man, that his conscience is thus en- 
trenched against the will, armed with efficiency, 
which is very generally subservient to Sensation, 
Affection, and Passion. 

We may conceive of any particular Feelings and 
should we think ourselves capable of producing it, 
by a voluntary exertion, might will to produce it; 
but we should find that no act of efficiency upon 
the heart could immediately produce it. The facul- 
ty of Feeling is operated upon by the Efficiency of 
man, only mediately^ -through those mental opera- 
tions which occasion feeling. Thus, should a man 
exert himself to produce in himself a particular sen- 
sation, he could effect his purpose only by his agen- 
cy on the faculty of perception, to produce such a 
perception as ordinarily is followed by that sensa- 
tion. Would he make himself love, hate, hope, fear^ 
or experience any other emotion, he must, by his 
agency on his intellectual faculties, excite those 
thoughts which alone occasion those emotions. 

We cannot cease to feel, in consequence of any 
voluntary exertion to cease from feeling; so that 
the heart of a man is but partially, and that indi- 
rectly, under the goverment of his will and agency. 

Professor. Now then, for The Will: what can a 
man do with his will, if he will? Has he any power 
of agency over his own volitions? This is the very 
pith of the Calvinistic and Arminian controversy; 
but you must treat the subject without the least re- 
ference to any theological disputation. 

Pupil, You have taught me to treat this subject 
philosophically; that is, to exhibit a fair, simple ^ 
picture of my own consciousness and memory. 



Mental Efficiency, 157 

Well then, I am not conscious that I will, neither 
do I remember that I ever did will, except in con- 
sequence of some motive; and hence I conclude, 
that if my faculty of agency ever operates on my 
will, it must be indirectly and mediately, by opera- 
ting on those faculties which furnish and present 
motives for volition. A volition which I remember 
that I once had, to determine at a certain future 
time, in a particular case, in a particular manner, I 
find may be a motive to that determination, so that 
a volition remembered, may become a motive to a 
future volition: but I do not find, from any thing 
in my own memory, consciousness, or experience, 
that the recollection of any past, voluntary agency, 
produces immediately any volition; or that I have 
any direct efficiency upon my own will. 

Professor, You may read, if you please, the fol- 
lowing extracts from the notes on Dr. Reid. I have 
altered a few words for my own satisfaction, and 
made some additions. 

Pupil, " It remains for us to inquire if the power 
of agency extends to the faculty of the will, so as 
to regulate its volitions. We think; and when we 
will to think, the object of our power of agency is 
an act of thinking. We perform the external uction 
of writing, and then, the act of writing is the object 
of agency. We think and write, when we Vv^ ill, be- 
cause the Supreme Being has connected the power 
of performing these operations, with the voluntary 
exertion to perform them. But is volition ever the 
object of agency? Willing is a mental operation all 
must allow; and we ask, Is volition the object of 
voluntary exertionP"^ Do I always, or at any time, 

O 



158 Of Mental Agemij 

-will to have a certain volition^ and then voluntarily 
exert myself to produce that volition, so as actually 
to produce that certain volition? A certain volition 
always respects some action to be done. If I ivill^ 
that Inoxv -will resolve to, perform it; I need exert 
no agency upon my faculty of volition, for / now 
will to perform it; and I could not will to will its 
present performance, without actually having alrea- 
dy the certain volitition to perform the action in 
question. If I will in future to resolve on the per* 
formance of some action, when that future time ar- 
rives, if I remember my previous determination, I 
shall then will to perform it, from the memory of 
my former purpose; unless I then have some motive 
for refusing to determine, as I previously intended 
to do. In regard to a future, intended volition, 
therefore, no voluntary exertion will produce it in 
any other way, than by producing the recollection 
of a past purpose, as an inducement; and even then 
the inducement will not prove a motive, if any 
change in our thoughts or feelings, moves us to the 
choice of not performing the action, the perform- 
ance of which we formerly intended to will.* 

" An apple and an q^% lie before me. I have the 
opportunity of making my election between them. 
I have not yet determined which I will take, but I 
will to determine. Will a determination immediate- 
ly follow my will to determine, even as the motion 
of my fingers follows my volition to write? Is 
choice so connected with an antecedent will to 
choose, as the voluntary motions of the body with 
the operations of the will, which relate to them? 
We apprehend that it is not; for every one, wh^ 



upon the WilL i58 

will examine his own mental operations will find, 
that after his will to make a choice between the egg 
and the apple, he must have some motive for his 
choice of taking one of them. If then he chooses to 
take one, say the apple, from some motive, and 
that motive is not the mere volition to deter- 
mine which he will take, his determ/mation to take 
the apple is not immediately consequent on anj 
power of agency exerted on the will, but the im- 
mediate consequence of that simple or complex 
mental operation, which constituted the motive. 
Now that a mere volition to determine which of 
two things I will take* never was to my mind a 
motive for the subsequent choice to take one of 
them in preference to the other, I am certain; for I 
never was conscious, so far as I remember, of ever 
choosing from such a motive; nor have I ever known 
a man who did choose from such a motive. We 
are conscious of no operation of our efficiency upon 
the will, which according to a mental constitution 
produces volitions. We feel pei-suaded, therefore, 
that no act of the will, follows a determination to pro- 
duce an act of the will, in the same manner, and for 
the same reason that bodily motions, or various in- 
tellectual operations, follow volitions. We will to 
speak, and speak, because the faculties for doing 
so, are rendered obedient to the faculties of volition 
and agency: we will to think upon a particular sub- 
ject, and thought follows our voluntary effort to 
think; but if we will to have a choice, a determina- 
tion, a purpose, or any kind of volition, the future 
volition which a man should imagine himself able 
to produccj will not follow, without the intervention 



160 Power of Agetiey, 

of some other mental operation, which shall consti- 
tute a motive for that particular volition." 

Professor, Well, to conclude, you have only to 
decide whether the faculty of Efficiency ever ope* 
rates on itself 

Pupil, It never does directly: but indirectly it 
may,* for one volition may occasion an operation of 
agency; a pleasant feeling may result from that exf** 
ertion; the feeling may be a motive for willing to 
repeat the exertion; and again, the operation of 
agency may be consequent upon the new volition. 
In this way any exertion, consequent upon volition, 
may give rise to a great variety of feelings, and 
conceptions, each of which, or any combination of 
them, may serve as a motive for willing some other 
similar, or different, operation of agency. 

Professor, It appears, then, that this faculty of 
agency, under the direction of the will, can operate 
directly on every part of the body to which there is 
an uninterrupted communication of nerves,* and 
either directly or indirectly, upon every faculty of 
the human mind; even upon itself. How wonder- 
ful, how simple, and yet how complicated a being 
is man! To a very great extent he can do what he 
wills; even in the regulation of his own thoughts, 
feelings, volitions, and other mental actions. Let 
him know himself, and if he perseveringly deter- 
mines it, he may govern himself. 



CONVERSATION XIV. 



Consideration of several Attributes of the Soul -which ai-* not inhe- 
rent.— Of Liberty, Capacity, Power and Necessity.— Of Physical 
Liberty and Necessity.— Of Moral Liberty, Moral Certainty, and 
Metaphysical Necessities. 



Professor, Having taken a survey of the faculties 
of the human mind, and spoken of its simple opera- 
tions, it seems necessary that we should converse 
a little about the attributes of Liberty, Capacity, 
Power, Necessity, Disposition, Inclination, Habit, 
Principles of Action, several Complex Operations, 
and the Improvement and Injury of the original 
faculties of the soul. 

PupiU If you please, Sir, I should like to turn 
interrogator. 

Professor* It will, perhaps, conduce quite as 
much to your edification in knowledge to ask ques- 
tions as to answer them. You may proceed, without 
being reproached as a Tankee, 

Pupil, What then is Liberty? 

Professor, Liberty and freedom are terms that 
denote the same thing. They express the relative 
state of the thing concerning which they are pr^^di- 
cated. They express the state of any thing in rela- 
tion to some contemplated effectual resistance^ ob- 
struction^ compulsion^ or necessity^ from some ex- 
02 



162 Liberty and Necessity. 

traneous cause. Had we never formed an idea of 
one of these things, we should never have conceived 
of liberty^ or freedom; by which we mean a state of 
exemption from resistance, obstruction, compulsion 
or necessity. Liberty can with propriety be predi- 
cated only of beings that are capable of some ope- 
ration; and of beings destitute of effectual compul- 
sion, or restraint, from without themselves. 

A mere animal, for instance, is capable of animal 
operations, such as walking, running, flying, swim- 
ming, eatmg, drinking, and sleeping. Now an animal, 
that is capable of walking, has liberty to walk, when 
he is not physically obstructed in walking, so as to 
be absolutely prevented, by some other being. A 
fish, that has fins, and is alive in the water, has 
liberty to sxvim^ when it is not physically and effec- 
tually restrained. A bird has liberty to fty^ so long 
as it has wings capable of wafting it, and is not 
physically compelled to desist from using them. Cut 
off the fins and tail of a fish, and the wings of a 
fowl; and then the fish has no liberty to swim, the 
bird no liberty to fly. Leave the fins on a fish, but 
take it out of the water, and it has no liberty to 
swim. Leave the wings of a bird on his back, but 
hold it under the water, in your hand, or thoroughly 
drench its plumage, and it will have, for the time, 
no liberty of flying. An animal that is capable of 
slumbering, and that is not prevetrted from sleeping, 
by something that disturbs him, has the liberty of 
sleeping. Man is at liberty to perform any action of 
which he is capable, when he is not physically and 
eifectuaily restrained from doing it, by some being 



Power and Capacity* 163 

more powerful than himself. This is a physical 
liberty of action. 

To ascertain, therefore, the extent of man's li- 
berty of action, I must ascertain what actions he is 
capable of, and how far he is physically prevented 
from doing them, by some extraneous cause. The 
idea of restraint, implies some restraining cause or 
agent. 

Man is capable of performing those actions which 
he has power to do, when he has the liberty of 
doing them. For instance, when a man has all his 
limbs in a healthful state, wills to walk, and finds 
the faculty of agency on his muscles obedient to his 
will, he has the power of walking, if he is not phy- 
sically prevented from walking, by some cause with- 
out him '.t If. We say, therefore, that he is capable 
of walking, or has a capacity for walking, under 
such circumstances, when nothing but liberty is 
wanting to constitute the perfect /?0Tt;er of walking. 

Pupil, So that a man may have a capacity for 
v/alking, when he has no power of walking, because 
he wants liberty to complete his power of walking. 

Professor, I hold my little son by the legs: my 
arms are more powerful than his legs: he wills to 
walk, but he has not the power of walking, because 
I hold him fast. He has not the liberty of walking; 
but he has a capacity for walking. Had he liberty 
he would have the power, for nothing but liberty 
is, by the supposition, wanting to constitute his 
power of walking. 

Now a man has liberty to perform all those ac- 
tions, of which he is capable, when no physical re- 
straint is exerted upon him by some extraneous 



164 



Power and Liberty, 



cause. If any physical restraint is exerted upon him 
by any extraneous cause, to force him not to do, any 
action for which he has a capacity, he is not at li- 
berty to perform the contemplated action. 

Pupil, It seems to be requisite, I think, to as- 
certain wh'dt poTJuei's a man has, in order to a correcft 
understanding of the liberty with which he is en- 
dowed. Pray, Sir, what constitutes the power and 
the liberty of perception? 

Professor. Each kind of perception requires dis- 
tinct things to constitute the power of that parti- 
cular perception. The general description, which I 
give of Power to perform any operation, is this, 
that it includes every thing essential to the actual 
production of that operation. Of course, the exist- 
ence of a faculty or of faculties for doing any thing, 
is always included in any particular power of action. 
Liberty of action is another thing included, for 
where there is no physical liberty to perform the 
action, there is no power of performing it. 

Pupil, You speak, I perceive, exclusively of the 
liberty of action. Would you distinguish it from 
the liberty of not acting? 

Professor. Liberty not to perform any particular 
action is the exemption of any agent from compulsion 
to do, or the physical necessity of doing, an action. 
Liberty to perform an action may be called, for the 
sake of distinction, positive liberty; and liberty not 
to perform an action, negative liberty. Exemption 
of an agent from compulsion to do, or not to do 
an action, is the prominent idea included under the 
term of liberty^ whtther it be positive or negative. 
Pupil, That a n^an may have liberty to perform 



Liberty and Power, 165 

an action, is it necessary that he should have, at the 
same time, liberty not to perform it? 

Professor. Negative liberty is essential to positive 
liberty. A man cannot be compelled not to do an 
action, and yet have liberty at the same time to 
perform it; nor can he be compelled to do it, and 
yet have liberty not to perform it. He cannot, there- 
fore, have physical liberty to do an action, and 
yet be under the physical necessity of not doing it: 
nor can he have the liberty of not doing it, and yet, 
be under the necessity of doing it; so that if he has 
positive liberty to do an action, he must not be 
under the necessity of not doing it, which is the 
same thing as to say he must have the negative li- 
berty of not doing it. 

Pupil. Well, Sir, is it essential to the power 
of performing an action^ that we should have the 
power of not performing it? 

Professor. It is not; for this would imply the ne- 
cessity of the co-existence of two directly contrary 
powers, to constitute a single power. In many in- 
stances the power to perform a mental operation 
implies something which would render the exist- 
ence of a power of not performing the same opera- 
tion, an impossibility. This" will appear from the 
description of different powers. 

Pupil. I am constrained to interrupt you again, 
for I wish to know whether the power and the 
liberty respectively, of doing any action, implies the 
power, and the liberty of performing a directly 
contrary action. 

Professor, Certainly not, for every distinct action 
must hjvye its proper power and liberty. To walk 



166 Fower of Perception, 

one way, and to walk in a directly contrary way, 
are two opposite actions. Now a power to walk one 
Way, since it is a voluntary action, may imply, 
among other things, a volition to walk in that par- 
ticular way; and the motive for willing to walk in 
that particular way, may be the very motive for 
willing not to walk in the opposite way; so that the 
fower to walk in one way may exist, when I have 
no power to walk in the opposite way. Again, one 
way may be open to me, and the other may be ef- 
fectually obstructed; so that I have liberty to walk 
in one way, and not in the opposite. It is to be re- 
marked, that walking in one w^aj^, and not walking 
in that one v/ay, are not opposite actions* Not doing 
is the mere negation of action. The converse of a 
proposition in which an action is predicated, is not 
a proposition in which a directly opposite action is 
predicated, but one in which the non-entity of the 
action is affirmed. For instance, I walk southxvard 
is not the converse of I walk northward; but I walk 
not southward^ is the converse of the first statement; 
and 1 walk not northward^ of the second. A nega- 
tive particle introduced in any proposition, in the 
right place, will make it the converse of what it 
was. I may have power and liberty to walk, when 
I have not to sit; or to stand still, when I have not 
to walk; or to will one action, when I have not the 
power and liberty to luill a contrary action. 

Pupil. You was going to describe the power of 
perception, before I interrupted you. What, Sir, is 
the power of seeing? 

Professor, The power of seeing includes the fa- 
culty of perception, the existence of a sound eye in 



Power of Perception, 167 

its proper place, and of light; the transmission of 
rays of light from an object of vision to the eye, 
and the exemption of the other faculties of the 
mind from such intense employment, as prevents 
perception, together with the liberty of seeing. If all 
thtse things, but the last, should conspire to pro- 
duce the power of seeing, and some one more pow- 
erful than ourselves should exert a physical agency 
on our faculty of perception, so as to prevent our 
seeing, we should not have the power of seeing. 
The liberty of seeing, however, when all the other 
things named conspire to produce the power of 
vision, cannot be taken away, so far as we know, 
by any other being than our Maker. By the eye in 
its proper place I intend, in its due connexion with 
the optic nerve and brain. If light be absent, or 
if no eye exist in its proper place, or if there be no 
faculty of perception, or no object of vision; or if 
the mind be wholly occupied with the mental ope- 
rations, there is no power of seeing, in a sound 
man, when awake, and under the ordinary opera- 
tion of the laws of our mental nature. 

To constitute the poxvcr of hearings the faculty 
of perception, a sound ear in its proper place, the 
vibrations of air upon the tympanum of the ear, a 
state of mind in which other things do not intensely 
occupy it, and the liberty of hearing, are essential. 

The power of tasting mcludes the existence of 
liberty to taste, a faculty for tasting, the organs of 
tasting in a proper state; and the contact of some- 
thing vo be tasted with those organs. 

Thvi power of smelling is constituted by the ex- 
istence of the faculty of perception, the nasal organs 



168 Different Powers* 

in a proper state, the liberty of smelling, and th& 
contact of some effluvia of the object to be smelt 
with those organs. 

The power of touching includes the liberty, the 
faculty, and the organs of touching in a proper 
state; together with the contact of something with 
those organs, to be touched. 

The nerves spread over the whole body, in a 
proper state, may be considered as the essential 
part of the bodily organs by which we perceive in 
these five different ways. 

Pup'iU I am impatient to hear your account of 
the power of performing the other simple mental 
operations. 

Professor* The existence of the faculty of Con- 
sciousness, and of some previous mental operation, 
of which to be conscious, together with the liberty 
of being conscious, constitute the power of con* 
sciousness. 

The existence of the faculty of Understanding or 
Conception, together with liberty of operation, con- 
stitute the power of understanding, 

PupiL Is not the previous existence of an opera- 
tion of consciousness, perception, memory, judgment, 
reasoning, conscience, volition, feeling, and agency, 
requisite to constitute the power of conceiving of 
each of these things? 

Professor, Why did you not add, " and of con- 
ception?" 

Pupil, Because I clearly understood, that it 
would be absurd to suppose, that an operation of 
conception was essential to constitute the power of 
conception, for that would be supposing an opera- 



Different Powers, 169 

tion of conception must have existed before there 
was any power to perform it. 

Professor. You are correct. It seems, then, that 
we may have power to conceive of an operation be- 
fore we actually perform that operation. Conception 
is an instance of this kind. Now then I ask, what 
should prevent me from conceiving of an act of me- 
mory, had I the faculty of conception, without the 
faculty of memory? 

Pupil, I know not that you would be prevented 
from doing it; and so you might do it, if you had 
poxver. That you would not have the power, I can- 
not affirm; for I conceive of an angel, of Satan, of 
a mountain of salt, and of a man as tall as a steeple, 
without ever having perceived, or ever before, per- 
haps, conceived of such things. 

Professor, It is true, that we more readily con- 
ceive of such mental operations as we have had, 
than of any which we have not performed; vet I 
cannot ascertain, that the actual experiencing of anv 
operation is essential to the power of conceiving of 
them. Conception, as we have already shown, is a 
sort of creative, inventive, originating faculty of the 
human mind. 

Pupil. V^ hat is the power of judging? 

Professor, A conception of the meaning of a pro- 
position, together with the faculty and the liberty 
of judging, constitute the power of judging consti- 
tutionally. Volition and attention are requisite in 
addition, to constitute the power of forming ac- 
quired judgm en ts. 

The power of reasoning comprehends the pre- 
vious conception of at least two propositions, two 
P 



170 Dtffereyit Powers, 

judgments, together with the liberty and faculty of 
inferring from them a third, of which he conceives. 

The power of memory includes the faculty and 
liberty of memory, together with the previous ex- 
istence of some other mental act to be remembered. 

The power of recollection consists of the faculty 
and liberty of memory, the previous existence of 
some act to be recollected, a volition to recollect, 
and voluntary agency on the memory to produce 
recollection. 

The power of conscience includes the faculty of 
conscience, liberty to exercise it, and some previous 
judgment concerning a law, obligation, and the con- 
formity or non-conformity of some action to that 
law and obligation. 

Of the seven powers appertaining to the ^even 
faculties of The Understandings it may be well 
here to remark, that God alone has the power of 
absolutely depriving us of the liherty of thinking. 
We may partially impair our own liberty of think- 
ing; and men may in some instances deprive others 
of the liberty of employing some of their intellectual 
faculties for a little while; but him whom God has 
made free to think, not all the tyrants in the world 
ean compel not to think. 

The power of feeling includes the liberty and 
faculty of feelmg, together with some previous 
thought which is the occasion of feeling. 

I'he power of volition includes the faculty and li- 
berty of volition, together with the conception of 
some action deemed practicable to be resolved on, 
and the apprehension of some motive for willing the 
performance of it. 



Liberty and Necessity, 171 

The power of agency includes a volition to per- 
form some action, together with the faculty and li- 
berty of exertion in obedience to the will. 

These are the POWERS of man to perform 
simple operations of the mind. To describe the dif- 
ferent powers of complex operations, would re- 
quire too much time. Only keep in mind, that 
poxver always includes every thing essential to the 
performance of an operation, and you will generally 
satisfy yourself, so far as you have knowledge of 
causes and effects, what constitutes the power of 
performing any action. 

Fupil. Are there not many kinds of liberty and 
necessity of which you have said nothing? 

Professor. A law which does not forbid any ac- 
tion is said to give liberty to perform it; because 
the law presents no legal obstruction to it. A person 
too, is said to give liberty to do any action which 
he determines not to use any exertions to prevent 
from being done. If a law authorizes any action, it 
may be said to give moral or legal liberty for its 
performance. 

Oi physical necessity nothing more need be said. 
There is a metaphysical necessity^ that two and two 
should amount to neither more nor less than four; 
that a square should not be a circle; that the same 
thing should not exist and yet exist at the same time; 
that a proposition should be either true or false, and 
not both in the same sense; and that a being of in- 
finite knowledge and perfect truth should not lie. 
Many similar things are metaphysically necessary; 
ajjd to a metaphysical necessity, or a necessity re- 



1 7% €ertainty. 

suiting from the nature of the things which exist, 
there is no opposing liberty. 

Moral certainty^ or any thing which is absolutely 
certain in moral operations^ has been called, some- 
times moral and sometimes metaphysical necessity^ 
but v/e think very improperly. When people mean 
moral certainty they should say so; and not con- 
found the certain futurition of a moral action with 
necessity. 

Some things, moreover, which have been called 
moral necessities^ are absolutely physical necessities. 
It is said, for instance, to be morally necessary^ that 
every volition should be consequent upon some mo- 
tive; whereas this is a physical necessity^ resulting 
from the very nature of volition, and the natural 
constitution of the human mind. It is not only mo- 
rally certain that there will be no volition without 
some motive; but it \s physically impossible^ during 
the continuance of the present mental 7iature of 
man, that there would be any act of the will with- 
out some motive, in a sane mind. 



CONVERSATION XV. 



Disposition of Mind. — Inclination. — Habit. — Imitation. — Consideration 
of sereral Principles of Human Actions. — Principles of Substances, 
Sciences, Actions, and Moral Actions. — Sentiments, Instinct. — In- 
stinctive, Animal, and Mechanical Operations. 



Pupil, What do you mean by Disposition of 
mind? 

Professor. It is the name of any relative state of 
the mental faculties, I have a mental disposition to 
learn, if my mind is in such a state as is conducive 
to the acquisition of knowledge. For instance if my 
faculties are in such a state relative to learning, that 
I conceive of the importance of learning, desire to 
learn, judge it best to learn, and will to pay the re- 
quisite attention, that I may learn, I have a dispo- 
sition to learn. 

Pupil, You derive the word, I presume, from 
iispono^ or dispositum^ a placing in order ^ and use 
it always in the strict sense. 

Professor, I do: and I assure you, I never found 
a man who could tell me what he did mean by dis*- 
position^ that attempted to give any other definition 
of the term. It surely is not the name of any one 
feeling, or of any other single operation of mind. 
We hear much of a disposition to believe. It is a 
very important one, if we mean by it such a state 
V 2 ' 



174) Disposition* Inclination* 

of the mental faculties relative to testimony, as is 
likely to ensure assent to the truth of credible and 
valuable testimony. If a man judges that a speaker 
is a person of veracity, and has interesting truth to 
communicate, and at the same time desires to hear 
his testimony, he has a disposition to believe. On 
the other hand, if a man doubts the veracity of a 
testifier, or hates his person, or judges that he has 
nothing of importance to communicate, he is dis- 
posed not to believe, 

A right mental disposition in relation to any 
m.ental operation to be performed, is as essential a& 
the right disposition of the eye and of light in rela- 
tion to the seeing of any object; or the right dis- 
position of a cannon, to carry a point blank shot 
through a target. 

PupzL What do you mean by a mental Inclina- 
iioni^ 

Professor, Mental inclination is such a disposi- 
tion of mind as presents many inducements to any 
specified voluntary action. It is figurative language, 
derived from the inclination or bending forward of 
the body towards any object. If a man says he has 
an inclination to go to the theatre to-night, his 
meaning is, that he has several inducements to will 
the operation of going, but has not quite determined 
to go. If he has willed to go; he says, I have deter- 
mined, resolved, purposed, intended or willed to go 
to the theatre to-night; but if he has not actually 
v/illed, yet thinks himself almost ready to do it, 
from the inducements which he at present has, he 
asserts that he is inclined, or has an iiiclitiation to 
go. A man is always inclined to do that, for willing 



Mental Habits. 175 

to do which he apprehends many powerful induce- 
mentsj but he always wills to do that, for doing 
which his inducements constitute a motive. 

Pupil. Hence I am inclined to do many things, 
which I have not, upon the whole, motives for re- 
solving to do. I have been inclined to visit the 
theatre, but never willed to do it; and so was never 
there. 

Professor.' Yes; and it is owing to your mental 
disposition that you apprehend any inducements^ and 
that you are not actually moved^ to mental deter- 
mination^ and activity^ in relation to those actions. 

Pupil. What should I mean when I speak of 
mental Habits? 

Professor. Mental habit is any such disposition 
of mind in relation to any kind of action, which we 
have often rtrpeated, as renders the repetition of it 
easy, and common. Habit is something acquired, 
and when confirmed, more strongly resembles a 
mental faculty than any other attribute of the soul. 
Hence it is frequently called a second nature. The 
habit of imitation is one of the earliest which we 
form. 

PupiL Are there any general laws concerning 
habit? 

Professor, It is a law of our nature, that the 
frequent repetition of any action, shall render the 
performance ©f that action easy; and commonly 
present a motive for future repetitions of it. 

Pupil, Of course, it is a law of our nature, that 
the frequent performance of a particular kind of ac- 
tion, shall produce a habit of action. 

Professor* It is another law of our nature, that 



176 Principles of Action. 

not very ardent, but moderately agreeable feelings 
shall result from habitual actions: and another, that 
a habit, once formed, shall be difficult to resist and 
eradicate; but may be destroyed by the formation 
of a contrary habit. 

Pupil. Can you classify the habits of man? 

Professor, Not easily; for any action of which 
he is capable, by being often repeated, may become 
the germ of a habit, lasting as life. Man forms 
habits of thinking, feeling, choice, and efficiency. 
He has habits of speaking, writing, dressing, eat- 
ing, drinking, sleeping, amusement, idleness, study, 
and labour. But one thing I would have you re- 
member, that it is of unspeakable importance to 
form amiable and healthful habits of body, and vir- 
tuous, studious, systematic habits of soul: for so 
powerful is habit, that it may enable the animal 
frame to resist that poison which would have occa- 
sioned death before the habit of using it was form- 
ed; and the mind, to take unceasing satisfaction in 
unremitting, intellectual, and benevolent pursuits. 

PupiL We have heard much about principles y 
and principles of action. I would thank you to re- 
peat to me, what you have formerly said on this 
subject, that your views may be more thoroughly 
impressed on my mind. 

Professor. A principle^ is the beginning, the ori- 
gin, the foundation of any thing. It is derived from 
the Latin wprd principium. When you trace a science 
to the axioms on which it is founded, you trace it 
to its first principles. The first principles of any 
complex substance, are those simple substances of 
which it is compounded or constituted. Hence, 



Principles of Action. 177 

flour, yeast, water, and salt may be called the com- 
ponent principles of bread; and the ten mental fa- 
culties which have been named, the component 
principles of the human mind. 

If we inquire into the origin of human operation, 
and ascertain what it is that occasions or produces 
any operation, we ascertain the principle of that 
operation. Hence the soul itself may be denomi- 
nated 2L principle of thought, of feeling', of volition, 
and of agency. It is very frequently called an ac- 
tive principle^ because it has the power of beginning 
and continuing various kinds of operations. 

The principle of any particular action is that 
which, figuratively speaking, lies at the foundation 
of it, and supports it. Hence every faculty may be 
called the first principle of its own operations. Be- 
sides these first principles of action, those antece- 
dent operations upon which any subsequent action 
depends, are called the principles of that action. 
Hence a motive is the principle of a volition. If you 
ask, upon what principle a man willed a certain 
action, you inquire what motive induced him to 
will it. , 

Any thing that is very generally among mankind, 
a motive for willing any particular kind of opera- 
tion, is called a general^ or common principle of 
action. Hence huyiger^ because it moves all men to 
seek and receive food, is called a common principle 
of action. Each of the natural appetites has the 
same distinction. Habit is an acquired principle of 
action, because it furnishes a standing motive to 
every one who forms it, for choosing to act in a 
particular way. 



1 78 Sentiments, 

Mankind are so universally influenced in their 
volitions, and voluntary exertions, by the desire of 
wealth, power, society, health, life, happiness, and 
the approbation of those whom they esteem, that the 
desire and love of each of these things is styled si 
e^mmon principle of action. These desires are na- 
tural to all men in their present state. Hence we 
say, that a man is governed in his conduct by one, 
or the other, or all of these principles of action, in 
all the common concerns of life; unless he is ha- 
bitually moved by a superior, acquired principle of 
action, called the sense of duty • 

Feeling and Conscience, as we have already seen, 
frequently furnish motives for our conduct, and 
therefore may be called principles of action; and 
even common principles. 

The common principle of voluntary efficiency^ is 
volition; for a man exerts himself upon this princi- 
ple, that he xvill to do it. 

Pupil. Is not sentiment a very general principle 
of action? 

Professor, By sentiment I design to denote any 
such judgment as ordinarily operates as a motive 
to volition. I answer, therefore, that sentiment is a 
very common principle of human action. 

Pupil. Many of our constitutional judgments I 
should think, then, might be called sentiments; for 
t\it judgments^ that the things which we perceive, 
really exist, and that they are such as we perceive 
them, are principles of action to all men. 

Professor. You are undoubtedly correct. It is 
another comnum principle of action with men, that 
every operation of mind of which they are conscious^ 



Moral Principles. 179 

#r which they remember, has really been performed 
by themselves. Our judgments, concerning our own 
mental identity, the intelligence of the persons with 
whom we converse, the credibility of testimony; 
and in short, all other permanent judgments, whether 
constitutional or acquired, which commonly move 
men to will a course of conduct conformable to 
those judgments, are principles of action. 

One of our most commonly operative sentiments 
in relation to our voluntary agency upon material 
objects is this, " That in the phenomena of nature, 
what is to be, vv'ill probably be like to what has been 
in similar circumstances."* 

PupiL What is a moral principlef 
Professor, Any thing which lies at the foundation 
of a moral law, obligation, or action. 

Pupil. I designed to inquire, particularly, about 
the principles of moral actions* 

Professor, When you have ascertained what is 
a moral action., you will then find no difficulty in 
ascertaming what is the principle of any particular 
moral action. For instance, if every volition is a 
moral operation, then every motive is a moral prin- 
ciple; and the faculty of volition is an inherent mO' 
ral principle. If every operation of conscience is a 
moral action, then the faculty of conscience is a 
moral principle of action; and Q^ch. judgment in de- 
pendence on which conscience operates, is a moral 
prmciple of conscience. If no operation of man is 
a moral action, but some operation of voluntary ef- 



* Dr. Reid, 



1 80 3Ioral Agency. 

fidency^ then the faculty of agency is a moral prin- 
ciple, the volitions on which our operations of agen- 
cy depend, are moral principles of agency; and the 
motives on which these volitions depend, are ulte- 
rior moral principles of agency. 

Pupil. You speak hypothetically. I should be 
obliged to you for a definition of a moral action. 

Professor, I will offer a few general remarks on 
this subject; but must refer you for full satisfaction 
to the science of theology. 

Any law given for the regulation of the actions 
of an intellectual^ sensitive^ voluntary efficient^ or 
agenty is a moral lazu. All other laws are called 
physical. 

Any action -ivhtch is required or forbidden by a 
moral law, is a moral action., in contradistinction to 
a physical action, or operation. 

Pupil. Moral laws and moral actions, of course, 
may be either good or bad, right or wrong. 

Professor, Yes; for every law which a ruler gives 
his subjects; a master, his servant; a parent, his 
child; a teacher, his pupil; or the Creator, his intel- 
lectual, voluntary, efficient creature, is a moral law; 
and every act of disobedience, as well as of obe- 
dience, is a moral action. 

Pupil, In some sense, it appe irs to me, that a 
moral action may be a very immoral one; and a 
mora/ law, an im7noralUw, Am I right? 

Professor, Perfectly: for one mor d law of one 
being, may be contrary to the moral law of another 
being. A parent, for example, may require his 
child to steal; and God requires the same child not 
to steal. Now conformity to any moral law is 



Moral Agency, 181 

3®metimes cdled moral, in contradistinction to non- 
conformity, which is popularly denoted humoral, or 
vicious. Moral, therefore, has two senses; one of 
which is opposed to physical, and the other to im- 
moral. That moral lazu of any being which is con- 
trary to the moral, law of th6 Creator, is an immo- 
ral or vicious law: and that moral conduct which 
is required by a moral law of man, but which is 
contrary to the moral law of God, is immoral con- 
duct. When we enquire, what is a moral action? 
we use the word moral in opposition to physical. 
It is in this sense, that I have said, that any action 
required or forbidden by a moral law, is a moral 
action. 

Pupil, From what you have already said, I 
should infer, that a 7noral sentiment^ is any such 
judgment on any moral subject, as is commonly a 
motive to a particular kind of moral actions. 

Professor, We accord in judgment; and let me 
add, it is happy for mankind that all of their 'diZ- 
quired Judgme7its are not senti?nents; for then, every 
man's moral actions would be as unreasonable as 
his opinions are erroneous. 

Pupil. What do you call Instinct?^ 

Professor. An a7ii?nal principle of action; and so 
called, because it appertains to all animals; and ex- 
cites them to many actions. 



* "Instinctive actions," says Lord Karnes, " cannot be said to have 
a motive, because they are not (?one with any view to consequeuces."— 
Elem&nts of Criticism j vol. i. p. 46. 

Q 



182 Human Instinct, 

Pupil, What is this Instinct? Is it a faculty, or 
a disposition? 

Professor, Instinct in man is such a disposition 
of the faculties of perception and agency in relation 
to each other^ as produces instantly certain actions, 
without any conception of them, or volition concern- 
ing them. 

Pupil. Will you h^ve the kindness to illustrate 
your definition? 

Professor. In a child, the perception which it 
has through the stomach and organs of tasting, in 
consequence of the operation of the gastric juice 
on the coats of the stomach, in the absence of food, 
is immediately followed by an operation of the fa- 
culty of agency on the lips, tongue, and throat, 
which produces the act ot sucking. The child has 
no conception of the action, nor of the utility of 
it; nor of its ability to perform it; neither does it 
will to perform it, from any motive whatever. It 
sucks, instinctively. The author of our nature has 
disposed the faculties of perception and agency in 
such a manner, that the child exerts its power of 
agency in sucking, immediately in consequence of 
certam perceptions, so that if the child had no other 
faculties of mind than these two, it would be able 
to suck. The perception which is followed by suck- 
ing, is commonly called the sense of hunger. 

Pupil, Sucking then is an operation performed 
by instinct. What other operations, do mankind 
perform from this disposition? 

Professor. It is to be remarked, that men fre- 
quently perform those actions from volition, which 
are ordinarily performed from instinct. With this 



Instinctive Operations, 183 

understanding, I denominate sw.allowtng^ wiriking^ 
sucking^ shrinking^ laughing^ crying^ weepings sigh- 
ing^ starting^ and all those actions performed by 
our bodily members for self defence^ or self-preser- 
vation^ when they are performed without volition 
to perform them, instinctive operations. None of 
these are performed, except in consequence of some 
perception; and they are frequently performed with- 
out any intention. Hence instinct is the principle of 
these operations. 

PupiL I think Dr. Reid represents breathings and 
the contraction and relaxation of the muscles^ in all 
VOLUNTARY, bodHy actions^ to be instinctive ac- 
tions. 

Professor* I think him incorrect in this; for 
breathings when involuntary, as it generally is, re- 
sults not from perception of any kind; but from the 
mechanical construction of the chest, lungs, and 
windpipe of the human frame; and the chemical 
affinity of the blood in the living animal, for a por- 
tion of the atmospheric air, called oxygen gas, to- 
gether with its want of affinity for the other portion, 
called azotic gas. Hence I have known the dead 
body of a man to breathe, from pulling down the 
diaphragm, so as to produce a vacuum favourable 
to the distension of the lungs. This case of unnatu- 
ral breathing was purely a mechanical operation, 
without any chemical influence. 

The action of the muscles in voluntary opera- 
tions is the effect of our mental efficiency upon 
them; and although we know not the mode in which 
our mental effi Jen<:y affects our nerves and muscles, 
yet we know the fact, that upon volition, the mind 



184 Muscular Motion. 

does exert an agency upon every moveable part of 
the body. This is something widely different from 
instinct. The muscles are so connected with the 
mechanical structure of our bones, and with one 
another, arranged like loops and puUies, that the 
contraction or distention of certain muscles being 
effected, through the agency of the mind, by the 
medium of the nerves, the bones are moved me- 
chanically. Muscular 7notion, therefore, when the 
result of volition, is no more instinctive, than ner- 
vous influence, whatever that may be; and breathing 
is no more instinctive than the circulation of the 
blood, or the muscular distention and contraction 
of the material heart. Some of our involuntart/ mus- 
cular 7notions^ however, are instinctive; as in the 
case of sucking. 

Breathing is partly a mechanical operation, and 
partly the result of what is usually called the vi- 
tality of the blood. The principles of breathing are 
the mechanical structure of the organs employed , 
in it, and animal life: and the principles of muscular 
motions are the mechanical structure of the mus- 
cles, the influence of the nerves, and the action of 
our mental efficiency upon them. 

Sleeping, involuntary natural breathing, the cir- 
culation of the blood, and the motions of the heart, 
are all dependent on animal life. The motions of 
the bones, are dependent on mechanical structures 
and muscular operation: and the growth of the 
bones, nails, hair, and indeed of every nerve, mus- 
cle, sinew, and portion of the human frame, upon 
vegetable life. As the plants of the earth grow 
from food supplied to them by the earth, air, light. 



Growth of the Body, 185 

and heatj so the parts of the human body are fed 
by the blood; and the blood by the aliments suited 
to the nature of the vital fluid. We thrive and 
grow, not from volition, not from instinct, not from 
mechanical principles, but from the principles of 
vegetation. As so many capillary tubes in plants 
convey the sap to every vegetating portion, so the 
lacteal vessels take up the chyle prepared for them, 
and convey it to the thoracic duct, which pours the 
new stream of life into the aorta and heart. From 
this great reservoir, the arteries take it to every in- 
creasing particle of the human frame. 



Q 



CONVERSATION XVI. 



Several Complex Operations of Man considered. — Attention, Obser- 
vation, Reflection, Inquiry, Investigation, Consideration, Contem- 
plation, Meditation, Comparison, Association, and Abstraction.— 
Compounding not a Mental Operation, unless it be a name givea to 
several successive Conceptions. 



Pupil. Will you describe some of the principal 
complex operations of man? 

Professor, Of several actions which are partly 
mechanical, partly animal, and partly mental, such 
as voluntary walking, eating, drinking, writing, 
reading aloud, speaking and the like, we have al- 
ready said enough. Dancing, playing on instruments 
of music, riding, fighting, and the practice of every 
domestic, ornamental, mechanical, or other art, is a 
complex operation, 

Pupih I desire particularly a knowledge of com- 
plex mental operations. 

Professor. Some of the most important complex 
mental operations, which are described by a single 
term in our language, are the following, viz: 

I. Attention. This is a voluntary effort to con- 
fine some one or more of our intellectual faculties 
to some particular object, or objects, for the pur- 
pose of knowing or perceiving something, which 
we judge may be known or perceived. Attention 



Complex Mental Operations. I8i^ 

always implies a judgment tiiat by attention some- 
thing may be perceived or known; together with a 
volition^ and a consequent exertion of the faculty of 
agency upon some other faculty; to keep it in a 
state favourable to its appropriate operation; so that 
at least three simple operations are always denoted 
by the term attention* 

Let perception be the object of attention^ for an 
example. Attention will then include a judgment, 
that something may be either seen, touched, heard, 
smelt, or tasted; a volition to exert our faculties to 
perceive what may present itself to our perception; 
and an actual agency upon that faculty, so as to 
hear any sound that may reach the ear, or to see 
any object exhibited to the eye, or to smell, taste, 
or touch such things as may come in contact with 
the organs of these senses. 

Let me speak to a man who appears not to hear 
what I say; or if he hears, not to be employing his 
Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, Conscience, or 
Memory, about my statements; and I will say, at- 
tend to me. If he then judges, that I have some- 
thing to utter, and voluntarily exerts himself to 
hear me, and apprehend my meaning, he performs 
the complex mental operation of attention, 

IL Observation. Attention to any object of 
perception, is the complex mental operation called 
observation. Of course it includes as many simple 
operations as attention. Hence, a statement of any 
thing which we have attentively perceived, is an 
observation, 

III. Reflection, is another complex mental 
act, which consists in a man's attention to his own 



188 Complex Operations, 

mental operations. If he judges that he may know 
what is transacted in his own mind, and voluntarily 
exerts himself to remember, be conscious or con- 
ceive of; or judge, reason, or exercise his conscience 
about any of his own thoughts, feelings, volitions, 
or exertions, he is the subject of oriental reflection. 
It most commonly denotes the turning again of the 
attention of the mind to itself, and its own conscious 
operations. 

IV. Inquirt, is a voluntary exertion of the mind 
upon its faculties of conception and judgment, for 
the purpose of framing propositions in the form of 
questions. You exemplify this complex operation 
whenever your mind creates any interrogation which 
you put to me. 

V. Investigation, is the institution of an in- 
quiry into any subjeci, from the desire or the de- 
termination to form some judgment concerning it. 

VI. Consideration, is a voluntary, and for some 
time continued thinking of some operation, or con- 
duct, in regard to its consequences, or other rela- 
tions. Of course, consideration implies attention to 
at least two things; namely, some operation and its 
consequences, or other relations. 

VII. Contemplation, is a voluntary, general, 
and serious consideration, of a number of objects 
in their various relations to one another. 

VIII. Meditation, is the consideration of any 
object with a design to form some plan of future 
conduct, or to be prepared for some future event. 

IX. Comparison, implies the conception of at 
least two things, and of some relative judgment 
concerning them. Hence if I compare one apple 



Complex Operations* 189 

with another, I conceive of each, and of the mean- 
ing of the thing which I predicate, at least in my 
€>wn mind, in relation to them. I say, for instance, 
this apple, of which I conceive, is like or unlzke 
that, or is larger, or smaller, or better, or worse, 
than that, of which I also conceive. Something of 
this nature enters into every mental operation of 
comparing; so that there is no comparison without 
a conception of each of the things compared, a con- 
ception of the thing mentally predicated in relation 
to them, and a relative judgment. 

X. Association or Classification, is a com- 
plex mental operation, which includes the compa- 
rison of a plurality of objects, and a determination 
to arrange, and label them, according to our judg- 
ment of their resemblance, or dissimilitude.^ 

Cast into my lap twenty things, and bid me asso- 
ciate, or classify them. I will perform the operation 
thus. First, I perceive each one of them, in one or 
more ways, for I see them all; I handle them all. 



* " To form a class of certain objects, is nothing else but to give the 
same name to all those which we judge to be similar; and "when out 
of this class we form two or more, we still do nothing else but choose 
new names . to distinguish objects which we judge to be different. It 
is by this artifice alone we reduce our ideas to order, and this artifice 
accomplishes nothing more; we must add, that it can do nothing but 
this. Indeed we should be grossly mistaken, if we imagined that there 
are in nature species and genera, because there are species and ge- 
nera in our manner of conceiving. General names are properly the 
names of no existing [[external] thing; they only express the views of 
the mind, when we consider things under relations of resemblance or 
difference. There is no tree in general, no apple-tree in general, no 
pear-tree in general; there are only individuals; therefore there are 
neither species nor genera in nature." — Condillac. 



190 Association, 

Then I compare each one of the twenty with every 
other one of the remaining number. I perceive that 
five of them have one colour, which I call red; and, 
in the operation of comparing, judge that they are 
like each other, and unlike the other fifteen in this 
respect. I call them, therefore, red things; because 
thing denotes any object of knowledge, and is the 
noDst general term in our language. On comparison^ 
in like manner, Ijudge^ that five others out of these 
twenty are blacky five white, and five green, I have 
of course, by comparing these twenty things to- 
gether, in relation to their colour, and forming 
judgments concerning them, in consequence of per- 
ceptions through the eye, divided them into four 
companies, or classes, which I distinguish as classes 
of red, black, white, and green things. Now I have 
performed one work of association: but I attend to 
the things still, and make another classification. I 
grasp each thing of the twenty in the palm of my 
hand; and from the perception of touch, compare 
each, in order, with every other thing, and judge, 
that ten of them are in shape like each other, and 
the other ten like each other, but unlike the first ten. 
I give a particular name to each shape, for the sake 
of distinction, and so call the one round, and the 
other cubic. Hence I have two classes of things; 
namely, cubic and round things. On further com- 
parison, I judge them all alike in several of their 
attributes, of a different nature from their colour and 
shape. They are all elastic, of similar consistency, 
and I saw them all cut out of the tusk of an ele- 
phant. I give a name, therefore, to denote this si- 
milarity of the things in several attributes, and call 



Association. 191 

tliem all ivory. Hence, should I compare them with 
other objects around me, that want elasticity, and 
other attributes which belong to these twenty things, 
I should say, these are ivory things^ ten of which 
are round^ and the other ten^ cubic in shape,* and 
five of them are in colour red^ five blacky five zdhite^ 
and ^ve g-reen. 

In this way we classify or associate all objects 
of our conception. By this complex operation men 
have divided all things into uncreated and created 
things; into substances and attributes; and all sub- 
stances into mind and matter, 

PupiL And is this that association of ideas of 
which we hear and read much that is unintelligible?* 

Professor* An idea you know is nothing but a 
conception; and all the things of which we conceive 
we class in various ways, in consequence of compar- 
mg them. An association of ideas^ is nothing more 
than an association or classification of conceptions. 
Now our conceptions will admit of as many classes 
as there are kinds of things of which we conceive. 
We have of course conceptions of substances, attri- 



* " The object which we name a tree, a child will call a tree after 
Bs, the very first tree which we shall show it; and this name will be 
for it the name of an individual. However, if it be shown another tree 
it will not wait to ask its name: it will call it a tree, and render this 
name common to two individuals. It will in the same way render it 
common to three, to four, and at last to all the plants which will ap- 
pear to it 4.0 bear some resemblance of the first trees it had seen. It 
is naturally induced to generalize, because it is more convenieut t» 
use a name which it knows, that to learn a new one. It generalizes, 
therefore, without having formed a design of generalizing; nay, without 
remarking that it generalizes."— . Co7ic/?Ytoc. 



192 A Train of Thought. 

butes, mind, matter, operations, faculties, relations^ 
dispositions, and the like. 

PvpiL Are all our classifications acquired? 

Professor. Every one of them. Classification is a 
voluntary operation. 

Pup'iL Of what great use is association of things? 

Professor* Should men never classify objects of 
thought, they could speak of individual things only. 
Besides, association greatly assists our memory. It 
is a law of mental operation, that the memory of any 
thought of a single object should greatly facilitate 
our recollection of other things, which we have at 
any former time classed with it. 

It is even a law of our mental nature, that mental 
operations which have been classified merely by a 
conception of, and judgment concerning, the time of 
their existence, should be easily remembered. Hence, 
if we can only recollect one mental operation, per- 
formed at a certain time, we can often readily recol- 
lect many operations, that very speedily followed 
it. This is recalling what is called a train of thought. 

Pupil But why should the thought of one object 
in a class, or of one idea in a train, bring up a multi- 
tude of other objects, in the same class, or ideas 
that were in the mind at, or near, the same. time? 

Professor. I can assign no other reason, why these 
things should be, than this, that God has so con- 
stituted our minds that these things are actually ex- 
perienced by mankind in general. We find these to 
be laws of our mental nature; that a train of thought, 
which has once passed through our minds, if volun- 
tarily or involuntarily commenced again, is easily re- 
traced; that we perform any mental operation, and 



Abstraction, 193 

train of operations, more and more easily, and 
rapidly, in proportion to the number of times, in 
which we have repeated them; and that the memory 
of one thing shall frequently occasion the memory 
of a number of other things, with which it was as- 
sociated by some work of our own minds, or to 
which it was related by some apprehended circum- 
stances. These are laws of memory as well as of as- 
sociation. 

Pupil. There is another very important complex 
mental operation of man which you have not 
named. 

Professor* Abstraction, is the Xlth complex 
mental operation, of which I designed to speak. 
It is intimately connected with classification; and 
without it we should never have any abstract terms, 
or general zvords^ so that language would consist of 
nouns, exclusively; and of such nouns only as de- 
note individual things. 

Pupil, Well, Sir, what is abstraction?^ 

Professor, It is a mental process, which includes 
the comparison and classification of individual things, 
together with a judgment, that all the things of each 
class are alike, at least in some respect; and a de- 
termination to employ one name to denote any one, 
and every one, of the individuals of that class, so 
far as we judge it to be like the rest, without re- 



* "There is no man in general. — Abstract ideas are therefore no- 
thing bal-<1enominatiofiS. if we really imaginff! any thitigel.se in ihf^m, 
we should reseoable a painter who should obstinately be beiit ou \^■^\<^t• 
ing man in general, and who, it is obvious, can never paint but indivi- 
duals."— CondUlac. 

R 



194 Abstracti07u 

garding the things in which it may differ from 
them.* I will refer to an example just given. Hav- 
ing classified the twenty things cast into my lap, by 
comparing them, and judging them, I will to use 
a name that shall designate any one of the ten, that is 
judged to be of a similar shape, without any present 
regard to colour, elasticity, or any thing else but 
shape; and I invent, or adopt, the word ball. Of 
each and every one of the round things thus classi- 
fied, I say, this is a ball. Subsequently, if I com- 
pare any other object with any one of these ten 
balls, and resolve not to attend for the present to 
any thing appertaining to them but their shape, I 
shall judge, that the other object is like, or unlike, 
each of the balls in shape. If I judge it, upon com- 
parison, to be like them, in this one respect of 
shape, I shall say, " this is a ball too." 

The ten things that from similarity of shape 
among themselves, but dissimilarity to the balls, 
have been put into a distinct class, I wish to speak 



* An abstract ferm is such a name of an individual thing of which we 
conceive, as we judge equally applicable to any one of many similar indi- 
viduals. Such a term we could neither form, nor use, did we not volun- 
tarilj take away, that is, abstract, from our conceptions concerning an 
individual, several things which are peculiar to it as an individual. J}£an 
is an abstract term. In forming it, we abstract from our conceptions of 
an individual man those which are peculiar to any one, and not com- 
mon to every other individual being, that we designate by this name. 
We abstract, for instance, the colour of the complexion, the size of the 
limbs, and th*? expression of the features, as well as the distinction of 
sex, when we say, " God made man upright." Of the meaning of this 
tertrif man, we conceive, or have an idea. We conceive that it denotes 
any one individual, in whom certain attributes meet, without regarding 
certain other attributes that may be peculiar to some one, and not com- 
mon to other individuals called meit. 



Abstractmi, 195 

of in relation to their shape, to the exclusion of 
every thing else perceived in them, and so I invent, 
or adopt, the name of cube. By subsequent compari- 
sons, I am induced to call every other object, which 
in shape resembles one of these things, a cube; 
whatever may be its other attributes. Hence any 
thing that is judged to be like another thing in 
shape which we have previously called a ball, we 
denominate, when considered in relation to shape 
alone, a ball. 

Now put, for the first time, five balls of wood, 
five of ivory, five of marble and five of lead into a 
child's hat, v/ho by comparing and judging has 
learned to call them balls in distinction from all ob- 
jects of a different figure. Let him now be taught 
to compare these balls in some other respect than 
that of figure. Let them be all of the same size, 
and he will soon judge, that while alike in shape 
and size, they are not all alike in weight. By 
handling them, he will have such perceptions as 
will induce the judgment, that five may be put 
into one class, from being like each other, and un- 
like the other fifteen in weight. In this way, con- 
templating them for somcvtime, he will make four 
classes, each of which will consist of five indivi- 
duals. Now he will want a name to designate each, 
and every one of the five, as belonging to one of 
these four classes. There is, however, no name in 
our language to designate each of a class of objects, 
merely from regard to their specific gravity. We 
must therefore turn the attention of the child to 
other things in which each ball of the five in each 
class is like all in its own class, and unlike all in 



1 96 Abstraction, 

the other classes. The five in one class look 
alike, and differ m appearance from those of 
each other class. The five in one class are alike 
elastic, and the five in each of two other classes 
are also elastic; but the five in one class are less 
elastic than the five in the other class. The five 
in the last class are not elastic. Besides, one 
class o£ the balls were cut out of a tree, another 
out of an elephant's tusk, another out of a gritty 
block of a certain kind of stone, and the fourth 
were run out of a substance rendered liquid by- 
heat. The child still wants a name for each thing 
of each class, that shall serve for every one of five 
in its own peculiar class. He is taught therefore, to 
call the five balls, that have a peculiar appearance, 
texture, and degree of elasticity, that were cut out 
of a tree, wooden balls; and any one of the five is 
a wooden ball. In proceeding thus far, there has 
been no attention paid to the kind of a tree from 
which each wooden ball was cut, nor to its colour, 
nor to many other of its attributes. When, therefore, 
the child sees any other object, that is a ball, and 
that has the attributes of wood, he calls it a wooden 
balU abstracting, or taking away voluntarily, from 
his contemplation of the thing, its size, colour, and 
all other things, which are not common to every 
thing in the class of things called wooden balls. 

The five balls that have the highest degree of 
elasticity, with a peculiar texture, appearance, and 
origin, the child calls ivory balls; and each and every 
one of them an ivory ball. In like manner he ob- 
tains a notion oi a marble^ and of a leaden ball. 

Pupil, In abstracting, it appears to roe, that we 



Abstraction, 197 

voluntarily conceive of a part of a complex object, 
of uhich as a whole we have previously conceived, 
with a design to classify that complex object, ac- 
cording to the part of which we voluntarily con- 
ceive, to the exclusion of its other parts, with ob- 
jects that resemble it in this selected feature, while 
they differ from it in others.* 

Professor, Every class of things is a complex 
whole, constituted by constituent parts which have 
more or less resemblance to each other. Mankind 
for example, is an abstract term, designed to de- 
note all beings collectively which would indivi- 
dually be called a man^ without any regard had to 
those attributes in which one man may differ from 



* ** We must here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception^ 
which sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, some- 
times the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. If the word 
be taken in the first sense, [as it always should be,] I acknowledge 
that every act of the mind is an individual act; the universality there- 
fore is not in the mind, but in the object, or thing conceived.'* 

Dfi. Reid. 

What Dr. Reid calls a general conception, is nothing but a complex 
object, of whose distinct attributes we have so many distinct concep- 
tions. We adduce a passage from this author which perfectly expresses 
our opinion. **I apprehend that we cannot, with propriety, be said to 
have abstract and general ideas, either in the popidar or in the philo- 
sophical sense of that word. In the popular sense an idea is a thought; 
it is the act of the mind in thinking, or in conceiving any object This 
act of the mind is always an individual act, and therefore there can be 
no general idea in this sense. In the philosophical sense, an idea is an 
image in the mind, or in the brain, which, in Mr. Locke's system is 
the immediate object of thought; in the system of Berkeley and Hume 
the only object of thought. I believe there are no ideas of this kind, 
and therefore no abstract general ideas. Indeed, if there were really- 
such images m the mind, or in the brain, they could not be general, 
because every thing that really exists is an individual." — ReiiTs Works, 
vol. iii. p. 57. 

R2 



198 Abstraction. 

another. Ma?i also is an abstract term, formed by 
voluntarily conceiving of some things which we have 
found in every individual included under the term, 
while we voluntarily exclude from our conception 
all those minor differences which we discern. One 
man has a white skin; another, a black skin; one 
man is tall and another short; one man crooked and 
another straight; but voluntarily declining to think 
of these things, I conceive of a part of each of 
these individuals, of the intellectual and bodily fa- 
culties of each, for instance, and then judging, that 
the colour of the skin, the length, crookedness, 
shortness and straightness of each individual being 
disregarded, these are essentially alike in their fa- 
culties, I resolve to give each of them the name of 
?nan^ that I may thereby class and distinguish them, 
from beings that do not possess similar attributes. 
FupiL Is abstraction necessary to classificationf 
Professor, Conceive of five objects as perfectly 
alike in all respects as possible. You still find, that 
they are numerically different. If, then, you put 
these five things together into one class, and call 
each apea^ you conceive of each without regard to 
its numerical difference and individuality. You cannot 
therefore classify any two things without abstract- 
ing from the consideration of each its numerical 
difference, if you class them from regard to their 
similarity. 

PupiL Is classif cation essential to abstraction^ so 
that we could not abstract without it? 

Professor, We might abstract had we never be- 
fore classified; but the first abstraction would lay 
a foundation for a classification. Should we consi- 



^ Compounding, 199 

der, for instance, the attribute of a thing without 
regard to the substance of which it is an attribute, 
we should prepare the way for a division of a thing 
into its substance and its attributes. 

Pupil. Mr. Locke speaks of compounding' or 
composing as a mental operation. Do you call this 
a simple or a complex operation? 

Professor, The apothecary compounds^ when he 
conceives of, and selects different substances, and 
amalgamates them, or grinds or mixes them together; 
but of any mental operation of compounding I know 
nothing, by my own consciousness or memory, or 
by the intelligible testimony of others; unless it 
consists in conceiving of one external thing, and 
then of another external thing, and then of the two 
as being so connected or physically compounded, 
as to constitute one complex thing; which is nothing 
different from a simple act of conception, for the 
object of an act of conception may be either simple 
or complex. If it is the union of two things of which 
we conceive, this union is a simple object; but if 
the thing made by union or composition be the thing 
conceived of, it is a complex object of conception. 
For example, I conceive of the word thought^ then 
of the word /w//, then of the U7iiting of the two, 
and then of the compound word thoughtful. Here 
is no mental operation of compounding distinct 
from four successive, simple acts of conception. 



CONVERSATION XVII. 



Improvement and Injury of the Original Faculties of the Mind.— - 
They have their Infantile state. — Exercise and Discipline the chief 
means of their Improvement. — Insanity, a state of mind resulting 
from some Injury. — Dreaming. 



Pupil, Are the original faculties of the mind in 
man capable of any improvement? 

Professor. Every one of them is capable of im- 
provement by exercise and discipline. We may vo- 
luntarily employ one faculty, so as to render many 
of its important operations easy from habit; or we 
may so neglect to employ it, that its operations will 
be comparatively feeble and difficult^ In infancy 
and youth the mental faculties are commonly in a 
feeble, infantile state; and they acquire strength 
with years. 

Pupil. We have a striking example in the facul- 
ty of memory, of the possibility of the improvement 
of our original faculties. I have observed, that per- 
sons who exercise the memory a good deal, commit 
any thing to memory, so as to be able to recollect 
it at pleasure, much more easily and rapidly than 
others who have exercised it less, and than they 
themselves did at first. A child who has learned to 
recite one stanza, will subsequently commit two 



Mental Improvement, 201 

staiizas with more ease, and in less time than it did 
one. 

Professor. Many persons complain of the weak- 
ness and treachery of their memory. They are for- 
getful, and often cannot recollect, because they have 
suffered the faculty to become feeble for the want 
of exercise. 

Pupil Do we not find that some men whose 
other faculties are very energetic, have bad me- 
mories? 

Professor, We do; and we attribute it to the 
fact, that they have exercised their other faculties 
greatly to the neglect of this. These very men, 
however, will generally remember those operations 
of mind which delight them. Hence a philosophical 
and argumentative man, will remember a chain of 
reasoning, when he cannot recollect the precise 
words in which he heard it delivered. He is ac- 
customed to remember reasonings; while others 
who have employed themselves in remembering 
and reciting fine speeches, will be able to reiterate 
an elegant paragraph which they have heard but 
once, without the variation of a word. 

Pupil, Dr. Johnson, I think," remarked, concern- 
ing those who complain of the want of memory, 
that no man forgets the person xvho kicked his 
shins^ 

Professor, It is no less true of the other faculties 
than of memory, that they are improved by exer- 
cise. In this respect, there is a strong analo: be- 
tween the members of the body, and ihe constitu- 
enics of the mind. If any one limb is kept in a state 
of inactivity, it becomes feeble and rigid; but those 



202 Mental Improvement, 

parts of the human frame that are exercised most 
regularly, become most powerful. If men would 
reason more, they would be more capable of reason- 
ing: if they would exercise their judgment more, 
they would be better judges. Even the faculty of 
perception, and the bodily organs of it, are render- 
ed more accurate and capable, by being judiciously 
exercised. 

PupiL Is it the part of wisdom to improve one 
or two faculties exclusively, or even pre-eminently? 

Professor* No better general rule can be given, 
than to employ and improve all mental faculties, 
habits, and dispositions, with due regard to their 
relative importance. A mere man of memory is a 
contemptible being; but the man who has all his 
faculties improved by use, is more likely to obtain 
that happiness which may result from all the con- 
stituent parts of his nature. 

We are in danger of exercising none of our fa- 
culties, except those of conception and feelings too 
much; unless it be from a wrong educatione From 
education some almost exclusively employ the me- 
mory; but if destitute of any injurious, extraneous 
influence, men will commonly indulge themselves 
inordinately in that work of the conception, which 
we call imagination, and in feeling alone. Con- 
science and judgment are most commonly exercised 
too unfrequently. 

PupiL Are our feelings capable of much im- 
provement? 

Professor, It is the business of a physician, par- 
ticularly, to prescribe for the regulation and im- 
provement of our SENSATIONS, becausc they depend 



Mental ImprovemefiU 203 

©n the state of our bodily health and organs, our 
food, our drink, the state of the weather, the quali- 
ty and temperature of the atmosphere, the stimulus 
which we take, and all the various things which 
are used as medicines. The deaf, dumb, and blind 
frequently evince how delicate our perceptions and 
consequent sensations may be rendered by use and 
constant attention. T^e senses which any of these 
persons retain, are generally more acute than the 
same are in those who enjoy the five. 

Our emotions are dependent on previous mental 
operations; and by improving the quality and the 
energy of them, our emotions may be improved. 
We find by experience, that certain thoughts are fol- 
lowed by certain affections; and if we would cherish 
the affections, and frequently enjoy them, we must 
voluntarily exert ourselves to reiterate the thoughts. 
If we find that certain thoughts are productive of 
certain inordinate passions, which are not ultimate- 
ly productive of happiness to us, we should exert 
ourselves to avoid the reiteration of the thoughts 
which occasioned them: and the best way to expel 
one class of thoughts, is voluntarily to attend to 
some other subject. 

We may acquire such self-command over our 
own thoughts, as to attend to any one particular 
subject, to the exclusion of all others, for a consi- 
derable time. 

Our feelings frequently need suppression; and 
the habitual indulgence of them renders us habitu- 
ally sensitive in an unreasonable degree. We may 
avoid the force of many feelings, and the existence 



204 Mental Injuries. 

of others, by immediately recurring to subjects 
which ordinarily excite a different class of feelings. 

Those mental operations which require the most 
exertion, lazy people are the least inclined to per- 
form, and those who would attain to eminence 
should determine by all means to render the per- 
formance of them habitual. 

Men are naturally averse to close attention to any 
subject, and extremely reluctant to study, but habits 
may be formed, that will render idleness, or fre- 
quent revery, burthensome, and regular application 
to business, a source of moderate, but continued 
gratification. 

Pupil May not the mental faculties be injured 
or improved by physical means? 

Professor. Every faculty of the mind, while re- 
sident in the body, is in a greater or less degree 
affected by the state of the body. Excessive eating 
and drinking will for a time benumb all the facul- 
ties; and any one of them, by excessive application' 
may be impaired. Insane persons exhibit numerous 
instances of injury done to the mental facul6es, by 
the imprudent and excessive use of one or more of 
them. 

Pup'iU What is insanity? 

Professor. It is a state of mind in which the 
ment'ril faculties do not operate in a natural manner. 

PupiL What are the most common mental causes 
of insanity? 

Professor. An excessive indulgence of some af- 
fection or passion, is the most common cause of 
permanent madness. Inebriation is a very common 
cause of temporary madness, that not unfrequently 



Breaming, ' 2©5 

terminates in idiocy; which when superinduced may 
be called the paralysis of all the faculties but that 
of perception. 

Pupil. But what do you say of a perfect natural 
idiot? 

Professor, In my opinion, for I have no certainty 
on the subject, a natural fool never had a human 
immortal soul, any more than the brutes have. 

Pupil What sort of a soul has a brute? 

Professor, I will endeavour to answer that ques- 
tion, in a future conversation on comparative men- 
tal science. 

Pupil. Well, Sir, is not dreaming' a species of 
insanity? 

Professor, Any mental operation performed while 
one is asleep, is called dreaming. There is some 
resemblance between the state of an insane person 
and that of a sleeping person who dreams: still 
dreaming is not raving. When one dreams, he does 
not generally think himself asleep; and w^hen one 
is insane, he is very prone to think all other men 
are more mad than himself. In a state of insanity, 
some of the faculties seem to be dormant, while 
others perform strange operations: and in sleep the 
faculties of the dreamer are not all equally active, 
nor equally consistent in their activity. 

Pupil. Do we always dream, when asleep? 

Professor. We do not always remember what 
our minds have been doing, when we were asleep; 
nor can we recollect any considerable portions of 
our mental actions done while we are awake. That 
we do not remember to have been at all times con- 
scious of thinking, feeling, willing, and mentally 

S 



206 Dreaming. 

exerting ourselves, when asleep, is therefore no 
proof that we have not been. That our minds are 
always active, when we are asleep, or in a swoon, 
I cannot affirm; and must therefore leave you to 
form your own opinion, from such facts as may 
occur to you. 

Pupil. In what respects, particularly, do the 
mental operations of a man sleeping, differ from 
those performed by him when awake? 

Professor. A sleeper generally perceives nothing 
through his eyes, ears, nose, or organs of taste,* 
while he has various. perceptions through the organs 
of touching, and many sensations in consequence of 
them. A sleeper is more prone to exercise his fa- 
culty of conception in matters of imagination, than 
when he is awake, and often experiences very lively 
emotions in consequence of them. A dreamer per- 
forms many operations, which he judges, at the 
time, to be acts of seeing, hearing, smelling, tast- 
ing, and touching; but when he awakes, he is in- 
duced to judge, that the objects which he perceived 
had no real existence, or else were perceived with- 
out the intervention of bodily organs. 

Sometimes a sleeper judges his conceptions to be 
perceptions; and this mistake no wakeful person 
makes, unless he is insane. The insane often make 
it. Memory, Judgment, Reasoning, Consciousness, 
Conscience, Feeling, the Will, and the faculty of 
Agencv are also frequently operative during sleep; 
but this peculiarly distinguishes dreaming from 
our waking operations; that our voluntary agency 
upon our bodies is in a great measure interrupted. 
Dreamers commonly cannot speak, and perform 



Dr earning. 2€)7 

other corporal actions which they will, and exert 
themselves, to perform. 

There are some exceptions to this general rule 
concerning the inefficiency of our agency upon our 
bodily members while asleep; for one who walks in 
his sleep, called a somnambulist^ has power over his 
ambulatory members, and sometimes over his arms 
and hands, while his eyes and ears are locked up in 
sleep. 

Pupil, In sound sleep, then, the agency of man 
over his bodily organs and members is in a great 
measure suspended; so that his thinking and wil- 
ling and efficiency do not produce their ordinary 
external effects. 

The judgment, moreover, is given to error, in 
supposing that we perceive, and by our bodily 
members perform, what we neither actually per- 
ceive, nor do, through our bodily members. These 
seem to be the principal differences between a 
dreamer, and a wakeful moral agent. 



CONVERSATION XVIlf. 



Comparative Mental Science. 

Professor, The professor of anatomy frequently 
instructs his pupils in the structure of the human 
frame by comparing it with the frames of different 
animals. I have pursued something of a similar 
course with you, in teaching the science of the hu- 
man mind. I have exhibited to you something of 
the peculiarities of minds not human, that you 
might better understand the operations of the hu- 
man soul. Now let me ascertain what you remem- 
ber of comparative mental science. 

Pupil, Any systematic arrangement of what we 
know concerning different kinds of minds, when com- 
pared with each other, is comparative mental science. 

Of the minds, or souls, of any other beings than 
men we know but little, because we have very few 
means of becoming acquainted with them. Of our 
own mental acts we are conscious, and have me- 
mory, but these faculties afford us no aid in the 
investigation upon M'hich we are entering. 

Professor, What then are our sources <.f know- 
ledge concerning souls superior or inferior to that 
of man? 

Pupil, Reasoning from external indications of 
mental operations, and Kevelation, are our only 



Comparative Mental Science* 209 

sources of knowledge, concerning the souls of brutes 
and angels; and concerning the Uncreated Mind. 

Professor. What is a spirit? 

Pupil, Any thinking, sensitive, voluntary agent, 
that is destitute of a material body, is a spirit. The 
name however is sometimes used as synonymous 
with mind and soul Besides, tnind and spirit are 
used by some writers to denote Consciousness, Con- 
sience, Conception, Judgment, Reasoning, and Me- 
mory collectively, to the exclusion of Perception 
by the senses. Feeling, Volition and Agency, which 
they denote by the word 50m/. Hence some would 
say, that men have both souls and spirits^ but that 
brutes have only souls. 

We use, however, mind and soul as synonymous, 
according to the general custom of mankind, and as 
comprehensive of the whole substance in any indi° 
vidual that thinks, feels, wills, and voluntarily or 
instinctively acts; while we use spirit to denote this 
same substance in a state of separation from a ma- 
terial body. God is a spirit^ without any bodily 
form. 

Professor. What faculties has the Divine Mind? 

Pupil, All the faculties of the human mind, with 
the addition of a faculty of Prescience. His faculty 
of Perception, however, does not operate through 
any bodily organs; nor have we any reason to judge 
that his faculty of Feeling ever is the subject of 
any sensations. 

Professor. Man, it seems then was formed after 

the divine mental image; and although he wants 

prescience^ yet he is able to acquire such judgment 

and prudence as supply its place^ so far as it is de- 

S2 



210 The Divme Mind. 

sirable for creatures, to possess any attribute of 
character resembling it. 

What are some of the principal differences be- 
tween the Divine, and a human, Mind? 

Pupil, The first is uncreated, and self-existent; 
the last is created, and dependent on the first, for 
the commencement and continuance of its exist- 
ence. The Divine Mind is infinite and immutable; 
but the human is finite and mutable. God is eternal^ 
or without beginning and without end; but man is 
only everlastings or without a termination to his 
mental duration. The Agency of God can produce 
substances where nothing before existed; but the 
agency of man has only a very limited power over 
a few things which already exist. 

The Divine Mind is perfectly and immutably 
good in all its operations; but the human is sus- 
ceptible of both good and evil. 

Professor, You cannot proceed much further, 
in this direction, without entering upon the science 
of theology; which would be contrary to our present 
design. 

Let us leave the doctrine of spirits, and attend to 
souls inferior to those denominated human. What 
do you know concerning the souls of brutes? 

PupiL Divine Revelation says little of them. 
It incidentally remarks, however, that the soul of a 
brute goeth downward, at death; by which it is ge- 
nerally understood, that at death the soul of a brute 
is annihilated. 

Our knowledge concerning the souls of animals 
inferior to man is derived from induction and ana- 
logy. We observe the external motions of animals, 



Of the Souls of Brutes. 211 

and attribute them to such mental faculties in them, 
as we know are in ourselves the efficient causes of 
similar external motions. 

Professor, Do all animals possess the ten mental 
faculties which are common to men? 

Pupil. No animal inferior to man possesses them 
all. 

Professor. Is any one of our faculties possessed 
by every animal? 

PupiL The faculty of Feeling is; and every 
creature destitute of this, is denominated a vegeta- 
ble, a mineral, or something besides an animal^ and 
is destitute of a soul. 

Professor. You will find also, I think, that one 
other faculty is common to all. What do you 
understand by a brute? 

PupiL Any animal inferior to the human animal. 

Professor. Have brutes all the various y^^/j/z^* of 
mankind? 

PupiL In general, brutes have no other feelings 
than those denominated sensations. That many of 
them have emotions I am not confident. 

Professor, Have all hr nits- perception? 

PupiL The greater part of them have; and their 
sensations seem to be consequent upon them as in 
men. It is however, very questionable whether some 
brutes have not sensations immediately in conse- 
quence of some impression on their bodies. The 
snail, the oyster, the clam, and several similar ani- 
mals, appear to feel^ but give only faint indications 
oi perception. 

Professor. Let me state to you a fact. Oysters, 
if placed with the concave part of their shells 



212 Of the Souls of Brutes. 

downwards, on your cellar floor, and sprinkled 
with salt water, will, at the time of tide when they 
usually feed, open their pearly lips and drink in 
their accustomed beverage. If you enter the cellar 
when they are feeding and make a noise, or if you 
enter with a lighted candle, they will close their 
mouths in a moment. Do they not hear, then; or 
perhaps hear and see both? 

Pupil, It would be, perhaps, rash to affirm that 
they do not hear; but to me it seems most probable, 
that light and sound acting upon them, produce cer- 
tain sensations, whereupon they instinctively exert 
their faculty of agency in closing their wide mouths. 
Hence we attribute to instinct all their operations. 
Theyy^^/, and act from sensation without any con- 
ception or volition. Instinct in some few animals 
inferior to man, I would say therefore, consists in 
such a relative disposition of the faculties of sensa- 
tion and agency that certain actions immediately 
follow certain sensations. 

Professor. Well, I shall not oppose your theory, 
until 1 have some positive proof to offer in favour 
of the notion that they see and hear. That they do 
something like it, I have already shown. As for 
conception or volition, none ever saw any indica- 
tions of either in them. We may remark, that the 
soul of an oyster, which is destitute of the power 
of leaving its native place, 'is the most diminutive 
soul of which we have any knowledge. The snail^ 
the clam, and other similar creatures, besides the 
power of sensation are capable of IochI motion. The 
clam, upon a perception or as you think a sensation 
from the noise of a foot approaching it on the sand 



Of the Souh of Brutes. 213 

beach, will settle iisclf to the bottom of its hole. 
Sensation and agency if not perception and agency- 
are so connected in its soul, that certain actions in- 
stinctively follow certain sensations. 

Pupil Sensation and instinctive agency^ to a cer- 
tain extent, it seems then, that all animals, even 
clams and oysters, have in common xvith man. 

Professor. Which of our five senses are enjoyed 
by most animalsf 

PupiL All animals I believe are capable of taste 
and touch; so that even oysters have some per- 
ceptions. Many animals are able to smell in addition 
to the two former. The greater number of animals 
have all the five modes of perceiving which men 
have. 

Professor. Have brutes any faculty of under- 
standing? 

Pupil. Some brutes appear to conceive of objects 
of sense, and of these things alone. A horse which 
has been accustomed to company and then is se- 
parated, will, for a day or two, whinny after his 
companion. If he did not conceive of him, when he 
does not perceive him, it seems incredible that he 
should manifest uneasiness at his absence. A horse, 
a dog, an elephant, and most of the larger tribes of 
animals, discover frequently design. There can be 
no design without some degree of understanding. 
The objects of conception to brutes are, however, 
few, when compared with those presented to the 
human mmd. We have no evidence that they ever 
conceive of any of the things denoted by abstract 
terms. 

Professor. Have brutes judgment? 



214 Of the Souls of Brutes, 

Pupil, I think they never conceive of a proposi- 
tion, and consequently never have any operations 
that may be properly denominated judgments. None 
of them I believe reason. None of them have con- 
science. 

Professor. Are any of them conscious of their 
own mental operations? 
. Pupil. If they are, I have no proof of it. 

Professor. Do brutes possess a faculty of me- 
mory? 

Pupil. Some of them appear to, in an inferior 
degree. They have what may be called recognitioUy 
or an act of memory resulting from the repetition 
of any particular perception or conception, but not 
recollection. Recognition is a species of remem- 
brance, that probably is never exercised but in con- 
sequence of perceiving again what has been before 
perceived; or conceiving again that of which the 
brute has before conceived. 

If the horse does not remember any former per- 
ceptions of a companion, why should he whinny 
for him: if a cow does not remember some of her 
notions of an absent calf, why should she bellow 
after it, as she will for two or three days after it 
has been concealed from her? The memory of 
brutes may be co-extensive with their perceptions, 
and their conceptions of perceptible objects. 

Professor. Have any of the brutes a faculty of 
volition? 

Pupil. Some of them appear to conceive of a 
few external actions, and to will the performance of 
them. My horse when weary of confinement in the 
stable, would unhook the door and get out, so that 



Of the Souls of Brutes. ^15 

I was obliged to substitute a padlock instead of a 
hook. He then gnawed the padlock until he found 
it useless. Now unless he conceived of getting out, 
and willed to get out, I cannot assign any reason 
for his ingenious exertions to do it. 

A fox, one should think, must conceive and will 
the performance of his actions, when he takes wool 
into his mouth, and gradually immerses his body, 
beginning with the hinder part, until he has driven 
the vermin on him to the wool, when he abandons 
the wool to the stream. 

If dogs and elephants have conception, and they 
certainly indicate design, then they may conceive 
of something to be done, and will to perform it. 

Most animals, however, appear to act exclusively 
from instinct, instead of conceptions, motives, and 
volitions. 

Professor, You have already said, that brutes 
possess the faculty of feeling, which is the subject 
of sensa«^ions. They have in many instances sym- 
pathetic sensations^ which very nearly resemble 
the affection of pity. A few animals discover feel- 
ings, which if they do not deserve the name of emo- 
tions, are sensations of the highest order. The dog 
and horse, frequently manifest something like love 
and gratitude. An elephant discovers long cherished 
resentment; and most animals in some circumstances 
evince /ear. 

Pupil, To what extent have brutes the power of 
agency? 

Professor, Their faculty of agency operates, I 
believe, exclusively upon their bodily organs, so as 
to produce their accustomed instinctive or voluntary 



216 Of the Souls of Brutes, 

actions. If they have conception, I have no proof 
that they exert any instinctive or voluntary agency 
in conceiving of any thing. They give no evidence 
of voluntary exertions of memory. They have no 
conscience, judgment, or reason, upon which their 
efficiency could be exerted. Have they many m- 
stinctive operations? 

Pupil, I know of no brute that laughs. Several 
of them cry, and moan; two species of them hiss; 
and the greater part of them have all the other in- 
stinctive operations which are common to the hu- 
man family, besides many that are peculiar to them- 
selves. 

Professor, Do brutes form habits of acting? 

Pupil, They are generally as expert in this bu- 
siness as the human species of animals. They seem 
naturally disposed to imitation; and some of them 
very soon learn to imitate every thing which they 
perceive, so far as they have faculties for perform- 
ing similar actions. The horse forms habits of tra- 
velling, and the parrot of imitating the human 
voice; while every tribe of brutes form other habits 
adapted to their nature and state. 

A disposition to imitate is a natural attribute of 
all animals that have perception. 

A disposition to consort with its own species, is 
also common to most animals; and most animals 
are gregarious, or have a disposition not only for 
a companion, but for considerable company. 

Professor, No aninal, however, finds society so 
essential to its happiness as man; and none is capa- 
ble of deriving such benefit or injury from it. 

Have brutes any complex mental operations? 



Of the Souls of Brutes. 2ir 

Pupih None. 

Professor. Are the mental faculties of brutes ca- 
pable of improvement or deterioration? 

Pupil. Their mental faculties may be injured by- 
abuse received from man; but their original facul- 
ties are capable of little improvement; and that chief- 
ly by physical agency on their bodies. Their habits 
may be strengthened or eradicated in some in- 
stances; and their dispositions may be somewhat 
affected by the manner of their treatment. 

Professor. Man appears to hold a middle rank 
between superior and inferior souls. When we con- 
sider the faculties, instincts, habits, and powers of 
brutes, in all their variety, we must exclaim, Horn 
manifold are thy works ^ Lord^ God^ Ahnig-htyJ but 
when we turn to man, A single human mind ex- 
cels them all! 



CONVERSATION XIX. 



lt£capitulation of the Principal Doctrines taught in the preceding 
Conversations. 



Professor. Anyone who would have his pupil 
master of any science, must repeatedly question 
"him, and require a summary of the knowledge 
which he has acquired. I wish you thoroughly to 
imderstand the science of which we have treated; 
I therefore will patiently hear from you a recapitu- 
lation. Begin, if you please. 

Pupil. Science signifies any such mental opera- 
tion as is denominated knowledge. The word is de- 
rived from scio^ to know. 

Any act of consciousness^ or of memory^ and any 
act of constitutional^ intuitive^ or inductive judgment^ 
is called knowledge. 

A particular science is any systematic arrangement 
of knowledge about any particular subject. 

Mental Science is our knowledge of mind sys- 
tematically arranged. 

The Science of the Human Mind is our know- 
ledge of the mind of man systematically arranged. 

The consciousness which mankind have of their 
own mental operations, is the foundation upon which 
this science is erected. 



Recapitulation^ 219 

Any thing which subsists as the subject of inhe- 
rent attributes, is a substance. 

A substance is an object not of perception^ but of 
conception. 

The nature of a substance is known only by its 
inherent attributes. 

All the substances with which we are acquainted, 
may be divided into two classes; the first of which 
includes all material^ and the second, all immaterial 
or mental substances. 

Any portion of a material substance is called 
matter; and any immaterial substance, A mind. 

Any number of organized particles of matter is 
called A BODY. 

A mind connected with a body is called a soul. 

A mi72^ subsisting without a body, or considered 
as separated from it, is called a spirit. 
'^ Some of the inherent attributes of matter, by 
which it is distinguished from mind, are solidity, 
extension, inertness, .mobility, divisibility, and in* 
sensibility. 

The inherent attributes of a mind are its faculties 
of thinking, feeling, volition and efficiency. 

Man, in- his present stkte, is a complex being, 
constituted by two kinds of substances, matter and 
mind. 

The material part of man is so organized as to 
constitute the human body. 

The human mind, and the human body of the 
complex being man, are, to a certain extent, mu- 
tually dependent; and in other respects, severally 
independent, on each other. 

Any thing done by the miri '- is called a mental 



220 Recapitulatioiu 

operation; any thing done by the body, a bodily ope- 
ration; and any operation performed by the co-ope- 
ration of a man's mind and body, is ascribed to the 
complex being, or person, having two constituent 
substances in his nature. 

Professor* Give an example. 

PupiL Reasoning is a purely mental operation; 
involuntary breathings a purely bodily operation: 
and reading aloud^ an operation neither of the mind 
nor of the body, but of the man, performed through 
the co-operation of his two constituent substances. 

Professor* Well: proceed in your didactic man- 
ner. 

PupiL Any operation performed by any single 
faculty of man, is called a simple operation: and any 
work of man, however it may be designated, by a 
single term^ that requires the co-operation of two or 
more faculties, is denominated a complex operation. 

Simple and complex mental operations, are such 
as are performed by one, or more of the mental fa- 
culties. 

Any thing done by the mind, or body, or both, 
is an action; and any action performed in conse- 
quence of a volition to do it, is called an exertion^ 
or an exercise^ or an act of efficiency ^ indiscrimi- 
nately. 

An attribute is any thing attributed tOy or predi- 
cated of, an other. 

All attributes of substances may be divided into 
such as are inker ent^ or such as are extraneous and 
mcidentaU 

Inherent attributes are those which we conceive 



Recapitulation* 221 

of as inhering in the substance to which they belong, 
and which are essential to its existence. 

All other attributes are extraneous and incidental^ 
for the substance to which they appertain may be 
conceived of as existing without them. 

Mankind are conscious of performing ten distinct 
kinds of mental operations. 

We constitutionally judge, that every effect must 
have an adequate cause. 

Man is the efficient cause of all his own mental 
operations. 

That in the original constitution of the human 
mind, whereby it performs any simple operation, is 
a mental faculty, for performing that operation. 

Without the requisite faculty for performing each 
of its own mental operations, the human mind would 
not be an adequate cause of the effects which it 
actually produces. 

An inherent faculty^ is that, in the original con- 
stitution of any substance, whereby it is capable of 
any operation. 

The human mind has ten inherent faculties^ which 
are called The Perception; The Consciousness; The 
Conception^ or Faculty of Understanding; The 
Judgment; The Memory; The Faculty of Reason- 
ings or Induction; The Conscience; The Hearty or 
The Faculty of Feeling; The Will, or the Faculty 
of Volition; and The Efficiency^ or The Faculty of 
Agency, 

Men when awake and sane, perceive external 
objects through the instrumentality of their bodily 
organs of sense. 

Om perceptions may be divided mKofve classes; 
T2 



2^ Recapitulation. 

viz. those of seeing, those of hearing, those of 
smelling, those of tasting, and those of touching. 

Men are conscious of nothing but their own pre- 
sent mental operations. 

Men conceive of everv object of knowledge. Our 
perceptions and the things perceived, our concep- 
tions and the objects of which we conceive, are all 
of them objects of conception. 

Any ideay or notion of a thing, is a conception of 
it. 

All ideas, or conceptions, are simple operations of 
the mind, so that there are neither complex nor ab- 
stract ideas in any mind. 

Abstract terms are names invented to designate 
any one thing in a genus, species, order, province, 
or class of any description, which contains many 
things similar to it, in its distinguishing characteris- 
tics, but dissimilar in some other attributes. 

These terms are called abstract, because we con- 
ceive of each and every thing denoted by them, as 
if they were abstracted from some of the attributes 
which belong to them as individuals, but not to all 
of the same class, that are respectively designated 
by the same general name. 

Professor, Give an example. 

Pupil. I conceive of the meaning of the term 
quadruped. I take away from each and every indi- 
vidual, when I consider it as a quadruped, every 
other attribute than this, that it has four legs* Qua- 
druped is an abstract term. When I call a horse, a 
cow, an ox, a hare, a tiger, a leopard, severally, a 
quadruped, I abstract voluntarily, from my concep- 
tion of each of these animals, their colour, size, 



Recapitulation, 223 

sex, covering, propensities, and all other things in 
which they differ from each other; while I conceive 
of each as an animal having four legs, in which they 
all agree. Instead of having an abstract idea, I con- 
ceive of a name, that is capable of being applied to 
many individual animals, and of describing each in 
respect to one of its most distinguishing charac- 
teristics. 

Professor* I shall divide your discourse into 
several lessons by asking you a question now and 
then. Proceed in your summary of mental science. 

Pupil, The conception of images of things, es- 
pecially of things that we judge to have no real 
existence, is called imagination; and the faculty of 
conception when thus employed, is called the ima- 
gination. 

Discernment^ Comprehension^ Apprehension^ and 
Intuition are other principal acts oi conception. 

The object of every act of Judgment^ is some 
proposition expressed or understood. 

All acts of judgment are such as result either 
from our constitution, or from reflection and expe- 
rience. The former are called constitutional^ the lat- 
ter ttc^wfr^^ judgments. 

For our constitutional judgments we can give no 
other reason than this, that God has so formed the 
minds of men that they naturally form such judg- 
ments. 

Some constitutional judgments are called intuitive^ 
because they immediately result from intuition. If 
we judge a proposition to be true so soon as we 
understand the meaning of it, it is an intuitive 
judgment. 



224 Recapitulation, 

Every proposition, which from bare intuition is 
judged to be true, is called a self-evident propo- 
sition. 

Any proposition which men constitutionally judge 
to be true, is denominated an axiom. 

Our acquired judgments are those which we learn 
to form from reflection, experience, reasoning, and 
attention to testimony. 

Believing^ or an act offaith^ is an acquired judg- 
ment; which has some proposition, which is the 
subject of testimony, for its object. 

Memory h2is ioY its object in every mind, some 
of the past mental operations of that mind. 

An act of memory consequent on a volition to 
employ the memory upon the subject, is called re- 
collection or reminiscence. Any act of memory not 
immediately resulting from voluntary exertion, is 
called remembrance. 

Logic is the science of reasoning. Reasoning is 
the act of inferring a conclusion from some con- 
templated premises. 

Axioms, or self-evident propositions, lie at the 
foundation of every system of reasoning. 

We must argue from things known to things un- 
known. 

Every act of perfect reasoning includes three 
propositions; the two first of which are called pre- 
mises^ and the last the conclusion^ or inference. 
These three propositions, so connected as to frame 
an argument, are called a syllogism. 

When one of the premises is generally admitted, 
and so well known, that it is not stated, the argu- 



Recapitulation. 225 

merit, consisting of two propositions, is called an 
enthymeme. 

Any act of reasoning in which the premises are 
unquestionably true, and the conclusion necessarily 
follows from them, is called a demonstration. 

In probable reasonings^ the premises are proba- 
bly^ but not certainly true. 

All our reasonings may be considered as either 
analogical or synthetical^ according as we reason 
from effects to causes, or from causes to effects. 

Our inferred judgments we often reverse, from 
discovering some defect in the premises whence 
they were deduced; but our constitutional judg- 
ments are never changed. 

Professor. Your next lesson is concerning Con- 
science, which is often called the Moral Sense, 

Pupil. Conscience always has for its object some 
moral laxv^ moral agent^ or moral action. 

A moral law is any rule of conduct laid down for 
the governnjent of an intelligent, sensitive, volun- 
tary agent, or efficient. 

A physical law is any general observation con- 
cerning any uniform physical operations, descriptive 
of those operations. 

A physical action is any operation of an involun- 
tary agent upon mind or matter. 

A m.oral action^ as distinguished from a physical 
action, is any action of an intelligent, sensitive, vo- 
luntary agent, that is either required or forbidden, 
and so to he judged of, by some moral law. 

In the judgment of the moral law, which God 
has given man, those actions of man, and those 



226 Recapitulation. 

alone, which God has either required or forbidden, 
arc moral actions. 

Breathing, and the circulation of the blood, for 
instance, are neither required nor forbidden by the 
law of our Maker, because they are natural opera- 
tions; and they are neither morally good nor mo- 
rally evil. Nevertheless, they are operations predi- 
cable of man; and of man too, consisting of body 
and mind, for so soon as the mind is separated 
from the body, breathing and the circulatioii of the 
blood cease. 

Conscience either approves or -disapproves of some- 
thing of a moral character. 

No operation of conscience can be opposed to a 
man's present judgment: but many are the instances 
in which the dictates of conscience are hostile to 
our present feelings. 

We have now treated of seven kinds of mental 
operations, any one of which is called a thought. 
We have spoken of seven mental faculties, that 
perform these seven kinds of thinkings which are 
denominated together The Understanding, 

The Understanding therefore, besides a faculty 
of understandings includes six other intellectual ia-- 
culties. 

Professor* Very good: now pass to the Faculty 
of Feeling, 

Pupil, The operations of The Heart are always 
consequent upon some previous thought. 

Our feelings may be divided into two great 
classes; the first of which contains all our sensa- 
tions; and the second, all our emotio7is. 



Recapttulatio7u 227 

Our three most powerful sensations are called 
appetites. 

Every sensation is consequent upon some opera- 
tion of the faculty oi perception* 

Our emotions are either affections or passions; 
and are consequent upon some other kind of thinking 
than that called perception* 

The Will is that mental faculty by which a man 
chooses, resolves, or determines. 

Any act of the will is called a volition* 

Every volition has for its object some contem- 
plated action^ which a man conceives himself to be 
capable of performing. 

Any thought or feelings or complication of 
thoughts or feelings, or of both, that is the true 
reason why any volition is performed, is the motive 
to that volition. 

No rational man ever had a volition without 
some motive to that volition. 

Any one who has a volition without some motive 
of which he himself conceives, is either a fool or a 
madman* 

The immediate consequcQce of volition is the 
exertion of our faculty of agency, so far as we have 
the power of doing what we will. 

The mental faculty of effciency operates directly 
upon some of the mental faculties, and indirectly 
upon others. 

It is the province of man's effciency to perform 
what he wills. 

So far as any one can do this, he has the power 
of voluntary agency. 

Man's power of voluntary efficiency is finite, and 



228 Conclusioti* 

circumscribed by such laws as his Creator has been 
pleased to establish. 

Thus we have briefly surveyed the operations of 
man's ten mental faculties, which are the inherent, 
and essential attributes of his mind. 

Professor. The incidental attributes of the human 
mind have been treated of in such a concise manner 
in the preceding conversations, that a recapitulation 
is needless. Permit me to express a hope, that you 
will frequently re-consider the doctrines you have 
learned, and grow in knowledge through eternity. 



THE ENB. 




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